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ABSTRACT 
 
 The first process of transitional justice in Colombia was implemented in 2005 through the 
Law of Justice and Peace (LJP) that focused on the demobilization of paramilitary groups under 
the government of Alvaro Uribe Vélez. Although the LJP has received multiple criticisms, state 
bureaucracy has portrayed forensic intervention as ‘the great success’ of the transitional justice 
process.  
In this dissertation, based on 11 months of ethnographic research in Colombia, I explore 
whether an efficient methodology existed on the part of forensic state agencies in order to find 
and identify the remains of forcibly disappeared persons and the role(s) that families have played 
in the forensic process from the investigation to the return of the remains of their relatives. 
Results indicate that despite the fact that there was a solid instrument like the National Search 
Plan for Disappeared Persons, the plan was irregularly and incompletely implemented. In fact, 
the search for the disappeared was mainly based on testimonial evidence provided by 
perpetrators, which was almost never verified and/or compared to other sources of information as 
it was assumed that the confession was true. This led to unmethodical archaeological recoveries 
and problems with the identification of remains as these almost always lacked a presumptive 
identity. Regarding the participation of families, results suggest that relatives have been treated 
more as sample donors than as active subjects in the forensic process.  
Finally, I examine if families’ perceptions of truth, justice and reparation have been 
fulfilled by forensic networks in the framework of the LJP. Results indicate that a ‘transitional 
friction’ occurs when the homogenizing concepts and ideas promoted by the discourse of 
transitional justice lift up particular understandings of truth, justice and reparation and ignore 
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local perceptions of victims and grassroots communities. Particularly, I highlight as problematic 
the fact that forensic evidence, and thus, ‘forensic truths’ have not been used to aid judiciary 
investigations to reveal the responsibilities in the perpetration of the crime of forced 
disappearance, thus contributing to the impunity that is still enjoyed by many state agents who 
participated in this and many other crimes perpetrated in the company of paramilitaries.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation arose from two questions that consistently came up in my work as 
forensic anthropologist at the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences 
(INMLCF) in Colombia between 2010 and 2012. The first was: what are the best strategies and 
methodologies to search for and find victims of forced disappearance in a country with a 50-year 
internal armed conflict that has left around 200,000 casualties and more than 80,000 
disappeared? And, what impacts -positive and negative- have forensic sciences had in the lives 
of the families of the disappeared? These questions emerged at a time when Colombia was just 
beginning to implement transitional justice mechanisms through Law 975 of 2005, also called 
the Law of Justice and Peace (LJP), that focused on the demobilization of paramilitary groups 
under the government of Alvaro Uribe Vélez. The law established a system of disarmament 
based on the free will of the paramilitary to confess the events in which they participated, 
including information on the whereabouts of the disappeared. In exchange, the paramilitary 
would receive a sentence of five to eight years in prison regardless of the types and/or number of 
crimes committed. 
The concept of transitional justice emerged and developed in the 1990s, and by 2000 was 
already adopted by scholars and policy makers as different countries were experiencing 
transitions from dictatorial regimes to democratic systems (Bell 2008). Transitional justice has 
been defined as the adoption of a series of political, economic and social changes to address past 
abuses and achieve democracy (Uprimny and Saffon 2005). Other scholars have broadened its 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	   	  	  
2 
definition to the application of a series of mechanisms to respond to past human rights violations 
in the transition to democracy while improving economic development and social justice (Hinton 
2010a). Those mechanisms include, but are not limited to, trials, amnesty agreements, truth 
commissions, lustration policies, reparation and reconciliation programs, exhumation and 
identification of victims, reparation policies, and programs of reintegration and disarmament of 
combatants from illegal armed groups. Although transitional justice instruments have been used 
to transition from war and/or conflict to democracy, the use of these instruments has expanded 
into already democratic countries interested in addressing past human rights abuses (Winter 
2014).  
 The roots of transitional justice go back to the establishment of international tribunals in 
1945 and 1946 to prosecute individuals from Nazi Germany and Japan for atrocities committed 
during World War II (Hinton 2010a). However, the formal origin of transitional justice began in 
Latin America in the mid 1980s when many of the countries that suffered repressive regimes 
began to establish democratic processes. In the complex transition to democracy, procedures to 
redress past wrongs advanced through the creation of truth commissions, national trials and 
international courts. Unfortunately, as these mechanisms began, the governments of such 
countries passed laws to limit or prevent the prosecution of perpetrators and in some occasions 
amnesties were offered (Doretti and Fondebrider 2001). For example, Chile and Argentina 
passed amnesty laws in 1978 and 1990, respectively. The aim of such laws was to avoid future 
investigations and trials for the crimes committed in the context of the dictatorial regimes 
established in both countries (Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006). Dictatorships in the 
Southern Cone were inspired by the Cold War and encouraged by the anti-Communist policy of 
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the United States to target insurgency movements and leftist militants. In Chile, after having 
provided pardons to perpetrators, the government of Patricio Aylwin established a truth 
commission in order to reveal the crimes perpetrated by government officials and the military, 
thus privileging truth over justice (United States Institute of Peace n.d.). Nevertheless, at the 
beginning of the 2000s in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, impunity laws expired or were declared 
unconstitutional, thus judiciary files were reopened allowing the prosecution of former members 
of security forces (Penchaszadeh 2015; Pizarro 2007). 
 On the other hand, judicial mechanisms were applied from the onset in Bosnia and 
Rwanda in the 1990s to respond to large-scale human rights abuses. The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), established in 1993 by the United Nations (UN), 
aimed to address the conflicts in the Balkans by prosecuting those individuals most responsible 
for appalling acts such as murder, enslavement, torture and rape. The ICTY has addressed crimes 
committed from 1991 to 2001 and it is particularly known for indicting the perpetrators of the 
Bosniak Muslims genocide that occurred in Srebrenica in 1995 (Schabas 2001; Wagner 2008). 
Likewise, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) aimed to prosecute the 
perpetrators of the Tutsi genocide occurred in 1994 that took the lives of over one million people 
(Cobban 2007; Morris and Scharf 1998; Pham, Weinstein, and Longman 2004). Although the 
positions that assume that by holding individuals accountable for serious crimes, future crimes 
would be deterred and reconciliation would be achieved have been highly questioned (Arzt 2006; 
Burnet 2010; Leebaw 2008), the establishment of international tribunals was key to the 
advancement in the development of international jurisprudence on crimes against humanity, 
genocide and war crimes as well as for the education of lawyers and researchers interested in 
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international criminal law (Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006). Additionally, the swing 
toward justice was furthered by the 1998 Rome Statute and the subsequent establishment of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), which began functioning in 2002 (Hinton 2010a). 
Of the non-judicial mechanisms applied in the framework of transitional justice, truth and 
reconciliation commissions are perhaps the most common. Two of the most famous are the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa and the Guatemalan Historical 
Clarification Commission (CEH). The TRC, created in 1995, had three objectives: document 
human rights abuses that occurred in the context of racial segregation known as Apartheid; 
provide recommendations for the reparation and rehabilitation of victims, and offer amnesty to 
perpetrators (Quinn and Freeman 2003). On the other hand, the CEH, established in 1994, aimed 
to investigate the numerous human rights violations that occurred during the armed conflict in 
Guatemala between 1962 and 1996. The CEH examined details of particular cases and provided 
recommendations to the government regarding reparations. Although peace and reconciliation 
efforts of truth commissions have been questioned by some scholars because, as they argue, they 
might sharpen social and political differences or cause re-traumatization of victims (Quinn and 
Freeman 2003), truth commissions can also constitute important mechanisms for 
comprehensively dealing with a legacy of mass abuse.  
When transitional justice became a multilevel policy response applied by governments as 
well as an academic field of study, it rapidly became popular in theory and practice as it was 
assumed that it could work as a magical ‘toolkit’ to rebuild broken societies and failed states 
(Hinton 2010a). Nevertheless, transitional justice has been the subject of scrutiny and strong 
criticism. Some of the recurrent criticisms are that transitional justice is a manipulative discourse 
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employed by governments that use the human rights jargon to cover impunity as it has happened 
in Colombia (Uprimny and Saffon 2005), as will be discussed in this dissertation. Others state 
that transitional justice cannot be a coherent concept if the application of mechanisms to achieve 
its goals are challenged and questioned (Bell 2008). Additional criticism indicates that when the 
only vehicles to achieve significant changes in the path to democracy are state institutions that 
design policies and make decisions on their own, the mainstream discourse of transitional justice 
might not resonate with communities and direct victims that are supposed to be the recipients of 
such policies at the local level (McEvoy 2008). Others see it as a ‘soft option’ for societies in 
transition whose states do not seek accountability and “do not want to have (m)any prosecutions” 
(Sarkin and McAuliffe 2017) as exemplified by the case of Mozambique where the General 
Peace Agreement (GPA) of 1992 gave Frelimo soldiers and Renamo insurgents a blanket 
amnesty for all civil-war era political violence healing  (Cobban 2007).  In this case, amnesties 
were given on the basis of an agreement towards reconciliation but without the creation of a truth 
commission as it was considered that “the African culture functions under a principle of 
forgiveness not confrontation, and such a commission would open wounds of war already in the 
process of healing” (Lundin Baptista 2004, 16). 
The application of transitional justice in Colombia has not been free from criticism and 
extensive debate either. On the one hand, Colombia is one of the few examples where we see the 
implementation of transitional justice in a ‘pre-post conflict’ society (Theidon 2007).  As I write 
this dissertation, Colombia is experiencing the incorporation of former Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) combatants into society after the peace accord signed 
between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and FARC in 2016. However, the continued 
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existence of groups such as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), the criminal bands 
(Bacrim), the dissidence of the FARC, and especially the drug trafficking, continue to make the 
armed conflict a current phenomenon. This has sparked debate inside and outside academia due 
to the complexity of achieving goals such as justice or reconciliation in a context where there is 
truly no transition towards peace (Díaz 2008).   
On the other hand, the agreement signed between former president Uribe Vélez and the 
paramilitary organization Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) was perceived as a way to 
offer impunity to victimizers and consolidate power relations developed over the last few 
decades between the political class and the paramilitaries (García-Godos and Lid 2010). In 
addition, it is widely recognized that there was no real dismantling of the illegal structures of 
paramilitary armed groups because the heirs of the AUC reconfigured into emerging criminal 
gangs known as ‘Bacrim’ (Guembe and Olea 2006; Baquero 2014). Additionally, the 
government paid no serious attention to the rights of victims especially in terms of truth, as 
victims claim that paramilitary confessions have only revealed half-truths as exemplified by the 
lack of criminal investigations of the multiple state agents implicated in the crimes perpetrated 
by paramilitaries (Verdad Abierta 2015a; Verdad Abierta 2015b). Furthermore, the 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs that emerged with the LJP 
have failed to consider how to move beyond demobilizing combatants to facilitating social 
reconstruction and reconciliation (Theidon 2007).  
Nonetheless, a particular aspect of the LJP that has attracted the attention of victims, 
nongovernmental organizations and forensic practitioners alike is that the ‘Justice and Peace 
process’ has been shown as the great success in terms of the search for remains of disappeared 
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victims. As my fellow colleagues and I remember, 2010, 2011 and 2012 were particularly busy 
years at the INMLCF due to the boom of exhumations resulting from the forensic interventions 
under the framework of the LJP. State agencies in charge of forensic recovery and analyses 
strengthened their institutions with the recruitment of new forensic practitioners, especially 
anthropologists, who travelled across the country searching for remains of disappeared persons. 
As databases of different governmental entities were filled with information, so were the 
morgues and the laboratories of forensic anthropology stacked with hundreds of remains. The 
demands to forensic experts increased, focusing especially on the identification of the recovered 
remains. It seemed that the Fiscalía General de la Nación1 was in a hurry to show the government 
the tangible results of the negotiation with the paramilitaries. Despite the fact that exhumations 
have decreased in number since 2012, forensic practitioners have continued to work hard to 
identify the recovered remains. 
The search for the disappeared and the location of multiple clandestine graves as a result 
of the transitional justice process has unveiled the different modus operandi of the paramilitary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 Fiscalía General de la Nación is the institution that conducts criminal investigations and has a 
staff of forensic practitioners under its CTI (Technical Investigation Body) office. The CTI 
conducts fieldwork and post-mortem examinations. The DIJIN (Directorate of Criminal 
Investigation and Interpol - National Police) is the second agency that conducts exhumations and 
recently began conducting post-mortem examinations. For its part, the INMLCF is mainly in 
charge of conducting post-mortem analyses and very rarely conducts exhumations. All agencies 
are state institutions. Although there is no clear criterion as to which cases are exhumed or 
examined by which agency, all cases with soft tissues involved must go to the INMLCF for 
analysis. The Exhumation Prosecutors from Fiscalía are the persons who organize the search and 
exhumation activities across the country and coordinate with DIJIN to organize the teams that 
conduct recoveries in case they need DIJIN personnel. All three agencies, CTI, DIJIN and 
INMLCF respond to the Fiscalía. In other words, all forensic reports are submitted to the 
prosecutors from the Fiscalía.  
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groups and the diverse methods of torture used before the disappearances and subsequent 
murders (Verdad Abierta 2015b). Likewise, Colombian society has not only learned about the 
existence of mass graves, but also of exhumations and experts like forensic anthropologists. At 
the same time, just as it has happened in other countries, in the context of the LJP, the forensic 
sciences have been portrayed as tools of social repair to redress past wrongs.   
Thus, exhumations and identifications have been pivotal to the mainstream discourse of 
transitional justice that identifies forensic intervention as a way to find truth and achieve integral 
reparation2.  
 
Human rights investigations, post-conflict intervention and forensic sciences 
 
 Different scholars have documented the beginning of the forensic human rights 
movement in Argentina following the repressive military regime established by the military junta 
from 1976 to 1983 (Arditti 1999; Doretti and Fondebrider 2001; Haglund and Sirkin 2002; 
Rosenblatt 2015; Smith 2017). Families of over 9,000 disappeared, particularly the 
Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo, demanded external intervention and found support from the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science. In association with the National 
Commission for the Disappeared (CONADEP), the grandmothers urged the involvement of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 According to the LJP and the Unidad para las Victimas (Unit for Victims), ‘integral reparation’ 
entails a series of economic and symbolic measures that include a public recognition of having 
caused harm to the victims and a public declaration of remorse on the part of the perpetrators. It 
also implies the collaboration of perpetrators in the search for missing persons. In addition, the 
state must guarantee the rights of victims to education, health, housing, employment programs 
and income generation, among others, as well as actions to restore their dignity and memory, and 
facilitate truth recovery. Furthermore, the state has to guarantee that events like those suffered by 
victims do not happen again.	  
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	   	  	  
9 
forensic science in the investigation of the disappearances and part of the result of such effort 
was the foundation of the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (EAAF) in 1984 (Arditti 
1999; Doretti and Fondebrider 2001). In addition to the advancements in forensic anthropology, 
the work of the grandmothers emphasized the need to include genetics as the instrument to 
identify the remains of their disappeared and murdered children as well as the grandchildren 
abducted by the regime. The implementation of forensic genetics resulted in the foundation of 
the National Genetic Data Bank (Arditti 1999; Smith 2016). 
Following the Argentine experience in Latin America, countries like Guatemala and Peru 
also saw the emergence of independent forensic anthropology teams (Guatemala’s Forensic 
Anthropology Foundation- FAFG; Peruvian Team of Forensic Anthropology- EPAF) by the end 
of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s respectively. Their work has focused on the recovery 
and identification of victims of forced disappearance and extrajudicial executions from the 
military dictatorships that occurred in Guatemala in the 1980s and the internal armed conflict 
that took place in Peru between 1980 and 2000. 
Another geographical focus in the history of human rights forensics is the former 
Yugoslavia, where the multiple crimes perpetrated against members of various ethnic groups 
urged the investigation and prosecution of heads of state, prime ministers, military and police 
leaders from various parties (United Nations, Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia N.D). 
One of the incidents investigated by the ICTY was the 1995 genocide of over 8,000 Bosniaks 
(boys and men), which emphasized the need of DNA testing to identify victims in the aftermath 
of mass atrocity. However, when the ICTY began operations, it hired forensic teams to collect 
evidence that could serve prosecutorial purposes. The use of forensic evidence with prosecutorial 
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and not humanitarian goals created an enormous tension between tribunals and families, as 
relatives demanded to know the whereabouts of their missing loved ones, the identification of the 
remains as well as their repatriation. Put another way, victims were not simply demanding justice 
but the scope of the tribunal did not include the identification of victims (Cordner and McKelvie 
2002; Wagner 2008). Later on, with the aim of responding to the families’ demands for 
identification and repatriation, the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) as well 
as other local and international organizations intervened. The Bosniak genocide provided 
forensic practitioners with technical and methodological challenges to recover and identify the 
remains given that Bosnian Serb perpetrators moved bodies from primary to secondary and even 
tertiary gravesites (Skinner, York, and Connor 2002; Wagner 2008). 
Forensic intervention in past and present conflicts, whether it has been the opening of 
mass graves, post-mortem anthropological examinations, or the application of DNA technology 
in an effort to achieve positive identifications has been the subject of extensive examination not 
only by forensic practitioners themselves, but also by social scientists, particularly cultural 
anthropologists. A number of scholars have examined the role of science in the service of human 
rights focusing on the many political and ethical dilemmas faced by the forensic community in 
the aftermath of conflict (Claude 2002; Corillon 1989; Doretti and Fondebrider 2001; Haglund 
and Sirkin 2002; Kinsella and Blau 2013; Kirschner and Hannibal 1994; Williams and Crews 
2003), while others have focused on the importance of developing and following standards and 
guidelines in international forensic intervention (Baraybar, Brasey, and Zadel 2007; Blau 2006; 
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Cordner and McKelvie 2002; Keough, Simmons, and Samuels 2004; Skinner, Alempijevic, and 
Djuric-Srejic 2003; Tidball-Binz 2006). 
Beyond the politics and ethics of international forensic investigations, one of the most 
appealing themes explored by social scientists has been the politics of memory, and how 
objections to exhumations, whether political or religious in nature, have played a role in the 
many ways memory is and can be exercised (Crossland 2000; Ferrándiz Martín 2007; Rosenblatt 
2015). Argentina represents one of the best examples of how exhumations and identifications 
have been interpreted by some victims as tools of false closure that are detrimental to the purpose 
of maintaining a living memory3. Likewise, other works centered in the Spanish Civil War have 
examined how executed bodies subject to indifference and oblivion for many years, have 
suddenly emerged into the public sphere posing challenging questions about the social 
management of the conflict in present and future times (Ferrándiz Martín 2013; Jerez Farrán and 
Amago 2010; Renshaw 2011). 
An additional issue of reflection and study has been the participation of families in the 
search for and the identification of missing persons (Aronson 2011; Robins 2011; Sanford 2009; 
Wagner 2016). Scholars specifically question if families have been essentialized to the search for 
missing persons or have been overlooked and made invisible in the forensic process. For 
example, early in 2018 at an event held in Bogotá on “The search for missing persons in truth 
processes” organized by Revista Semana, Luis Fondebrider, director of EAAF explicitly referred 
to this topic. Fondebrider stated that one of the lessons learned by EAAF in the multiple 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3 This is particularly the case of the Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo for whom 
exhumations, reparations and commemoration are tools that facilitate oblivion of the injustices 
suffered by their children (Marcos 2008; Rosenblatt 2015). 
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countries where they have intervened, is the need to incorporate families into the forensic 
process as active participants because a common mistake made across different contexts is 
“seeing family members simply as sample donors.” According to his statements, the relatives 
and the organizations that represent them should be part of the decision-making processes along 
with state officials and other personnel especially in the search processes because the 
information they provide may be key to find disappeared persons (Revista Semana 2018). 
Along the same lines, other scholars have examined the competing demands of relatives, 
courts and tribunals, transitional governments, and scientific practice (Crossland 2013; 
Rosenblatt 2015; Tidball-Binz 2006) exploring how forensic evidence illustrates the complex 
networks of the living and the dead. Additional works have focused on the cultural aspects of 
forensic intervention, particularly the existence of ‘improper burials’ (e.g., mass graves or 
clandestine graves) (Eppel 2006; Eppel 2014; Hepner and Steadman 2016) in East Africa, “and 
the ways in which these affect survivors and their spiritual, communal, and cultural aspects of 
‘closure’ as well as social practices” (Lopez-Cerquera 2018) 
A more recent examination of international forensic investigations has concentrated its 
attention on the role of genetics as a tool of transitional justice. Some topics explore forensic 
DNA and kinship analysis as tools of social and political care (Smith 2013) or the way forensic 
genetics has shifted from a human rights science practice to an apolitical and neutral practice 
(Smith 2017). Other subjects include the examination of DNA as a form of ‘re(con)stitution’ as it 
offers individual restitution via biological identifications, while it is also constitutional as it 
entails “new modes of postviolence reckoning” (Smith 2016, 1052) as exemplified by the context 
in Argentina where identifications have become pivotal for transitional justice and democratic 
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accountability. Additional topics examine DNA testing and its relation to ‘individuated 
memorialization’ and notions of care of the war dead (Wagner 2013); or the ways in which 
forensic genetics have produced unintended consequences such as the deepening of ethnic 
divisions and the construction of narratives and counter-narratives of victimization and 
accountability as happened in Bosnia (Wagner 2008; Wagner 2010). 
The growing literature on the application of forensic sciences as a tool of transitional 
justice in conflict and post-conflict settings illustrates the nuanced and complex world of social 
relations, culture, history and politics in which forensic intervention is inserted.  
 
Project rationale and research questions  
 
As described earlier in this chapter, the LJP marked the beginning of the implementation 
of transitional justice in Colombia, a process that was key to the advancement of forensic 
sciences to respond to the victims’ right to know. In an effort to comply with international law, 
specifically to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (CIDH) who has held that victim-
survivors or their next-of-kin have the right to know what happened, as well as the circumstances 
in which their loved ones died (Kovras 2017; Laplante and Theidon 2006), different institutions 
in Colombia drafted the National Search Plan for Disappeared Persons in 2007. This plan 
included three stages, starting with a preliminary phase that involved the collection of 
information that would help document the cases through the use of various sources of 
information; the verification phase, which implied the comparison and confrontation of 
information, and a final phase that integrated the recovery, analysis and identification of human 
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remains, all processes based on the Minnesota and Istanbul protocols (Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2017; Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 2004). One important aspect of the plan is that it acknowledged 
the need to take into account the needs of families as well as the incorporation of international 
standards in the process of investigation, search and identification (Ramírez 2016). 
The design of the National Search Plan for Disappeared Persons in some ways recognized 
the problems that the authorities were facing in terms of documentation of information such as 
the lack of formal reports filed by families and local communities that could offer contextual 
information on the cases, and the existence of thousands of unidentified remains in different 
public cemeteries from which many could correspond to victims of forced disappearance; an 
issue also pinpointed by Gómez and Patiño (2007) that had to be addressed by the National 
Search Plan. 
The continued perpetration of forced disappearance in an ongoing conflict raised a 
number of issues to forensic teams, including the existence of landmines that jeopardized their 
lives. In addition, the lack of a unified registry on the total number of disappeared persons posed 
challenges to those in charge of executing the National Search Plan for Disappeared Persons. 
However, the Plan seemed to be a solid starting point in the development of specific procedures 
by the Fiscalía to focus on each of the phases envisioned by those who drafted the Plan. 
Nevertheless, when exhumation activities increased exponentially between 2010 and 2012 it 
seemed that from the two starting phases of the search plan (data collection and verification), the 
Fiscalía was prioritizing confessions by paramilitaries over other sources of information 
(including information from families or the organizations that legally represented them) once 
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judiciary processes started. Soon, revelations by perpetrators became essential to the location and 
identification of victims of forced disappearance, or so state officials stated.  
Nevertheless, for those of us (forensic practitioners) who mainly worked on post-mortem 
examinations and less on forensic recoveries, it was unclear if the location of clandestine 
gravesites or public cemetery burials as sites of interment of disappeared persons were the 
product of confessions by paramilitaries or the collaboration of families in the search process or 
a combination of different sources applied as part of a systematic methodology. In other words, 
for forensic practitioners who worked in the laboratories there was no socialization on what the 
National Search Plan for Disappeared Persons was and how our work was a key part of the final 
phase of the plan. This situation evidenced the overall weak communication between and within 
state agencies in charge of forensic intervention and ultimately the deficient inter-institutional 
articulation in the search and identification of remains.  
 Due to the emphasis put on perpetrators and their confessions portrayed by the Fiscalía 
as ‘the ultimate source’ to find the disappeared, my first two research questions are: has there 
been a consistent and efficient methodology or procedure practiced by forensic agencies to find 
and identify the remains of forcibly disappeared persons in the process of transitional justice? 
And, what has been the role of families in the forensic intervention, beginning with preliminary 
investigations and ending with the return of remains of their loved ones? 
The first two research questions of this dissertation aim to critically evaluate the forensic 
process that undertook the search and identification of disappeared persons, acknowledging that 
the Colombian forensic apparatus (human resources, technologies, infrastructure and economic 
resources) was less than ready to undertake the titanic task of locating and identifying thousands 
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of human remains in the shortest possible time. My purpose in examining the existence or 
absence of methodologies or procedures in the search for and identification of disappeared 
victims and the role(s) that families have played in the forensic intervention is to propose a 
critical discussion that explores the contradictions of the interests raised by state bureaucracy –or 
its rhetoric- regarding finding and returning the disappeared to families and what actually occurs 
in practice.  
The second part of this study that goes hand in hand with my first research question is an 
interest to examine forensic intervention and social repair as a problematic combination that 
creates assumptions on the side of state bureaucracy but also expectations on the part of families 
and victims’ organizations. For instance, the mainstream discourse of the LJP assumes that the 
search, identification and return of remains are tools of symbolic reparation that serve families’ 
personal needs, such as ameliorating the pain and perhaps recover from the ambiguous loss 
stemming from not having information on whether the loved one is alive or dead (Mladina 
2016). On the other hand, forensic intervention is considered a critical means in the path to 
achieve justice, truth and reconciliation and is part of an “international toolkit of reconstruction 
and repair” (Smith 2017). The research question that stems from the latter assumption is the 
following: are families’ perceptions and expectations of truth, justice and reparation, which are 
the main tenets of the LJP, fulfilled by forensic networks (forensic experts, resources, knowledge, 
institutions)?  
To conduct a critical examination of forensic intervention in the context of transitional 
justice, I unfold the complexities of assuming forensic sciences as mechanisms of social repair 
especially in a context where despite the advancements in the recognition of the victims’ rights, 
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families of the disappeared still seek to be heard and recognized not only by a state that has been 
more than absent, but also by a society that has traditionally been indifferent to the tragedy of 
forced disappearance. 
 
Theoretical Orientations 
 
This study is engaged with two trends in scholarship: 1) Science and Technology Studies 
and 2) The anthropology of transitional justice.  
Science and Technology Studies (STS) arose as an academic field when sociologists, 
scientists and historians began to examine the relationship between science, technology and 
society (Sismondo 2010). Scholars were particularly interested in the ways in which scientists, 
scientific discoveries and technologies intertwine with law, ethics, public policies, politics and 
other elements of the social world. One of the main proponents of the field of STS is Bruno 
Latour whose works have examined what science is and how it is produced (Latour 2003; Latour 
and Woolgar 1986). Latour (2003) has argued that science is surrounded by a complex network 
of relations in which scientists, funding agencies, lawmakers, government officials and other 
actors contribute to the production of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, Law and Hassard 
(1999) have suggested that scientific activity is a complex system of social relations and cultural 
practices that revolve around the production of knowledge where strong power relations are 
established and complex social networks are constructed. 
Research produced under the umbrella of STS has explored not only how human societies 
produce and use (collectively and individually) science and technology, but also the benefits, 
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dangers and expectations of the advancement of science and technology. Therefore, STS studies 
have examined the cultural, political and ethical effects of scientific knowledge and the ways in 
which people appropriate science and technological innovation. Within the realm of STS studies 
is the Actor-Network Theory (ANT), a framework to understand processes of technological 
innovation and scientific knowledge creation. ANT understands objects, ideas, people and 
processes as equally important in the production of science and technological achievements 
(Callon 1984; Law and Hassard 1999; Law and Lodge 1984). Thus, for ANT humans and non-
humans are equivalent aspects of actor-networks. This methodological approach is called the 
‘principle of generalized symmetry’ (Toom 2016) where humans and non-humans (e.g., objects, 
technologies, organizations and structures) are assigned equal amounts of agency.  
In recent years, the body of sociological studies of forensic science has grown 
substantially exploring topics related to technologies of remembrance and memorialization; the 
assumption of DNA as a truth machine; the contingencies and uncertainties of scientific evidence 
production; the implication of bodies in legal regimes, and questions of ownership over 
identified and unidentified remains in disaster contexts, amid other issues. Various combinations 
of these topics have been explored by different scholars (Bennett 2014; Evison et al. 2012; 
Haimes and Toom 2014; Lynch and Jasanoff 1998; Lynch et al. 2008; Petrovic ́-S ́teger 2009; 
Scully 2014; Smith 2017; Toom 2012; Toom 2016; Wagner 2013; Williams and Wienroth 2014), 
with attention to how these matters are part of a complex network “where inter alia forensic 
science, bodies and body parts, standardization, bereaved families, kinship, bureaucracy, politics 
and legal decisions intersect” (Toom 2016, 689).  
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In this research, I identify forensic sciences as a network of scientists, resources, legal 
institutions and law enforcement that link up with public policy, law and politics (Lynch and 
Jasanoff 1998; Toom 2012) effecting the lives of different participants who take part in human 
rights investigations. Furthermore, stemming from the ANT approach, I consider bodies and 
human remains along with technoscience4 equally relevant in the production of science as a form 
of post-conflict intervention. As argued by Crossland (2013), human remains have been used as 
evidence of past events and deployed as evidence for different ends, either legal, scientific or 
historical or even a combination of the three.  
In this project, I examine if and how the investment in technoscience brought about by 
the LJP was part of procedures and methodologies designed to locate and identify victims of 
forced disappearance. Furthermore, I investigate the role of families in the network of forensic 
sciences and if they have been understood as “partners and knowledge producers in their own 
right” (Smith 2017, 406) at all levels of forensic intervention, or if their participation is simply 
relegated to donate samples and be sources of ante-mortem information (Smith 2017).  
In addition, I explore how forensic science networks in the context of transitional justice 
create assumptions on the part of state bureaucracy and scientists, related to the ways in which 
the social fabric of a community or a society can be rebuilt, repaired and restored after mass 
atrocity. At the same time, I study how forensic sciences entangled with a law of transitional 
justice are used as powerful tools of knowledge production especially truth-making, highlighting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4 Technoscience is a subsection of STS that explores the intimate connection between science 
and technology and understands technological innovation as a necessity for scientific knowledge 
to advance. Technoscience opens up new possibilities that come to be gradually perceived as 
necessities (Lukes 2004). Technoscience in this research is understood as scientific expertise, 
technology, labs and human resources.  
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the forensic and judiciary truths and silencing other understandings of truth. The examination of 
the silences imposed on different truth perceptions, and other local understandings of additional 
notions that are part of transitional justice is directly related to the second theoretical orientation 
that I use in this work: the anthropology of transitional justice.  
In the emergent field of anthropology of transitional justice, disagreements between local 
and global transitional justice imperatives, particularly the tensions between theory and practice, 
have been the source of recent scholarly attention (Kim 2017). Hinton and colleagues (2010) for 
example, have explored the friction of the global-local encounter, also called ‘transitional 
frictions’ and the ways in which global conceptions and mechanisms of justice are experienced 
and translated on the ground. Along the same lines, other works have critically examined the 
appearance of new forms of accountability claims for past crimes as part of the social and 
political tensions of post-conflict contexts (Ferrándiz Martín 2013; Theidon 2006; Wilson 2003); 
the clash between former combatants’ perceptions and experiences and the mainstream state 
discourse of justice and reintegration (Theidon 2007); the testimony of violence as a way of 
breaking with conventional notions of reconciliation (Castillejo-Cuellar 2013); and the need for 
‘anthropological translators’ to assess needs, evaluate risks, and use participatory action in 
transitional justice developments (Kim 2017), among other studies. 
Revisiting the question of how forensic sciences are used as influential tools of 
knowledge production, I take a bottom-up approach to explore how families and victims’ 
organizations perceive forensic science networks in the context of transitional justice and create 
expectations around them. Moreover, I study the transitional friction that occurs when the 
homogenizing concepts and ideas promoted by the discourse of transitional justice lift up 
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particular understandings of truth, justice and reparation and ignore local perceptions of victims 
and grassroots communities.  
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CHAPTER 2. METHODS 	  
In the summer of I started to design the dissertation project, the aim of which was to 
evaluate the process of transitional justice in Colombia as a result of the LJP. My initial purpose 
was to investigate if confessions by perpetrators have aided in the location of remains of victims 
of forced disappearance and their impact on the forensic activities conducted by state agencies to 
search and identify those remains. Additionally, drawing from the existing scholarship of the 
growing field of anthropology of transitional justice, I was also interested in exploring the 
perceptions of families of the disappeared on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the LJP to 
meet their rights as well as their expectations. In order to evaluate if such questions were viable 
to later construct a more solid dissertation proposal, I made a first trip to Colombia between June 
and August of 2015. The aim of such preliminary visit was to assess if I would have access to 
data from Fiscalía and if I could establish participation interest from potential interviewees. 
Part of my knowledge on how forensic activities were conducted in Colombia comes 
from the fact that I worked as full-time forensic anthropologist at the INMLCF for over two 
years. This previous experience offered some advantage as part of my interest in the preliminary 
phase was to contact some prosecutors I worked with in the past as well as some of my peers in 
anthropology and other related forensic fields to make sure they would eventually participate as 
interviewees in my study. 
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Summers of 2015 and 2016: preliminary fieldwork 
An initial preliminary fieldwork phase was conducted in part of the summers of 2015 and 
2016 in order to obtain a better understanding of the process of transitional justice and the roles 
and opinions of various individuals who participate in different ways in the application and 
reception of mechanisms of transitional justice. This phase took place in the cities of 
Villavicencio, Bogotá, Cali, and Medellín (Figure 1) as some of the participants that I would be 
formally interviewing in the future resided in these towns.  
Those summers, I sustained open informal conversations with forensic anthropologists, 
odontologists and medical examiners from Fiscalía and from the INMLCF. As a result of those 
conversations I started to build my informants database using purposive sampling and snowball 
methods. 5  This database contained preliminary information not only on each potential 
interviewee and their associated agency, but also new names of prospective interviewees from 
additional agencies or organizations. In addition, I contacted the exhumations prosecutor of the 
Fiscalía in the Meta region, with whom I had worked in the past, whom assured that I would 
have access to the databases from the office of Fiscalía in the Meta region. This meant having 
access to information provided by perpetrators, by the family or the community, the forensic data  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5 Purposive sampling is also known as selective or subjective sampling in which the researcher 
relies on his/her own judgment when choosing members of a population to participate in a study 
(Web Center for Social Research Methods n.d.). Purposive sampling is useful for situations 
where researchers need to reach a targeted sample quickly.	  Snowball sampling occurs when a 
group of people recommends potential participants for a study, or directly recruits them for the 
study. Those participants then recommend additional participants, thus the sample group appears 
to grow like a rolling snowball. I used both methods because although having worked at the 
INMLCF gave me some networking, there were forensic professionals, prosecutors, state 
officials and other participants that I did not know and my peers could put me in touch with them 
for potential recruitment as interviewees.  
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Figure 1. Political map of Colombia. (Retrieved from 
https://www.mapsofworld.com/colombia/colombia-political-map.html, Accessed July 9 of 
2018). Fieldwork took place in the Meta, Cundinamarca, Valle del Cauca, Antioquia, Sucre, 
Boyacá, and Casanare regions. 
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ranging from site location, burial type, forensic findings, as well as information on the names and 
contact information of the relatives who provided a biological sample to aid in the identification 
process of each of the cases in this region.   
By the end of the preliminary phase, I also came in contact with family organizations, 
such as the Association of Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared (ASFADDES) and 
Familiares Colombia (Relatives Colombia), as well as with the non-governmental organization 
Colombian Interdisciplinary Team for Forensic Work and Psychosocial Assistance (EQUITAS), 
and sustained informal spontaneous conversations with some of their members. Additionally, I 
attended public hearings (versiones libres) of two members from the ‘Bloque Centauros’ from 
the AUC, who, in three days listed in front of the prosecutor (but did not explain in any detail) 
the crimes they remembered having perpetrated; confessed about a number of graves that they 
had pending to help locate; and explained the power networks inside their organization. 
Attending the hearings gave me an initial idea of how the judiciary process worked and the 
actors that participated in the process. 
Preliminary results from this research phase indicated that confessions by perpetrators 
have aided in the location of a number of bodies of victims of forced disappearance, but 
confessors have also revealed incomplete truths to the judicial system. According to some 
members of family organizations, this has to do with the fact that perpetrators have not provided 
all the names of the state agents with whom they collaborated in multiple crimes, including 
forced disappearance. Furthermore, forensic practitioners questioned confessions as the best 
source of information to locate remains, arguing instead that the information provided by local 
communities in the regions was much more reliable. Additionally, forensic experts and family 
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organizations indicated that very often the information provided through confessions had not 
been verified, which ultimately affected the victims’ right to truth and right to know. Moreover, 
some potential interviewees stated that the participation of families in the process of transitional 
justice had been very poor as relatives had not been able to refute the versions provided by 
perpetrators during public hearings or contribute to the investigation to facilitate a better 
understanding of past criminal events.  
Likewise, family organizations and non-governmental organizations argued that Fiscalía 
had been conducting exhumations for the practical purpose of verifying death as evidence of the 
confessed crimes, but not with the aim of carefully reconstructing the fatal events that 
surrounded the death. This effort according to different organizations would be key to contrast or 
complement the confessions provided by paramilitaries. In addition, as indicated by EQUITAS, 
the potential use of contextual evidence recovered by forensic teams could be used to not only 
reconstruct circumstances of death, but also to provide important information on burial patterns 
and systematic use of certain geographical areas for the concealment of bodies. This information 
could potentially be used to develop methods based on scientific research that could aid in the 
location of remains. Finally, I learned that there is a tremendous lack of personnel and supplies to 
respond to the number of forensic cases pending analysis, which evidently affects the families 
who often times have been waiting for years before being able to provide proper burial to their 
loved ones.  
In August 2016 I returned to the United States, refined my research questions, presented a 
project proposal and obtained IRB approval (UTK IRB-16-03104-FB). The research methods 
approved by the IRB committee were: archival research, purposive and snowball sampling 
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methods to recruit participants for interviews, application of semi-structured interviews,6 and 
participant observation. For the interviews it was agreed with the IRB committee that I would 
apply waiver of consent, hence none of my informants’ names would be collected and none 
would sign informed consent given the political situation in the country and the active internal 
conflict that could jeopardize the jobs and/or the lives of some of my interviewees despite the 
transitional justice process with the paramilitary and the ongoing peace process with the FARC. 
 
December of 2016 to July of 2017 
 
My official fieldwork started in December of 2016. The Meta region was selected as the 
primary center for fieldwork since Fiscalía-Meta allowed me to conduct archival research, they 
agreed to put me in contact with families and would facilitate my participation as an observer in 
exhumation activities conducted in this region. However, additional regions where fieldwork 
took place were Cundinamarca, Valle del Cauca, Antioquia, Sucre, and Boyacá as interviewees 
resided in these departments. 
The first two questions of my dissertation are as follow: has there been a consistent and 
efficient methodology or procedure practiced by forensic agencies to find and identify the 
remains of forcibly disappeared persons in the process of transitional justice? And, what has 
been the role of families in the forensic intervention, beginning with preliminary investigations 
and ending with the return of remains of their loved ones? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6 All semi-structured interviews can be found in the appendix of this work. 
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Before evaluating if forensic institutions had implemented consistent methodologies or 
procedures in the search process and identification, I first had to examine if perpetrators had met 
the requirement of confessing the whereabouts of disappeared persons and, if as stated 
informally by Fiscalía, confessions had been in fact an effective source of information. Then, I 
would examine how confessions fit the preliminary and verification phases of the National 
Search Plan for Disappeared Persons and if the Plan was in fact the basis of a methodology 
applied by the Fiscalía in the search for the disappeared. Thus, I started by conducting archival 
research by examining the databases and the figures from Fiscalía as well as the publications by 
EQUITAS that consolidated statistics on the sources of information used in the location of 
disappeared persons. Additionally, I conducted semi-structured interviews of state officials, 
including exhumation prosecutors from Fiscalía, members from Defensoría del Pueblo 
(Ombudsman); the Tribunal de Justicia y Paz (Court of Justice and Peace); the Unidad para las 
Víctimas (Unit for Victims) and from the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (National 
Center of Historic Memory) to verify that paramilitaries had systematically provided information 
on the location of remains. Additional data to verify the same information was obtained from 
semi-structured interviews of family organizations and non-governmental organizations listed 
below in this section. All participants were recruited through purposive and snowball sampling.  
With the aim of evaluating if state agencies had implemented systematic procedures 
(methodologies, logistics, scientific practices and standardized procedures) in the search, 
recovery and identification of disappeared persons, and if families had been active participants in 
the forensic process, I first examined the legislation that provided a framework to those activities 
aimed at finding the victims of forced disappearance (Law 589 of 2000, Law 975 of 2005 and 
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Law 1408 of 2010) and the programs and teams of organizations that resulted from the 
establishment of such laws. Moreover, I studied the existing Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) as well as additional forms and documents related to the processes of search, 
identification and return of remains from each of the three agencies that conduct forensic 
investigations. Additionally, I conducted participant observation of search and exhumation 
activities in Meta and in the Sucre regions to observe first-hand the plans and procedures put in 
place by forensic agencies.  
I attended a total number of four exhumation activities, each typically lasting from two to 
15 days, in which the remains of thirty-three (33) individuals were recovered. Exhumations took 
place in Meta, Casanare and Sucre. Some remains were found in clandestine individual graves 
and some others in individual or mass graves at public cemeteries. Fieldwork notes were taken to 
later facilitate ethnographic analyses of each of the activities. Through the use of snowball and 
purposive sampling I selected participants and conducted semi-structured interviews with 
forensic practitioners (anthropologists, pathologists, odontologists and geneticists), exhumation 
prosecutors, non-governmental organizations, and family organizations who actively participate 
in exhumation activities, as well as families (see section below) in order to assess the efficacy of 
state procedures.  
The final research question of this dissertation inquires: are families’ perceptions and 
expectations of truth, justice and reparation, which are the main tenets of the LJP, fulfilled by 
forensic networks (forensic experts, resources, knowledge, institutions)?  
To evaluate the expectations and perceptions of families on truth, justice and reparation in 
the context of forensic intervention, I conducted semi-structured interviews with family 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	   	  	  
30 
organizations and non-governmental organizations selected through purposive sampling. 
Additionally, I contacted a total number of eighteen (18) families with the help of Fiscalía, and 
divided them according to the following criteria: six families who had already received the 
remains of their loved ones and provided proper burial according to personal and family beliefs 
(group 1); six families who reported the disappearance of their family member(s) but Fiscalía 
had not found the remains (group 2); and six families who had reported the disappearance of 
their loved ones but Fiscalía had not performed any action to date to find the remains (group 3). 
Semi-structured interviews of families were not limited to a single family member but ranged 
from one to four members, depending on the number of people that happened to attend the 
meetings scheduled ahead of time. Thus, often times I agreed to meet one member of the family, 
but the person attended the interview with one, two or three more members who were willing to 
participate as informants. A total of 40 family members were interviewed. Tables 1 to 5 provide 
the list of participants and organizations interviewed, as well as the locations where interviews 
took place. 
As explained in this chapter, the methods applied in this research ranged from semi-
structured interviews with different focal groups, to the application of participant observation 
during exhumation activities and archival research mainly focused on data provided by Fiscalía. 
The following chapter lays out a brief historical account about the paramilitary violence in 
Colombia. Furthermore, it helps identify important moments as well as key players in the 
development and consolidation of paramilitarism.  
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Table 1.  Interviewed state officials and place of interview 
State agency Number of participants Place of interview 
Defensoría del Pueblo 2 Bogotá 
Fiscalía (Exhumation prosecutors) 3 Bogotá 
Villavicencio 
Sincelejo 
Unidad de Víctimas 2 Bogotá 
Tribunal de Justicia y Paz 1 Bogotá 
Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 1 Bogotá 
Total 9 
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Table 2. Interviewed forensic practitioners and place of interview 
Forensic agency Number of participants Place of interview 
Fiscalía (CTI) 15 Bogotá 
Cali 
Medellín 
INMLCF 10 Bogotá 
Cali 
Medellín 
Tunja 
DIJIN 1 Bogotá 
Total 26 
   
 
Table 3. Interviewed members of family organizations and place of interview 
Family organization Number of participants Place of interview 
ASFADDES 1 Bogotá 
Familiares Colombia 1 Bogotá 
Total  2 
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Table 4. Interviewed members from non-governmental or hybrid organizations and place          
of interview 
 
Non-governmental organizations  Number of participants Place of interview 
EQUITAS 1 Bogotá 
COMISION COLOMBIANA DE 
JURISTAS (Colombian Commission of 
Jurists CCJ) 
2 Bogotá 
MOVICE (Victims’ Movement of State 
Crimes) 
2 Bogotá 
Villavicencio 
ICRC (International Committee of the 
Red Cross) (hybrid organization) 
2 Bogotá 
Medellín 
Corporación Colectivo Sociojurídico 
Orlando Fals Borda 
1 Bogotá 
 
Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz 1 Medellín del Ariari 
Total 9 
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Table 5. Interviewed families in the Meta region 
Families Number of participants Place of interview 
Group 1 (6 families) 13 Villavicencio 
Group 2 (6 families) 12 Villavicencio 
Acacías 
Medellín del Ariari 
Group 3 (6 families) 15 Bogotá 
Villavicencio 
San Martín 
Medellín del Ariari 
Total   40 
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CHAPTER 3. OVERVIEW OF THE PARAMILITARY VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 
 
This chapter presents an account of the context in which paramilitarism emerged in 
Colombia: its rapid growth in the 1980s; the legal and illegal actors that contributed to its 
development; the heyday period and the activities and crimes that have characterized the 
paramilitary groups. When the paramilitaries emerged at the end of the 1970s, there were four 
guerrilla movements in Colombia: the FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN), the People’s 
Liberation Army (EPL), and the April 19th Movement (M-19), although in the next decade 
additional movements emerged.  
The guerrilla struggle was the product of a series of social conflicts that had their roots in 
the period of ‘La Violencia’ (from the mid-1940s to the early 1960s). In those years, liberal and 
conservative militants engaged in a war over land and power (Molano 2015) where oppressive 
groups known as ‘los pájaros’ (both liberals and conservatives) began to expropriate the lands of 
peasants by establishing regimes of terror and launching a security model based on violence. As 
a result, many peasants decided to organize into liberal guerrilla groups under the influence of 
the socialist model of the Soviet Communism, which was oriented towards a revolutionary 
model. The emerging liberal guerrillas guided peasant groups to dispossess and redistribute other 
lands, especially those of powerful landowners. The violence experienced had a special character 
of class struggle, as the elites (many of whom illegally appropriated thousands of hectares of 
peasants land) engaged in a political confrontation where there was only room for two political 
parties. Therefore, the politicized state, instead of protecting its peasants, went against them. The 
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newly armed groups decided to organize into ‘Repúblicas Independientes’ (Independent 
Republics), which were small territories without state control. However, in an attempt to harass 
these groups and end the outbreaks of armed violence that began to emerge in these areas, the 
military bombed these territories with the advice from the United States’ government. Part of the 
response to those attacks was the creation of the FARC in 1964, the first official revolutionary 
guerrilla movement in Colombia. The ELN, also born in 1964, incorporated the Cuban model 
ideology which was a nationalist project that did not follow the model of the pro-Soviet 
communist parties but advocated for the restoration of democracy through a voluntarist model 
(Luna Benítez 2006). This model supported the idea that the revolution had to be an act of will 
and it had to be brought to the poor, thus the ELN progressively gained support from various 
social movements as well as sectors of lower class neighborhoods tired of the abuse of the 
political class. 
In the framework of the Cold War, foreign policy concerning Latin America under both 
Truman and Eisenhower in the United States focused on the control of a communist threat 
through the establishment of a unified hemispheric defense. Such defense was predominantly 
achieved through supporting right-wing military dictatorships and signing mutual defense 
treaties, to which Colombia was a part (Lee 2017). Thus, the attacks to the Independent 
Republics were part of the counter-insurgency project and a way to secure that the Colombian 
government stayed allies with the United States. Such was the influence of United States in 
Colombia that the latter continued receiving increasing amounts of military aid and by the 1970s 
it became the third-largest recipient in Latin America. The true objective of American aid to 
Colombia, according to Lee (2017) was about preserving pro-US government rather than 
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countering narcotics especially if taken into consideration that the sowing and traffic of coca did 
not start until the 1970s.  
By 1978 the FARC had about 800 combatants and the ELN had 25 and both were 
beginning to expand across different territories. At that moment, the ELN was concentrated in 
the Magdalena Medio region, yet since the FARC had more combatants, it began spreading to 
the departments of Tolima and Meta by the end of the 1970s. FARC activities largely depended 
on the extortion of big landowners and by the beginning of the 1980s their survival also relied on 
the confiscation of coca from those who would soon become big drug traffickers and the 
extortion to mining and oil companies (Cadavid 2010). 
On the other hand, modern paramilitary or self-defense groups in Colombia have two 
foundational milestones that occurred nearly at the same time. The first took place in 1979 when 
Henry de Jesús Pérez unofficially formed the first self-defense group in the Magdalena Medio 
region in response to the constant abuse of power by the FARC guerrillas. De Jesús Pérez, a 
peasant whose family was constantly blackmailed by FARC, received support from the military, 
ranchers, political leaders and representatives from the Texas Petroleum Company with the aim 
of counteracting FARC guerrillas (Ronderos 2014). At the same time, another self-defense group 
called ‘Los Escopeteros’ (shotgun men) emerged in the area led by Ramón Isaza, one of the first 
farmers of the Magdalena Medio region, who initially formed a group with eight peasants with 
the aim of fighting the guerrillas who stole their livestock and extorted them. By 1981, Los 
Escopeteros joined the organization commanded by de Jesús Pérez and founded the Self-defense 
Forces of Puerto Boyacá (ACMM) based on the Decree 3398 of 1965 and Law 48 of 1968 that 
provided citizens with gun permits (Baquero 2014). The aim of such legislation was to aid 
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civilians in their fight against communism. Hence, citizens began to organize and defend their 
lands and properties with the collaboration of the military. However, rather than just defending 
their lands, de Jesús Pérez began to launch offensive anti-subversive operations and executed 
people suspected of sympathizing with any guerrilla group (Baquero 2014). Also in 1981, de 
Jesús Pérez received support from José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha, the most influential drug 
trafficker of the moment to combat guerrillas that were charging drug-traffickers with taxes on 
the transport of drugs in territories controlled by guerrillas, mainly the FARC. 
The second milestone occurred in Medellín, when as a response to the kidnapping of a 
member of Los Ochoa (a well-known family of drug traffickers in Antioquia) by urban guerrilla 
M-19, 223 drug traffickers, including Pablo Escobar, Carlos Lehder and Rodríguez Gacha, 
joined forces and created a group called Muerte a Secuestradores (Death to Kidnappers) (MAS) 
(Baquero 2013). In this way, the armed structures of the Medellín Cartel began to enjoy great 
popularity through the creation of the MAS, the first group of modern paramilitaries in the 
country. Shortly after, the two milestones converged as some drug traffickers joined the Self-
defense of Forces of Magdalena Medio (Puerto Boyacá), to the point that the most important 
paramilitary leaders became members of the Medellín Cartel (Baquero 2013). By 1983, MAS 
had already killed more than 100 people, including union and peasant leaders as well as 
communist politicians in different regions of the country with support from the police and the 
military (Baquero 2014; Ronderos 2014). That year, as explained by Ronderos (2014), the Self-
defense Forces of Magdalena Medio created the first military training schools. The first one, 
named ‘El Tecal,’ targeted peasants to train them on the use of weapons while encouraging 
hatred against guerrillas and communism. Paramilitary commanders who would become famous 
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by the mid 1990s, such as Fidel and Carlos Castaño, were trained in these self-defense schools 
that later spread to all the Magdalena Medio region and departments such as Meta, Córdoba and 
Cundinamarca (Baquero 2013). 
 
The hatred against leftist political organizations is strengthened 
 
In 1984, the government of president Belisario Betancur and the leaders of the FARC 
signed the ‘Uribe Agreements,’ in which the two parties committed to a ceasefire agreeing that a 
year after cessation of armed confrontation, members of the insurgent group would organize 
politically, economically and socially according to their free will. In this context the Patriotic 
Union (UP) emerged in 1985 as the leftist political movement associated to the FARC, that 
would serve as the platform to promote the social, economic and political changes needed in the 
consolidation of peace (Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo 2006). Meanwhile, the 
military stood against the peace policy promoted by the government and kept supporting self-
defense organizations to the extent that, in complicity with a number of politicians and 
paramilitaries, the military created the Peasant and Farmers Association of Magdalena Medio 
(ACDEGAM) as a façade to manage the finances of the Self-defense Forces of Puerto Boyacá 
(Ronderos 2014). For its part, the United States sabotaged the ceasefire and peace talks by 
pursuing “counterinsurgency and supply side policies against all leftist movements, which 
exacerbated social and political conditions in the country” (Lee 2017). 
The model of Self-defense Forces of Puerto Boyacá was later imported to other regions in 
the country by local politicians and landowners who saw in this organization a way to solve their 
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fight against the UP and the leftist movement Nuevo Liberalismo (New Liberalism) (Ronderos 
2014). This movement was led by politician Luis Carlos Galán, who was assassinated in 1989 by 
the Self-defense Forces of Puerto Boyacá in association with the Medellín Cartel and the 
Administrative Department of Security (DAS).7 
 By the end of 1985, the UP had already recruited people from the Communist Party, and 
even from the two traditional parties (liberals and conservatives), as well as artists and 
intellectuals, civic organizations, peasants, indigenous, and women’s organizations. This 
plurality was made possible because the UP, rather than being a political party, was a broad 
movement open to all who shared its central beliefs of democracy and social justice. The UP 
participated for the first time in the elections of 1986 achieving important results: 14 
congressmen, 18 deputies and 335 councilors. Additionally, its presidential candidate, Jaime 
Pardo Leal, received 10% of the votes in the country, which was very impressive for an 
independent party (Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo 2006) in a country where there 
was still only room for liberals and conservatives.  
Right after their first participation in elections, militants and political figures from the UP 
began to be assassinated, including two presidential candidates (Pardo Leal, who was killed in 
1987 by Rodríguez Gacha, and Bernardo Jaramillo who was apparently killed by Escobar in 
1990), nine congressmen, 70 councilors, dozens of deputies, mayors, and leaders of community 
boards, among others, without any state institution that could impede the ‘political genocide’ or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7 The DAS was a state agency in charge of intelligence and counterintelligence in Colombia. The 
DAS disappeared in 2011 after being infiltrated by the paramilitaries during the government of 
Alvaro Uribe Vélez. It was also discovered that during Uribe’s term, some of its employees were 
conducting illegal call interceptions to opposition leaders, magistrates, journalists and 
government officials. 
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would clarify the crimes and punish the perpetrators (Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear 
Restrepo 2006). The truce signed by president Betancur with FARC in 1984 failed as a result of 
the extermination campaign against the UP as well as the counterinsurgency fight fueled by the 
United States. However, between the signing of the truce with Betancur’s government and the 
failure of the negotiation, the FARC continued to grow. Between 1984 and 1987 at least a dozen 
more fronts emerged to complete 39 total. The growth of fronts was significant in Meta, 
Putumayo, Huila, Cundinamarca, Santander, Casanare and Norte de Santander, with emphasis on 
the eastern mountain range; also in the south of Bolívar, Antioquia and Chocó. Fronts also 
formed in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and additional fronts emerged in Valle, Cauca, 
Huila and Tolima (Llorente and Deas 1999; Verdad Abierta 2008). The incursion of the FARC in 
the drug trafficking business, no longer by means of the extortion of drug traffickers but through 
its transition to drug production allowed the FARC to grow significantly to the point that by 
1985 they already had 3000 combatants (Verdad Abierta 2008). 
 By the end of the 1980s, president Virgilio Barco signed peace agreements with different 
guerrilla groups: the M-19, the Quintín Lame Armed Movement (MAQL), the People's 
Liberation Army (EPL), the Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT), the Socialist Renewal Current 
(CRS), a dissident group from the ELN, and urban militias (Valencia and Mejía 2010). The 
processes of demobilization of different guerrillas in the early 90s responded to a progressist 
context and a political and cultural opening to issues of cultural diversity in the country. These 
trends were very strong and ended in the drafting of the Constitution of 1991, which recognized 
the civil, social and cultural rights of Colombian citizens. This time marked an optimistic 
atmosphere associated to the peace process between the government and the M-19 guerrilla, a 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	   	  	  
42 
group that understood the need to be incorporated into civilian life to be able to contribute to 
democracy. The M-19 also recognized that it was essential to lay down arms because the 
Colombian conflict was degraded by the influence of drug trafficking, the kidnapping practices 
and the degradation of values that had been the basis of the emergence of the guerrillas. It was 
perhaps the ideal time for self-defense groups to also lay down their weapons and negotiate with 
the government. Except that did not happen.  
In 1989, tensions arose between drug traffickers Pablo Escobar and both de Jesús Pérez 
and Rodríguez Gacha. However, Colombian authorities killed Rodríguez Gacha in December of 
that year leaving Pérez alone to fight Escobar. Feeling threatened with death, de Jesús Pérez 
appealed to president Cesar Gaviria in 1990, arguing that he and his group were willing to 
disarm. But it was too late. Their marriage with drug traffickers, in addition to the massacres and 
assassinations perpetrated made it impossible for the government to sign a peace agreement with 
the self-defense forces. In July of 1991, de Jesús Pérez was finally killed by hitmen in the service 
of Escobar (Ronderos 2014). 
Shortly after in 1992, former partners of Escobar, the Cali Cartel, military members and 
Fidel Castaño organized against Pablo Escobar. His enemies formed an organization called ‘Los 
Pepes,’ designed with the sole purpose of defeating him, as Escobar had become a terrible 
extortionist. In addition, Escobar had begun to assassinate government ministers, a move with 
which not all his allies were in agreement (Baquero 2013; Ronderos 2014). The death of Pablo 
Escobar, on December 2 of 1993, apparently at the hands of the Colombian government, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), marked 
the end of the coalition between Los Pepes. Some of the members of Los Pepes would 
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subsequently consolidate themselves as leaders of self-defense groups that would later join under 
the umbrella of the AUC. 
Soon after Escobar’s death, the government of Cesar Gaviria promoted surveillance and 
private security cooperatives known as CONVIVIR (Cooperatives of Surveillance and Private 
Security) that would operate in combat zones where public order was precarious. The 
CONVIVIR was a form of legal organization created to provide landowners with mechanisms to 
defend their lands from threats by the remaining guerrilla groups FARC and ELN (Baquero 
2014). The creation of the CONVIVIR coincided with United States’ military aid which reached 
a record of US $73 million under Bush’s government in the military fight against guerrillas as 
these very guerrilla groups have been the same ones demanding social reform that could threaten 
American economic interests in Colombia (Lee 2017).8  
The creation of the CONVIVIR allowed the paramilitary to grow tremendously through 
different groups that started to be noticeable in different parts of the country. One of these groups 
was the Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba and Urabá (ACCU) led by Carlos Castaño, 
who, after killing his brother Fidel Castaño in 1994, positioned himself before public opinion 
with a nationalist and counterinsurgent discourse. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8 For example, it has been recognized that Colombia is not only the regions gateway to South 
America thus having a strategic economic and geopolitical location, but also that “it is one of the 
United States’ most important Latin American and Caribbean energy suppliers in both present 
and future forms via extensive untapped oil/coal reserves and already established pipelines and 
open-pit mines” (Brittain 2009). 
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The	  expansion	  of	  paramilitary	  power 
 
By 1997 the paramilitaries had their power already consolidated in the Urabá, Antioquia, 
Chocó, Cesar, South Bolívar, Sucre, Llanos Orientales and Tolima regions. That year, they were 
responsible for 70% of the political assassinations in the country and finalized the year with the 
consolidation of most paramilitary groups into one: the AUC. According to Duncan (2006), 
Carlos Castaño managed a successful process of unification during the period of 1995-2000. His 
formidable structure had national coverage and initially included five regionally-based 
paramilitary blocks: 1. Bloque Norte: Córdoba-Bolívar-Magdalena; 2. Bloque Nutibara, 
Antioquia; 3. Bloque Central de la Zona Cafetera y Valle; 4. Bloque Medio Cundinamarca-
Tolima and 5. Bloque Casanare-Meta. The AUC was used as the flag that represented a political-
military anti-subversive fight that, according to Carlos Castaño, used drug trafficking as a means 
but not as an end (Baquero 2014). 
In 2001, other AUC paramilitary commanders had already positioned their power in other 
regions, including capital cities (Figure 2). These were Miguel Arroyave, Daniel Rendón 
Herrera, aka ‘Don Mario’ and Fredy Rendón Herrera aka ‘El Alemán.’ Arroyave had control 
over the new Bloque Centauros in the Llanos Orientales; bought a franchise of the AUC from 
Carlos Castaño for 7 million dollars and founded the Bloque Capital in Bogotá with 2000 men 
(Baquero 2013). The aim of this block was to control the major smuggling centers of the city, the 
prostitution businesses and other illegal activities to finance the Bloque Centauros. Due to 
internal conflicts in the organization, Arroyave was killed in September of 2004. Fredy Rendón  
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Figure 2. Paramilitaries from the AUC. Medellín, June 2002. Photo by Jesús Abad 
Colorado (Ponce de León and Abad Colorado 2015). 
 
 
on the other hand, operated in Urabá, Antioquia, and was known by his close friendship with 
Carlos Castaño, and military General Rito Alejo del Río. In this context, Arroyave, ‘Don Mario,’ 
‘El Alemán,’ as well as Diego Fernando Murillo, aka ‘Don Berna,’ and Carlos Mario Jiménez, 
aka ‘Macaco,’ among others, “went from being exclusively associated with drug trafficking to 
becoming powerful paramilitary commanders, whom, according to their rhetoric, trafficked 
drugs only to finance their political struggle although that, of course, was not true” (Baquero 
2014, 554). At the same time, simple landowners also known as ‘pure paramilitaries’ like 
Salvatore Mancuso, Ramón Isaza and Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, aka ‘Jorge 40’, among others, 
became drug traffickers who inherited the routes and contacts of the drug cartels of the 1980s. 
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They all consolidated paramilitary organizations with great political power to the extent that it 
was the paramilitary commanders who ultimately decided which governors would be elected in 
the regions where they operated (Baquero 2013). Thus, the apparent difference between 
camouflaged drug traffickers and pure paramilitaries is “a sophism launched from the AUC, 
promoted by the national government and disseminated by mass media” (Baquero 2014, 554). 
Meanwhile, the power and expansion of the FARC grew exponentially. Towards the end 
of the 1990s, the FARC decided to begin kidnapping members of the military and politicians to 
force the government to exchange them for imprisoned FARC combatants. In addition, multiple 
military bases were taken, and police posts were attacked. Furthermore, the FARC began to 
instruct its members in the manufacture of unconventional weapons, such as bombs and anti-
personnel mines, which caused massive civilian and military casualties and became the most 
effective means of waging the war (Verdad Abierta 2013). By the year 2000, the FARC already 
had more than 16,000 combatants (Verdad Abierta 2008). 
The paramilitary heyday experienced between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 
the 2000s in Colombia coincided with the implementation of Plan Colombia, a bilateral 
agreement between the governments of Colombia and the United States to reduce the supply of 
drugs (especially cocaine) in the United States, since around 90 percent of the drug distributed in 
that country came from Colombia (Shifter 2010). Colombia would benefit from the agreement as 
it would strengthen its security, and peace and economic development would be fostered, or so 
the agreement stated. Although Plan Colombia passed in the United States’ Congress as part of 
the ‘war on drugs’ policy, members of the Bill Clinton administration were profoundly 
preoccupied by the deteriorated security conditions in Colombia, particularly by the fact that the 
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Colombian military seemed poorly prepared to cope with the progress of the FARC (Shifter 
2010). Colombia was considered a failure state that did not have any control over its territory, 
hence the execution of Plan Colombia, in combination with the ‘democratic security policy’ of 
president Alvaro Uribe Vélez, reinforced the military, improved the security in the roads and 
reduced guerrillas’ kidnappings. As highlighted by Lee (2017), 80% of the budget of Plan 
Colombia went towards military aid, thus conflating Cold War ideology and “war on drugs” 
rhetoric and policies for the essential goal of preserving a pro-US government that would 
guarantee status quo stability in the country. In other words, halting FARC’s struggle of 
emancipation would ensure that Colombia’s elite would not lose their entrenched class 
dominance (Brittain 2009) and would preserve United States’ interests in the country. Yet, in 
2016 it became evident that Plan Colombia had been a resounding failure in the war on drugs 
since the hectares corresponding to coca cultivation increased from 145,000 in 2001 to 188,000 
in 2016, although they got reduced to 48,000 in 2012 (Villegas, Veloza, and Salazar 2017)9.  
The advancements achieved in the reduction of threats to security as a result of Plan 
Colombia had a high cost, as stated by Shifter (2010). The numbers of internally displaced 
people continued to increase mostly affecting indigenous groups and African-colombian 
communities (INDEPAZ 2009), and extrajudicial executions best known as ‘falsos positivos’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  According to Villegas and colleagues (2017), several analysts and public figures in Colombia 
believe that the increase in hectares of coca crops has been strengthened by the Santos 
government refusal to continue spraying with glyphosate, which decomposes the coca leaf. 
However, other analysts state that it is the increase in the price of coca what has encouraged 
more sowing by growers. Other analysts think that the key to achieving a reduction in coca 
hectares is to encourage the presence of the state in the areas where FARC are turning in their 
weapons, since it is precisely in these areas that illegal crops have concentrated and increased. In 
fact, the levels of drug trafficking have risen dramatically, thus illustrating the collapse of the 
Plan Colombia.	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(false positives) -in which the army camouflaged civilians as FARC combatants to present them 
as military successes- also increased. Additionally, bloody selective killings and terrible 
massacres were committed by paramilitaries often acting in concert or cooperation with the 
military under the consent of the local, regional and national powers that operated legally 
(Baquero 2014).  
 
Massacres and Schools of Death  
 
Some of the most horrific practices perpetrated by the paramilitary include the massacre 
of Mapiripán, the massacre of El Salado and the ‘Escuelas de la muerte’ (schools of death). The 
massacre of Mapiripán, Meta (an important area on the Guaviare river for the transport of coca 
produced in laboratories located in the jungles with large territories of land abandoned by their 
owners due to guerrilla pressure) responded to the need to take the regulation of the clandestine 
market of the coca leaf and paste away from the FARC in 1997. Thus paramilitary commander 
Vicente Castaño, in association with former captain of the military, Jorge Humberto Victoria, 
and in complicity with general Jaime Humberto Uscátegui, tortured, butchered and dismembered 
49 civilians accused of being guerrilla collaborators (Ronderos 2014). The massacre of 
Mapiripán marked the beginning of the paramilitary settlement in the Llanos Orientales region. 
General Uscátegui was sentenced to 37 years in prison but he was released in 2017 when he 
signed up for the ‘Justicia Especial para la Paz’ (Special Justice for Peace) (JEP), the legal 
framework of transitional justice that resulted from the peace agreements with FARC in 2016.  
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The massacre of El Salado in Montes de María, Bolívar was perpetrated by 400 
paramilitaries from the Bloque Norte of the AUC between February 16 and 21 of 2000. More 
than 80 peasants -including women and children- accused of being guerrilla members or guerrilla 
supporters were tortured, raped, and beheaded. Neither the troops of Marine Fusiliers No. 5, 
under Colonel Harold Mantilla Serrano, nor Counterinsurgency Battalion No. 31, under the 
command of Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Castañeda (both assigned to the 1st Brigade Marines, 
commanded by General Rodrigo Quiñones); nor the Police Department of Bolívar and Sucre, did 
anything to prevent the armed incursion or to stop the slaughter. Answers from the military 
forces have been contradictory from the outset: some officers state that it was a military 
confrontation between paramilitaries and members of the 1st Brigade Marines while the police 
states that it was a paramilitary operation against guerrillas (Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y 
Paz 2006). Impunity has been the common denominator of the massacre in El Salado as 
investigations have obscured the fact that crimes were systematic and have concealed the 
institutional responsibilities in this massacre.   
The ‘Escuelas de la muerte’ were schools of terror that existed in Colombia as one of the 
manifestations of excessive violence by the paramilitaries. The purpose was not to terrorize the 
population, but it was much more instrumental: to ‘collect’ bodies that were to be used for 
experimentation. That is, for the application of techniques of torture and dismemberment by 
students applying the lessons taught by their paramilitary commanders (Sánchez 2014). Perhaps 
the most notorious case of ‘escuelas de la muerte’ is the one in Belén de los Andaquíes in 
Caquetá, where 36 civilians were forcibly disappeared in 2002 and were recovered the same year 
with signs of torture and mutilation. In the year 2000, the Bloque Central Bolívar of the AUC 
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settled in this town of around 500 families to install their school of death. Paramilitaries forced 
many of the inhabitants to stay in town and join their ranks to then make them torture and 
dismember their own relatives (Quevedo-Hidalgo 2008). Years later, the confessions of a 
number of paramilitaries under the LJP revealed some of the names of their victims and 
confessed details of the bloody practices perpetrated in this region. 
As exposed in this brief account of the paramilitary violence in Colombia, the 
paramilitary phenomenon should not be reduced to a simple counterinsurgency project, to a pure 
drug trafficking project or to criminal factions that escaped the control of the establishment 
(Duncan 2006). The ‘para-institutional’ or ‘para-statal’ violence as labeled by Medina Gallego 
(2001) was a phenomenon that had profound implications in the configuration of the state and 
the Colombian society during the first portion of the 21st century. These ‘lords of war’ 
established control of local territories imposing new forms of economy regulation, justice 
administration, protection services, and provision of basic needs (Duncan 2006). The 
paramilitaries became the worst assassins in the history of Colombia with the support of some 
civil, business, and ecclesiastical authorities, as well as the military. The latter, supported by the 
United States government with training and funding became the accomplices and masterminds of 
different crimes. Many victims have been left behind by the paramilitary phenomenon and only a 
few truths have been revealed, especially because several of the real architects of the crimes 
perpetrated by paramilitary groups still enjoy impunity (Baquero 2014).  
The following chapter describes the negotiation towards demobilization between 
paramilitary groups and president Alvaro Uribe Vélez, which marked the formal introduction of 
transitional justice into the country. I will explain the implementation of the agreements and 
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some positive aspects after the implementation of the LJP, in addition to some of the multiple 
criticisms that it has received since its regulation in 2007. 
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CHAPTER 4. PARAMILITARY DEMOBILIZATION AND THE LAW OF JUSTICE 
AND PEACE: NEITHER JUSTICE NOR PEACE 
 
When Alvaro Uribe Vélez came to power in 2002, most Colombians supported his war 
policy aimed at defeating the FARC after peace negotiations failed between this guerrilla group 
and president Andrés Pastrana. By that time, it was evident that the FARC had strengthened their 
power throughout the country with a modus operandi characterized by kidnappings, extortions, 
assassinations and military attacks in different territories. In addition, they went from 
blackmailing drug traffickers to becoming growers of coca leaf and laboratory processors. Uribe 
Vélez took advantage of this context to consolidate a discourse associated with the United States’ 
Republican ideological stance after the 9-11 attacks in that country. To Uribe, the FARC were 
not considered a guerrilla group, but a terrorist threat that had to be militarily defeated without 
any hint of negotiation (Baquero 2014). 
On the other hand, the Colombian government had been conducting negotiations with 
Carlos Castaño, the leader of the AUC. Yet, the relationship amongst paramilitary groups was 
very tense at the time: there were frictions between Vicente and Carlos Castaño regarding the 
management of the AUC and Ramón Isaza, the leader of the Self-defense forces of Boyacá, 
never allowed an easy entry of the AUC to the Magdalena Medio region (Ronderos 2014). In 
addition, the complex relationship between drug-traffickers and paramilitaries for the control of 
trafficking routes and territories in addition to the horror machinery that paramilitaries built 
through the multiple crimes perpetrated, resulted in the gradual lost of social support that they 
had gained in different regional centers. Furthermore, the crisis between the paramilitaries 
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worsened because many paramilitary commanders, including Vicente Castaño, did not approve 
of the pressure exerted on them by Carlos Castaño to stop drug trafficking in order to negotiate 
with the government. Castaño believed that an announcement that stated that his organization 
had nothing to do with the cocaine business would provide paramilitaries with the opportunity to 
achieve a favorable negotiation: one in which they would not go to prison, nor expropriated, nor 
extradited (Ronderos 2014). However, in September of 2002, the United States requested Carlos 
Castaño be extradited for drug-trafficking charges, forcing him to rush to an agreement with the 
Colombian government in which not all paramilitary commanders participated.  
 
The beginning of negotiations 
In December of 2002, Law 782 came into force. This law modified Law 418 of 1997 and 
Law 548 of 1999, the statutes that set forth the mechanisms for peace negotiations, including 
demobilizations with illegal armed groups (Guembe and Olea 2006) (Figure 3). These earlier 
laws provided amnesties to all members of illegal armed groups who were political in nature and 
would demobilize voluntarily. Law 782 removed the requirement of ‘political in nature’ with the 
purpose of extending the benefit of disarmament to paramilitary groups.  In 2003, Decree 128 
was issued to regulate the demobilization of armed groups outside the law, especially the 
paramilitaries. Later in July of that year, the AUC announced the demobilization of its armed 
groups, confirming -at least in rhetoric- the cessation of hostilities and the abandonment of 
kidnapping, drug trafficking and fuel theft. However, none of these activities actually ceased 
(Ronderos 2014). The crime continuation on the part of the AUC did not disrupt the negotiations  
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	   	  	  
54 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Flow chart of laws and decrees related to the design of Law 975 of 2005 (LJP) and the 
sentences, laws and rulings that have modified it since 2006. 
 
 
 
 
Law 418 of 1997
Law 548 of 1999
Law 782 of 2002
Decree 128 of 2003
Law 975 of 2005	  
S. C-370 of 2006
Law 1592 of 2012
S. C-015 of 2014
AP 5094 of 2014	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with the government who that month announced the creation of a ‘concentration zone’ for the 
paramilitary commanders located in Santa Fe de Ralito, in the department of Córdoba. This event 
marked the signature of the Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement, where paramilitary groups committed 
to end attacks against the civil population (Baquero 2014). The result of the Santa Fe de Ralito 
Agreement was the failed attempt by the executive branch to have Congress pass the Alternative 
Criminal Law, which granted amnesties and pardons for atrocities perpetrated by illegal armed 
groups, including crimes against humanity. The draft of the Alternative Criminal Law produced 
widespread rejection by national and international public opinion because it categorized the 
paramilitaries as political criminals and provided them with amnesties, which went against the 
very nature of these armed groups that never had a political character. Although Congress 
rejected the Alternative Criminal Law, demobilizations began in 2003 when around 1,000 men 
from the Bloque Cacique Nutibara and the Autodefensas Campesinas de Ortega handed over 
their weapons and returned to their territories. Nevertheless, at that moment, there was still no 
complete legal framework to support the process of demobilizations (Guembe and Olea 2006). 
In April of 2004, Vicente killed his brother Carlos Castaño, but Carlos’ death did not 
affect the continuation of the agreements. In fact, Vicente demobilized with the Bloque 
Centauros after negotiations took place with the government under the Santa Fe de Ralito 
Agreement (although later on Vicente Castaño escaped justice after feeling betrayed by the 
government throughout the course of the negotiation) (Ronderos 2014). In July of 2004 
paramilitary commanders were invited by Congress to give a speech about their desire for peace, 
a speech that was applauded by several congressmen and rejected by only a few (Baquero 2014). 
Negotiations continued and president Uribe promised paramilitaries a new law that would help 
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prevent their extradition to the United States for drug trafficking charges. Between November of 
2004 and February of 2005, 3,793 paramilitaries from eight different paramilitary groups 
demobilized. Paramilitaries trusted the government in that sentences would be short and would 
not depend on how much truth they would provide or the number of goods that would be handed 
over (Ronderos 2014). 
 
Implementation of the Law of Justice and Peace 
Law 975, also called Law of Justice and Peace (LJP), was the final legal framework 
designed by the executive branch to disarm and reintegrate illegal combatants while guaranteeing 
the victims’ rights to truth, justice and integral reparation. Initially, the law aimed to demobilize 
paramilitary groups, though with time individual demobilizations by members from different 
guerrilla groups also took place under the auspice of the law. The process of demobilization 
occurred in three phases: first, the paramilitary groups presented the government with a list of 
men, weapons and goods to be handed over. Second, paramilitaries gathered in a public act 
where the government had to establish if by that moment, they had pending criminal proceedings 
against them in the civilian justice system. Those who had no pending criminal proceedings, or 
who perpetrated lesser crimes (different from war crimes under IHL) would not go to prison but 
would rather participate in reintegration programs and would access economic and social 
benefits provided by the government. Those who had perpetrated war crimes would be sentenced 
to a minimum of five and a maximum of eight years in prison, although confessions of crimes 
were voluntary and it was not mandatory to hand over all the goods (Guembe and Olea 2006). 
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Paramilitaries assigned to this group are also referred to as ‘postulados’10 in the LJP after they 
fulfill the eligibility requirements before they can benefit from a reduced sentence in prison. 
In 2006, the Constitutional Court revised the law in Statement C-370, and introduced a 
number of changes to the eligibility requirements including the following: 1) perpetrators had to 
confess all the truth about their illegal actions, including the legal networks that supported them; 
2) perpetrators had to provide all the information regarding the whereabouts of the disappeared 
(an element that was not initially contemplated); 3) perpetrators had to turn in all the goods 
acquired through illegal activities and those allegedly obtained by legal means with the purpose 
of facilitating reparations; and 4) in cases where the Fiscalía could corroborate that the 
perpetrators had hidden the truth in their confession, or could find them guilty of having 
continued to commit crimes, they would be excluded from the benefits of the LJP and would be 
prosecuted under the civilian justice system. According to the Constitutional Court, the 
normative design of the LJP had to articulate two justice approaches: the retributive, expressed in 
a mechanism of an alternative sentence that should not be confused with amnesty or pardon; and 
the restorative, which entailed the design of individual and collective reparation measures 
envisioned as compensation for the damage and the suffering caused by the paramilitary groups. 
Ideally, “the articulation of both approaches would maintain international standards in the 
protection of human rights, while at the same time would open the possibilities of a negotiated 
solution to the conflict” (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2012, 37). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10 The term postulado does not have an equivalent in English. It can be understood as an 
individual who solicits, aspires or claims something. In this case, an individual who aspires to 
benefit from a reduced sentence in jail.  
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 After modifications introduced by the Constitutional Court, the LJP also contemplated 
guarantees of non-repetition, and ‘measures of satisfaction’ for victims. These included the 
verification of the facts and the public and complete dissemination of the judicial truth; the 
search for disappeared victims and the application of measures to identify, return and bury their 
remains according to family and community traditions; an apology by the perpetrators, including 
the public acknowledgement of the crimes and their accountability; and the recognition of as 
well as commemorations and tributes to the victims (Law 975, Article 48). 
Paramilitaries strongly disagreed with the changes introduced by the Constitutional 
Court, which ultimately encouraged many of them to not demobilize. Their discontent was such 
that many paramilitaries cheated the government with false demobilizations,11 and some kept 
running the drug trafficking business from prison. Thus, in May of 2008 the government decided 
to extradite six of the main commanders to the United States, including Diego Fernando Murillo, 
aka ‘Don Berna,’ and Salvatore Mancuso for to drug trafficking charges (Ronderos 2014).  
According to figures from the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, between 2002 
and 2010, 53,659 members from armed groups demobilized; about 36,000 from self-defense 
groups; and 17,500 from the FARC, the ELN, and the Guevara Revolutionary Army (ERG) 
(Valencia and Mejía 2010). From the total demobilized combatants, 4,346 were subjected to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11 The government claims that approximately 36,000 paramilitaries demobilized. However, “it is 
a difficult figure to understand because, according to official sources, the number of 
paramilitaries in 2002 was 12,000. If it were true that 36,000 paramilitaries demobilized, this 
would mean that before demobilization, paramilitary combatants increased three times their 
number, which involves significant responsibility by the executive branch because they would 
have reproduced like rabbits in the middle of the negotiation itself and in front of government 
negotiators” (Gallón Giraldo, Rodríguez Rincón, and Abonía Vergara 2013, 190. Translated 
from the Spanish). 
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criminal proceedings contemplated in the law, as they accepted having perpetrated war crimes or 
had already open criminal proceedings under the civilian justice system. 
As explained by the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2012), the manner in which 
the LJP was conceived and applied in the judicial proceedings occurred in four phases:  
1) The investigative stage 
2) The evidentiary stage: imputation hearings and legalization of charges 
3) The conciliatory stage: incidents of reparation  
4) The sentencing phase 
In order to begin the first stage, the investigation was assigned to two prosecutorial units 
from the Fiscalía in Bogotá and Barranquilla, where the investigation of paramilitary blocks was 
appointed to a small number of prosecutors. The prosecutors began their investigative task not 
knowing the proportions of the paramilitary criminal structures; their areas of influence and the 
domain that these illegal armed groups imposed across different regions. Thus, with the aim of 
getting a better understanding of the paramilitary universe, prosecutors used different existing 
resources, such as thousands of files from the civilian criminal justice system that rested in the 
local and regional archives; victims testimonies, and data provided by the Judicial Police and by 
the CTI of the Fiscalía. The information gathered would help them not only interrogate but also 
cross-examine the postulados (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2012).  
The investigative stage was divided into three sub-phases: 1) confessions, also known as 
versiones libres; 2) invitation to victims to attend follow-up confessions, and; 3) a process of 
verification conducted by the prosecutors. In the hearings of confessions (which still take place), 
the paramilitary narrates different events and confesses the crimes perpetrated by him or by the 
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block to which he belonged. A prosecutor directs the hearings trying to unfold the hierarchies of 
the organization, from its emergence to its disarmament to later be able locate the places where 
the block operated (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2012). Participants of these hearings 
include the deputy prosecutor before the Court of Justice and Peace, delegates from the 
Defensoría del Pueblo (Office of the Ombudsman) to guarantee the protection of the rights of 
victims and perpetrators, a member from the Procuraduría General de la Nación (Office of the 
Attorney General) and the prosecutor’s assistant who transcribes the confession. Occasionally, 
after being contacted by the Fiscalía or by means of the edicts published in the newspapers, 
victims attend these hearings but are not allowed to share the room with the perpetrators or ask 
questions for alleged security reasons. Confessions have usually extended from weeks to years as 
exemplified by the case of two commanders from the Bloque Norte of the AUC, whose 
confessions took more than two years adding up to almost 60 hearings12 (Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Histórica 2012).   
Following the first confessions, victims are invited to a follow-up hearing, which marks 
the beginning of sub-phase two. In these hearings perpetrators have the opportunity to expand on 
or clarify data from the first confession. The victims are placed in an adjacent room with a 
television that projects a live video of the trial and often times a satellite links the hearings to 
units of the Fiscalía in other parts of the country where additional victims participate as 
spectators. The Organization of American States (OAS) or members of additional international 
organizations also have access to these hearings. In such scenarios, victims and their state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12 There are numerous explanations for why trials are so prolonged. However, perhaps the most 
evident reason is that the judicial apparatus in Colombia was not prepared for the hectic task of 
investigating and judging so many crimes that in turn affected thousands of victims. 
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assigned lawyers engage in a meticulous search of facts and criminal events to clarify details of 
cases of their interest.  
An anthropological ethnographic examination of versiones libres conducted by the Centro 
Nacional de Memoria Histórica (CNMH) in 2012, revealed that confessions of crimes have been 
accompanied very frequently by explanations to justify such crimes. For instance, postulados 
accuse their victims not only of having been guerrilla collaborators, but also justify their death by 
alleging that the victim was a drug addict, a prostitute, or a thief. Thus, “the victim is blamed for 
his own misery and death, in the context of a violence that is thought to be restorative of the 
social order” (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2012, 54). The attending families who sit 
in the contiguous room have no direct way to question the perpetrator. During the hearings, 
families can be heard through a microphone and ask questions but a face-to-face confrontation 
never occurs in that space. Nor is there a protocol to manage critical pain events, as often times 
psychologists from certified organizations whose role is to accompany families in the judicial 
process, “may offer relatives a hug and an aspirin and sometimes pat the back of victims sobbing 
in pain” (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2012, 51) but no formal procedures are 
designed to handle these situations.  
Finally, the sub-phase of verification involves the obligation by the Fiscalía to initiate a 
general investigation that corroborates the crimes confessed in the trial of version libre. At this 
stage, material authors, circumstances of the crimes, and the effects of offenses are revealed. 
Verifications are performed through interviews with direct or indirect victims and the community 
where events took place, and the process of verification should end before the beginning of the 
conciliatory stage. 
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The evidentiary stage implies a series of public hearings in which the magistrates of the 
Court of Justice and Peace present the charges to the accused as a result of both, the confessed 
crimes and the investigation towards the verification. At this phase the accused freely accepts the 
charges as he knows that the LJP is a special criminal proceeding based largely on his 
commitment to the construction of a collective truth (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 
2012). Additionally, signs of repentance and forgiveness on the part of the postulado must 
accompany the judicial truth that emerges in this setting. This regretful behavior is necessary to 
grant postulados the alternative sentence. Victims can attend these hearings and raise additional 
questions to the perpetrators, but once again, just as in the phase of confessions, there is no room 
for a probative debate.  
 The conciliatory stage is the third step of the Justice and Peace process designed to 
provide a space for reparation in the judiciary process. That is, the moment when the magistrate 
determines the obligation to repair the victims. This stage is called ‘incident of reparation’ which 
was modified by Law 1592 of 2012.13 Up until 2012, there was finally a face-to-face encounter 
between victims and victimizers at this stage, where the perpetrator had the opportunity to ask 
for forgiveness, and victims decided to grant it or not. The active presence of victims at this stage 
highlighted the individual trauma suffered by many families, as this was perhaps the only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13 The ‘incident of reparation’ that was contemplated in the LJP until January of 2013 was the 
opportunity for the victims to intervene in the judicial proceedings at the conciliatory stage. 
However, it did not operate effectively as it was subordinated to the progress of the judicial 
processes, which had been extremely slow. Law 1592 of 2012 eliminated the incident of 
reparation “and established instead the ‘episode of affectation’ or ‘the establishment of damages’ 
which does not require reparation by the perpetrators, nor the presence of the victims.” 
(González Posso 2014, 12). In other words, upon reaching this stage of the process the presence 
of the victims was made unnecessary by law. 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	   	  	  
63 
moment where victims could express their truth and their trauma to their victimizers.14 This 
phase of the process revealed strong improvisation due to lack of the protocols to facilitate a 
space for victims’ claims and to provide them with the necessary medical and psychological 
attention throughout the judiciary process.  
The final stage is the hearing where the magistrates declare sentence against a 
paramilitary block after studying the investigation conducted by the Fiscalía in a period of no 
less than one year (although initial sentences were against individuals and not paramilitary 
blocks). Each sentence can include around 1,000 victims and multiple crimes perpetrated by the 
paramilitary block.  
 
Considerations of the Law of Justice and Peace eleven years after its implementation 
 The LJP has brought forward multiple criticisms both locally and internationally. In fact, 
some observers catalog the LJP as a failed process (Cuervo Criales 2016). However, some 
analysts have highlighted positive aspects of the process. For example, Frank Pearl, the High 
Commissioner for Peace in Colombia in 2010, indicates that the LJP made it possible to make 
victims visible in Colombia, raising awareness of the victims’ rights (Eusse Guerra 2010). 
Furthermore, as noted by my interviewee from CCJ, the LJP made visible the crime of forced 
disappearance, particularly the practices such as dismemberment perpetrated by the 
paramilitaries. “People used to think that dismemberments were a myth promulgated by guerrilla 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14 As explained by the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2012), in this context, trauma 
should be understood as one that indirectly harms a person who has lost a family member or a 
loved one. This trauma affects their social life and family ties and makes the victims spectators 
of their own drama.	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soldiers and a few non-governmental organizations, however the forensic work has been key to 
reveal this and other macabre practices by the paramilitaries” (Interview with member from the 
CCJ, January 20 of 2017, translated from the Spanish). 
Other experts have noticed additional positive aspects such as the fact that the learning 
acquired by judicial operators has been enormous. For instance, as recognized by the 
International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), a change in the methodology of the judicial 
investigation was initially unthinkable. Nevertheless, prosecutors have progressively 
acknowledged that transitional justice juridical processes work differently than those of the 
civilian justice system (Colprensa 2014). For example, instead of hearing individual confessions 
prosecutors are now hearing confessions by paramilitary blocks to gain a better understanding of 
the conflict in the regions and the modus operandi of the different groups. Finally, perhaps one of 
the most important positive aspects of the LJP after its implementation is that deaths in the 
country associated to massacres reduced significantly. By 2001 the paramilitaries committed 
around 170 massacres per year, however in 2012 the number had been reduced to ten massacres 
(Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013).  
The LJP has also been proposed as a point of reference from which it is possible to reflect 
on its shortcomings and the factors that must be remedied in the face of new mechanisms of 
transitional justice applied to the Colombian context (Cortés Sánchez et al. 2017). Although it is 
outside the scope of this study to cover and analyze in detail all the drawbacks of the Justice and 
Peace process, it is important to briefly mention some of the most important criticisms raised 
against it that are outside the spectrum of analysis proposed by this dissertation. 
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I. The legal support to the paramilitaries and the thousands of pending criminal 
investigation 
One of the great failures of the process of Justice and Peace has been the lack of a 
complete investigation of the criminal structures and the complex alliances and complicities 
between paramilitary groups and politicians, businessmen, the military and the judicial system 
(Gaitán 2014; Valencia and Mejía 2010). After years of hearings in transitional justice, and 
following the submission of more than 15,000 certified copies of the judiciary files to the civilian 
justice courts to investigate politicians, military, police members and other collaborators, only 80 
sentences of parliamentarians have been issued for what is known as ‘parapolítica’ (González 
Posso 2014). Parapolítica was the name given to the political scandal unleashed in Colombia in 
2006 associated with the links between politicians and paramilitaries after the demobilization 
process of the AUC. Although the situation was not unknown prior to 2007, it was that year that 
politicians such as Clara López, Claudia López and Gustavo Petro began to demand judicial 
investigations. These politicians, well-known political opponents of Alvaro Uribe Vélez, began 
to point out the ways in which the paramilitaries managed to get their friends to become 
congressmen; how these illegal groups supported the political fraud of the presidential elections 
of 2002 and 2006 favoring Uribe Vélez, and unveiled the armed imposition of candidates by 
paramilitaries in different regions of the country so that their candidates could get to positions of 
mayors and governors (Gutiérrez Roa 2007). 
After 10 years, the few criminal investigations carried out by the civilian justice system 
against politicians associated with paramilitary networks have not been sufficient to conclude 
that the paramilitary project was part of a state policy. Some magistrates of the Court of Justice 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	   	  	  
66 
and Peace have indicated that “the promotion, organization and support of the paramilitary 
groups became a policy sponsored or facilitated by the high commands of the armed forces and it 
was not an isolated event” (Verdad Abierta 2015b). Though, not all magistrates share such an 
opinion (Verdad Abierta 2015b). 
It is true that in 2005, when the LJP was proposed, no one envisioned that the same 
jurisdiction could investigate ex-combatants and civilians, and nobody calculated the number of 
third parties involved in the war. The initial idea was that demobilized combatants who handed 
in their weapons would be eligible to be beneficiaries of the LJP and would be given an 
alternative sentence of no more than eight years, while the ordinary justice would investigate the 
politicians, militaries and businessmen incriminated by the confessions (Verdad Abierta 2015b). 
However, not even a third of the accomplices of paramilitaries have been investigated, as 
Fiscalía has put a halt to investigations. This situation reveals that the judicial system is 
completely politicized, which has prevented the unveiling and dismantling of criminal networks 
that promoted and launched the paramilitary project.  
The absence of a process to dismantle the paramilitary networks is in direct relation to the 
lack of judicial truth resulting from the confessions and ultimately the absence of justice. Even in 
cases where the paramilitaries have incriminated different legal actors, some postulados have 
limited their confessions to reference the names of people already investigated. Furthermore, 
when they have added new names of powerful individuals and names of corporations, these 
references have not been entirely included in certified copies that go to the civilian justice 
system, and therefore have not made any contributions to strengthen the judicial truth (González 
Posso 2014). 
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II. Macro-criminality patterns and their relation to the truth 
In December of 2012, Law 1592 came into force, which sought to streamline the 
application of justice with prioritization criteria to replace the ‘case by case’ type of 
methodology adopted in the Justice and Peace process, which worked very similarly to civilian 
justice. Instead, collective criteria would be adopted to analyze the context in which crimes were 
perpetrated as well as the ‘macro-criminality patterns’ that characterized paramilitary activities 
(González Posso 2014). This change introduced the idea that the events subject to the criminal 
process were not ordinary crimes and therefore could not be considered isolated, but part of 
macro-criminality phenomena. Thus, the Fiscalía approached the investigation from a 
multidisciplinary perspective that aimed for a better understanding of the sociopolitical and 
historical context and a reconstruction of the circumstances in which the crimes were committed. 
This approach also aspired to organize analogous cases and direct the analysis of the evidence in 
such a way that the identification of those responsible could advance in a substantial way. This 
methodology is also known as the investigation of system crimes (Gaitán 2014).  
Despite the fact that the judicial authorities have made progress in the construction of 
contexts and the incorporation of international law and jurisprudence in relation to system 
crimes, some magistrates and members of the Office of the Ombudsman indicate that the search 
for macro-criminality patterns is an incorrect approach (Verdad Abierta 2015b). It has been 
claimed that in order to achieve historical truth, crimes that involve serious violations to IHL and 
human rights must be incorporated into patterns of macro-criminality, which seek the 
condemnation of those most responsible. Yet, this objective does not necessarily coincide with 
the construction of the truth principle that the LJP promotes (Cuervo Criales 2016). For example, 
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in the specific case of forced disappearances, there must be diligence in the analysis of the 
patterns found in all disappearances, especially when there are additional crimes involved. Such 
is the case where victims are women and have been also subject to sexual violence. In these 
scenarios, as it has already happened, the risk is that prosecutors prioritize the crime of forced 
disappearance while at the same time neglect the sexual offense. Hence, the grouping of cases of 
forced disappearance must be the result of an exhaustive investigation in which the details of the 
cases can still be collected and documented, as these details are key to the reconstruction of the 
truth that the victims claim. 
 
III. The paramilitaries failed the government, but the government also failed the 
paramilitaries 
If an exercise of historical truth was conducted and paramilitaries were asked what led 
them to sign the Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement, they would surely indicate that the commitment 
that made them sign such an accord had little if nothing to do with the content of what would 
later become the LJP and the subsequent laws and statements that modified some of its articles 
(González Posso 2014). In other words, the negotiation went from offering paramilitaries a 
blanket amnesty, to sentences of eight years in prison that in turn depended on a series of 
collaborations on the part of demobilized combatants. Hence, if paramilitaries had known what 
the LJP would become they would not have negotiated with president Uribe Vélez. 
This process of transitional justice based on a sort of trial and error approach, highly 
disorganized from the beginning, led to a series of events that continued to leave traces of 
violence throughout the country as well as signs of discontent and despair among victims instead 
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of contributing to justice and peace. For example, the paramilitaries failed to turn in the goods 
acquired through legal and illegal activities to repair the victims. This situation has blurred the 
landscape of reparations as of the 73,393 millions of pesos destined to economic reparations, 
only 6,11% have been assumed by postulados; 4,46% by the Fund for Rehabilitation, Social 
Investment and Fight against Organized Crime (FRISCO) and the remaining 89,4% by the 
nation’s budget (Unidad para las Víctimas 2016).  
Paramilitaries also demobilized false combatants (relatives and friends and others) with 
the aim of helping them access social and economic benefits. Former president Uribe Vélez has 
admitted cases of false demobilizations by both paramilitaries and guerilla members and has 
stated that “former officials who proceeded in good faith” were deceived by members of these 
illegal groups making emphasis on the cheating guerrilla members of the Bloque Cacica La 
Gaitana from the FARC (Caracol Radio 2011). Yet, former paramilitary leader Freddy Rendón 
Herrera, aka ‘El Alemán, and Éver Veloza, aka ‘HH,’ who was the commander of the Bloque 
Calima of the AUC have both confessed before the Court of Justice and Peace that both the 
former High Commissioner for Peace, Luis Carlos Restrepo 15  (who was in charge of 
demobilizations), and president Alvaro Uribe Vélez knew about the false demobilizations by 
members from AUC. For example, the Frente Cacique Nutibara demobilized some 800 men 
when in fact it only had very few combatants. Even drug traffickers like Francisco Zuluaga, aka 
‘Gordolindo,’ paid five billion dollars to the AUC for posing as paramilitary member and 
demobilize under the agreement with Uribe Vélez (Resumen de Agencias 2011). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15 Since 2012, Luis Carlos Restrepo is a fugitive from the Colombian justice system. Restrepo is 
accused of different crimes, including conspiracy in relation to the false demobilizations by 
paramilitary and guerrilla members (Revista Semana 2013). 
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The false demobilizations, especially of those who did not go to prison, served to 
reconfigure the group of heirs of the AUC structure who continued their activities in the same 
areas of operation and business. These groups are euphemistically called ‘Bacrim’ or ‘emerging 
criminal gangs’ that continue to manage the drug trafficking business and the public contracts. 
Furthermore, the Bacrims maintain a territorial and military power that still has strong ties with 
official sectors that oppose a series of political reforms such as the peace process with the FARC 
and the restitution of lands taken away from peasants (Baquero 2014). Therefore, the argument 
that states that the paramilitary demobilization contributed to the de-escalation of violence in 
Colombia should be carefully considered. Although the number of homicides and kidnappings 
dropped since 2000, forced displacement figures increased between 2003 and 2007, which 
indicates that paramilitaries continued perpetrating crimes in the midst of negotiations. Likewise, 
the levels of forced disappearances increased, especially the cases of extrajudicial executions 
(González Posso 2014). 
Continuing with the ambivalences of the process, the state also disappointed demobilized 
combatants, because the legislation was too ambiguous in the determination of the procedural 
moment in which the alternative sentence would start. That is, it was unclear if the sentence 
began from the moment of incarceration, or from the acceptance in the process as postulados 
after meeting the eligibility requirements. Almost nine years later, the Constitutional Court, 
through Statement C-015 of 2014, and the Supreme Court of Justice in its ruling AP5094-2014, 
concluded that the time of the sentence would start from the moment of the nomination as 
postulados granted by the national government (Cortés Sánchez et al. 2017). At that moment, 
many demobilized combatants had initiated petitions to be released because they had already 
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paid a sentence of eight years in prison. Yet, for many of them the process to be released was 
incredibly slow, thus many resigned the process of transitional justice and switched to the 
civilian justice. In the civilian system their sentence had been fulfilled and thus many were 
released due to their good behavior and collaboration with the justice system. 
The state has also a pending task regarding resocialization towards a process of 
reconciliation. Some released postulados indicate that going to prison does not guarantee the 
non-repetition of crimes, and that the lack of education, the precarious attention to health and 
nourishment in prison, and the few existing reintegration programs, demonstrates that neither the 
government nor the society have moved beyond a true phase of reconciliation in Colombia 
(Verdad Abierta 2015b; Theidon 2007). 
 
IV. The state did not have the capacity to investigate all crimes nor the resources for 
victims’ reparations 
Another major flaw in the Justice and Peace process was the creation of false 
expectations for the victims. The LJP was very ambitious in terms of investigations and 
reparations as it was expected to investigate all the crimes and all the postulados, which is 
impossible, according to magistrate Uldi Teresa Jimenez (Verdad Abierta 2015b). It was 
assumed from the beginning that the state had the human capacity and resources to carry out all 
criminal investigations and that was not the case (Guembe and Olea 2006). Furthermore, from 
the first sentence issued, it was noted that the state had no capacity to pay the high judicial 
reparations foreseen by the government due to the number of victims of the conflict. In this 
regard, the LJP explicitly indicates the right of victims to ‘integral reparation,’ which includes 
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individual, collective and symbolic reparations. For the first two, there may be judicial and/or 
administrative compensation and both are monetary. In a broad sense, the judicial reparation 
depends on the existence of a criminal process through which a judge imposes a sentence to the 
perpetrator and establishes the obligation to repair the victim. Thus, this type of reparation is 
subsequent to the evidentiary process in which the magistrate can decide if the accused is guilty 
or not, depending on what is proven during the process. Though in the process of Justice and 
Peace it is assumed that all postulados are guilty. On the other hand, the administrative 
reparation program is directly implemented by the government through reparation rates for each 
type of crime and specific violation. The administrative reparation does not require a judicial 
process, but is a purely administrative proceeding (Torres, Ospina, and Cruz 2007).  
The problem after the first seven years of implementation of the LJP is that Article 23 of 
the Law 1592 of 2012 introduced changes concerning the administrative compensation and 
limited its recognition to the amounts established by Decree 4800 of 2011 regulated by the Law 
1448 of 2011, which determines the amounts to be paid by the state according to the victimizing 
act. These amounts were lower than those initially estimated by the Court of Justice and Peace, 
which produced ample discontent among the victims who felt disappointed by these changes 
(Cortés Sánchez et al. 2017). Under Law 1448 of 2011, 503,000 Colombians have been repaired 
with an amount of around 3.1 billion pesos (Rettberg 2015). 
 
V. A very small court that responds to justice, truth and reparation 
Perhaps one of the final and most important lessons of the Justice and Peace process has 
been that a small court of only three magistrates cannot respond for all the rights of the victims. 
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The Court of Justice and Peace, which started with three members and now has 113, has not only 
been in charge of the judicial process, thus responding to the victims’ right to the judicial truth, 
but has also been in charge of the complicated process of integral reparations. With such 
enormous tasks, a small team of magistrates and their assistants could obviously not respond 
effectively in the elaboration of sentences. Of the statistics of victims related to the confessions 
of postulados under the Justice and Peace process up to 2012, the paramilitaries confessed 
11,132 forced displacements from a total of 2 million cases reported in the Unique Registry of 
Victims (RUV); 25,757 homicides of 100,000 reported; 3,551 forced disappearances of a 
minimum of 40,000 claimed by their families and only 96 cases of sexual violence of no less 
than 10,000 reports (González Posso 2014). Therefore, it should not be unexpected that to date 
only 55 sentences have been achieved, of which only 27 are second instance or final sentences.16 
Additionally, as noted by my interviewee from the Office of the Ombudsman, the concept 
of satisfaction of the victims should not be a legal criterion to evaluate the process of reparation. 
This is especially true in processes that deal with forgiveness and socialization programs 
between victims and victimizers, as well as measures of commemoration to the victims. These 
should be procedures designed and applied outside the law because there is no way to legally 
measure if the victim has been satisfied or not (Interview with representative of the Office of the 
Ombudsman, December 12 of 2016). The result of these lessons in the face of a new process of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In Colombia there is a double instance in law, which is an indispensable guarantee in the Rule 
of Law, which consists of the possibility of going before a judge to review the condemnatory or 
unfavorable sentence. While the appeal is being processed and until the second sentence or final 
sentence is issued, the sentence is not final and cannot be executed (Hernández 2014). The due 
process in Colombia contemplates several instances to ensure the defendant’s right to defense. In 
the Justice and Peace process the right to appeal was incorporated, hence the second instance 
ensured the due process and the right to defense. 
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transitional justice with the FARC is that the court should exist solely to judge; a commission of 
truth must be implemented in the procurement of truth, and the judicial and administrative 
reparation process must be handled by an administrative entity. In a country with around eight 
million victims, the whole process cannot and should not be exclusively the responsibility of a 
single court (Interview with member of the Tribunal de Justicia y Paz, June 20 of 2017). 
This chapter described how the ruptures between the paramilitary groups and the terror 
implemented in many regions led to the termination of the paramilitary heyday and the need on 
the part of Carlos Castaño to negotiate the demobilization with the government of Alvaro Uribe 
Vélez. However, as it turned out, the result of these negotiations, that is, the LJP with its various 
modifications, were clearly not the product of what was originally agreed upon by Uribe and the 
paramilitaries in the Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement. Finally, given that ‘Justice and Peace’ was 
the first process of transitional justice applied in Colombia, the application of the LJP underwent 
multiple changes as a result of the trial and error approach that has not only affected the rights of 
the victims, but also the rights of the postulados, especially with regards to the sentences. 
Perhaps the most serious criticism to the process of transitional justice, which will be discussed 
in depth in Chapter 7, is the lack of truth regarding the participation of official sectors in the 
multiple crimes perpetrated by paramilitaries and hence the lack of criminal investigations to 
legal actors who are enjoying total impunity. 
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CHAPTER 5. THE PHENOMENON OF FORCED DISAPPEARANCE IN COLOMBIA 
  
The practice of abducting and killing persons followed by the concealment of their 
remains began in Colombia by the end of the 1970s (Muñoz Marín 2015). At the time, it was 
already common to see bodies thrown into rivers, dismembered, burnt, or buried in pits in the 
middle of the mountains. The first case of disappearance reported was that of Omaira Montoya 
Henao, a left activist disappeared in 1977, whose case is associated with the National Security 
Doctrine policy promoted by the United States’ government. This doctrine stimulated an 
extreme-right thought in Latin America encouraging a system of annihilation of the internal 
political enemy, considering as such all those who were against the interests of the nation, thus 
justifying their military repression (Feierstein 2010; Velásquez Rivera 2002). Therefore, 
although disappearances were already part of the violent struggle between liberals and 
conservatives in the period known as La Violencia (1948 to 1958), the first disappearances 
associated with the international definition of forced disappearance occurred in the late 1970s 
under the framework of the struggle against communism and the leftist ideologies that were 
considered the social base of the guerrillas. As described in Chapter 3, the military forces and the 
paramilitaries, in complicity with the political class, initiated the selective elimination of political 
opponents, using forced disappearance as a repressive mechanism (Rozo Alvarez and Puerto 
Valdivieso 2017). 
 This chapter offers a brief historical account of the way in which the crime of forced 
disappearance was typified at the international level, as well as the birth of the human rights 
instruments that prohibit its practice and establish that perpetrators need to be held accountable. I 
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also describe the efforts by families of the disappeared in Colombia to incorporate this crime into 
national legislation, in addition to their ongoing struggle to find their disappeared relatives. 
Finally, I provide a historic overview of the practice of forced disappearance that reveals that the 
paramilitaries have been the major perpetrators of forced disappearance in the history of the 
Colombian armed conflict. 
 
International regulations 
Despite the fact that forced disappearances had not been defined yet as a crime at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, they are considered a modality of violence related to 
practices against humanity developed during the World Wars (Centro Nacional de Memoria 
Histórica 2016). In fact, the first ruling of a Nazi officer for his responsibility in the execution of 
forced disappearances occurred during the Nuremberg trials between 1945 and 1946 (Centro 
Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2014a). However, it was in Latin America, under the framework 
of the Cold War, and particularly in the dictatorships established in Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, 
Guatemala and Uruguay (to a lesser extent) in the 1970s and 1980s, when militaries began to 
control the states and initiated the persecution and elimination of the internal enemy. The 
practice of forced disappearance created the necessity on the part of international bodies to 
generate instruments that not only defined forced disappearance as a crime but would also 
facilitate its sanctioning. 
By 1978 the United Nations (UN) General Assembly had expressed concern about this 
phenomenon on multiple occasions. Thus, by resolution 20 (XXXVI) of February 29 of 1980, 
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the Commission on Human Rights established a Working Group to examine queries pertinent to 
enforced or involuntary disappearances of persons (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 2009). Furthermore, in 1982, the Organization of American 
States cataloged forced disappearance as a grave violation of human rights through resolution 
AG/RES.618 (XII-o/82) (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016). 
In 1992, the UN General Assembly, by resolution 47/133, proclaimed the Declaration on 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance as a body of principles for all states. 
According to the Declaration, “the acts which comprise forced disappearance constitute a 
violation of the prohibitions found in other international instruments, including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment” 
(Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2009, 5). Additionally, the 
Declaration specifies that the organized crime of forced disappearance constitutes a crime against 
humanity as it is conceived as an action that is part of a generalized and systematic crime against 
a civilian population. Among a number of dispositions, the Declaration establishes the duty by 
states to fully investigate alleged cases of disappearance and try perpetrators before civilian 
courts. In addition, it states that perpetrators should not benefit from amnesty laws or pardons 
that might lead to impunity (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2009). 
In 1994, the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons was defined 
as the binding instrument for the American States and was enacted in 1996. In 1998, the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, which did not begin in full force until 2002, also 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	   	  	  
78 
recognized forced disappearance as a crime against humanity and defined it under article 7 as 
“the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or 
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that 
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with 
the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time” 
(Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016, 39). This definition expanded the subject 
responsible for the crime to include political organizations, which were not taken into 
consideration by the previous international dispositions. 
However, in 2001 the Commission on Humans Rights recognized the need to examine the 
existing international framework for the protection of persons from forced disappearance in 
addition to finding gaps to ensure complete protection of persons. It was established that the right 
to not be subjected to this crime was not recognized by any international treaty and there were 
voids not only on measures of prevention but also on effective remedies and reparations for 
victims. Thus, a new treaty was designed with the participation of almost 70 States, NGOs, 
associations of families of the disappeared and different experts. The treaty was named The 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006 (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights 2009). The Convention was designed as a legally binding instrument that 
defined as non-derogable17 the right to not be subjected to forced disappearance, and considered 
as victims not only the individuals subject to the crime, “but also any individual who has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17 “A non-derogable right is a right that may not be restricted or suspended, even in times of war 
or other public emergency. For instance, the right to life and the right to be free from torture are 
non-derogable” (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2009, 8). 
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suffered harm as the direct result of an enforced disappearance, such as family members” (Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2009, 9). In this sense, the 
Convention was the first international human rights instrument to establish the families’ right to 
the truth, while also affirming their right to material and moral reparations as well as guarantees 
of non-repetition (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2009).  
Since its establishment in 1980, the Working Group has been regularly renewed and has 
specified that forced disappearances can only be considered as such if perpetrated by state agents 
or by private individuals or organized groups, such as paramilitary groups acting on behalf of or 
with the support of, state authorities (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights 2009). Thus it does not admit cases attributed to individuals or organizations that 
do not fall under these categories, such as insurgent groups as it is assumed that states have the 
duty of investigating and resolving cases of forced disappearances perpetrated by non-state 
agents. Additionally, the Working Group does not attend to cases of disappearances in the 
context of internal armed conflicts, as these are the competence of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC), as determined by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional 
Protocols of 1977 (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2009). 
According to Customary International Humanitarian Law (IHL), forced disappearance is 
prohibited in international and non-international armed conflicts. During war events, parties in 
conflict need to take all feasible measures to find out what happened to people reported missing 
as a result of an armed conflict and convey all the necessary information to their families in order 
to guarantee their right to know. Moreover, IHL establishes the obligation on the parts to 
respectfully bury the deceased, as well as the adoption of measures to facilitate their 
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identification, including the recording of information available before the burial takes place and 
the marking of the location of the graves (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005; Centro Nacional 
de Memoria Histórica 2016). 
 
National jurisprudence and the struggle of relatives of the disappeared 
 In 1982, a movement against forced disappearances arose in Colombia led by the recently 
created Association of Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared (ASFADDES) that emerged in 
reaction to disappearances attributed to the police during the presidency of Belisario Betancur 
(Haugaard and Nicholls 2010). By 1987, the practice of forced disappearance had spread 
throughout the national territory and since its foundation, ASFADDES had been investigating 
and documenting more than 500 cases with the assistance of the Latin American Federation of 
Associations of Relatives of Detained and Disappeared Persons (FEDEFAM). That year, the first 
official journey for the search of missing persons was conducted in the company of judicial 
investigators, relatives of victims and human rights advocates. The event was organized by 
ASFADDES, the Permanent Committee of Human Rights (CPDH) and the Fiscalía General de la 
Nación. Later, along with FEDEFAM, ASFADDES reported the situation in Colombia before 
international instances and achieved the visit by the UN Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances in 1989 (Muñoz Marín n.d.). The first official journey and the 
invitation to the Working Group, aimed to demonstrate that the ‘private justice’ adopted by self-
defense groups, death squads and hitmen, was producing countless victims of murder and forced 
disappearance, especially from the left-wing political parties (Muñoz Marín 2015). 
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As explained by Muñoz Marín (n.d.), at the beginning of the 1990s, the relatives of the 
victims got involved in the process of writing the Colombian Constitution of 1991, managing to 
draft Article 12, which states that “no one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance, to torture 
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Furthermore, freedom was ratified 
as a fundamental right in Article 28. This would be the first official recognition by the state of 
the existence of disappeared persons. That year, ASFADDES also invited the EAAF to provide 
training for government officials, lawyers and forensic practitioners in the application of forensic 
anthropology and archeology in order to support investigations and aid in the search of missing 
persons. Moreover, EAAF held workshops of awareness with the families of the victims, and 
instructed them on what they should demand in the judicial and forensic investigations. 
The first journey in the search of disappeared persons, as well as the visit by EAAF, were 
key to acknowledge some of the main problems in the identification of missing persons, 
including the inadequate practices for the recovery of remains of those disappeared and 
assassinated; the lack of mechanisms in the collection of preliminary data; the practice of 
interring individuals in mass graves as well as in the municipal cemeteries; the complicity of the 
local authorities and the indifference of those who witnessed the crimes. In short, those activities 
were a fundamental precedent for the progress that would be made to the technical and scientific 
practices towards the search and identification processes of disappeared persons during the 1990s 
(Muñoz Marín 2015).  
Although the provisions contained in Article 12 of the Constitution formulated the 
prohibition of forced disappearance in order to protect the fundamental rights of citizens, they 
did not directly sanction forced disappearance as a crime. It was not until the enactment of Law 
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589 of 2000, following the struggle by the organizations of the relatives of the disappeared and 
the work of human rights associations, that the crime was typified and some mechanisms were 
created for its prevention, registration and attention. “The delays, obstructions and objections to a 
law that typified forced disappearance as a crime, suggested a reluctant attitude by governments 
to recognize its existence, which was closely related to the need to protect the military” (Centro 
Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016, 41). 
The definition of forced disappearance in national jurisdiction shares some characteristics 
with the definitions provided by international instruments. However, it places the responsibility 
on individuals outside the realm of the state. The crime of forced disappearance was typified in 
Article 268A of Law 589 of 2000 and then included again in Article 165 of the New Penal Code, 
Law 599 of 2000. The crime was defined as follows: “The individual who pertaining to an illegal 
armed group, subjects another person to the deprivation of his/her freedom, whatever the form, 
followed by the concealment of the person and the refusal to acknowledge his/her freedom 
deprivation or to provide information on his/her whereabouts, subtracting him/her from the 
protection of the law, shall incur in imprisonment from twenty five (25) to forty (40) years, a fine 
from five hundred (500) to two thousand (2000) legal monthly minimum wages, and the 
interdiction of public rights and functions from five (5) to ten (10) years. To the same penalty 
shall be subjected the state agent or the civilian acting under the determination or acquiescence 
of the state, who performs the conduct described in the preceding paragraph” (translated from the 
Spanish). 
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Law 589 of 2000 also established public policies and obligations to the state including the 
creation of the Commission for the Search of Missing Persons (CBPD)18 (Article 8). The CBPD 
would be in charge of the design, evaluation and support of the execution of the National Search 
Plan for Disappeared Persons. Furthermore, the law implemented the National Registry of 
Disappeared Persons (RND) (Article 9) that operates under the coordination of the National 
Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences (INMLCF) as well as the Urgent Search 
Mechanism (MBU) (Article 13), which obligates state agents to carry out all necessary actions 
aimed at establishing the whereabouts of the victim(s) as soon as their disappearance is reported 
to the authorities (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016; Rozo Alvarez and Puerto 
Valdivieso 2017). The regulation of these mechanisms began five years later by means of Decree 
4218 of 2005 that regulated the RND as well as Law 971 of 2005 that regulated the formal 
implementation of the CBPD. 
In 2010 Law 1408 was issued, whereby “homage is paid to the victims of the crime of 
forced disappearance and measures are adopted on behalf of their location and identification” 
(translated from the Spanish). The law approved a series of measures to achieve the location and 
full identification of the victims of disappearance, as well as mechanisms to provide assistance to 
family members during the processes of exhumation and return of remains. Furthermore, it 
included dispositions regarding biological samples from relatives of disappeared persons to be 
included in a bank of genetic profiles designed solely for identification purposes. In addition, it 
established the obligation on the part of the government to provide families with the necessary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18 The CBPD was integrated by the Ombudsman’s Office, the Attorney General’s Office, the 
Fiscalía, the Ministry of Defense, the Presidential Council for Human Rights, the INMLCF, the 
Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination and ASFADDES. 
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resources to pay for funeral, travel, lodging and food expenses during the entire process of 
remains’ return. Additionally, in compliance with international and humanitarian 
recommendations, the law recognized the obligation of the authorities to grant families their 
participation in the exhumation activities and organize a ‘dignified return’ of the remains to their 
families as they receive psychosocial attention during the process (Rozo Alvarez and Puerto 
Valdivieso 2017). Law 1408 was regulated by Decree 303 of 2015 and is therefore in the process 
of implementation. This decree incorporated The International Convention for the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance into Colombian domestic law. 
Later in 2011, the Law on Victims and Land Restitution (Law 1448) adopted measures of 
attention, assistance and integral reparation for the victims of the internal armed conflict as well 
as other dispositions that were subsequently regulated by Decrees 4800 of 2011 and Decree 3011 
of 2013 (Figure 4) (Rozo Alvarez and Puerto Valdivieso 2017). In direct relation to the crime of 
forced disappearance, Law 1448 established the right of families to the truth as an 
imprescriptible and inalienable right, thus guaranteeing their effective participation in the 
investigations and judicial proceedings against illegal armed organizations, demobilized or 
extradited individuals. In addition, the law established the economic amounts to be paid to the 
families of the victims as part of the administrative reparation to which they are entitled. 
Lastly, the ‘Final agreement for the termination of the conflict and the construction of a 
stable and lasting peace’ (translated from the Spanish), signed in 2016 between the FARC and 
the national government, recognized once again the magnitude of the problem of the disappeared 
in Colombia (Rozo Alvarez and Puerto Valdivieso 2017). Based on a model of transitional 
justice, the agreement established the implementation of mechanisms such as the Special Unit for 
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Figure 4. Evolution of the definition of forced disappearance in Colombia and the laws related to 
the search of victims of forced disappearance and the rights of the families. 
 
the Search of Persons Considered Missing as a Result of the Armed Conflict (UBPD) designed 
to strengthen the institutional competences and to facilitate the participation of victims in the 
search, location, identification and dignified return of remains of persons reported missing. 
However, unlike the CPBD, once the UBPD begins operations, it will carry out activities with 
humanitarian and extrajudicial purposes only. The UBPD was designed as the mechanism 
exclusively dedicated to search for disappeared victims, regardless of the perpetrator, but the 
Fiscalía must continue investigating whom the responsible of the disappearances were, beyond 
those cases allegedly perpetrated by the FARC.   
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As described in this section, since the year 2000 when the crime of forced disappearance 
was included in the Colombian legislation, the search, identification and return of remains finally 
began to be incorporated into the conversations between family organizations, state officials and 
relatives. In fact, through a number of legal instruments, the state recognized its obligation to 
allow family members to participate in the search processes of their missing relatives. However, 
when the LJP began to be implemented in 2007, there were no clear mechanisms to respond to 
the victims’ rights to truth, justice and reparation as the laws designed with this aim were still in 
the process of drafting. 
 
Periods associated with the practice of forced disappearance in Colombia 
According to the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2016) the phenomenon of 
forced disappearance has undergone a series of changes that can be traced to at least four 
historical periods: The first period dates from 1982 to 1990, and was characterized by the spread 
of disappearances throughout most of the territory. This period registered 6,528 victims (88,2% 
men and 11,8% women) of which the paramilitaries were the main perpetrators (38,8%) 
followed by guerrillas (26%) from over 3,400 cases from which a presumptive perpetrator had 
been reported (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016).  
Forced disappearances were associated with the counter-insurgency strategy adopted by 
the military to fight the different guerrilla groups in association with self-defense groups. Forced 
disappearances were also linked with the eruption of drug trafficking, the opposition of regional 
elites to peace agreements with guerrillas, as well as with the exacerbation of the anti-communist 
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ideology under the Reagan administration in the United States as explained in Chapter 3. The 
priority of the paramilitary groups and state agents was not the dispute over the control of the 
territory but the containment of a revolution associated with the social mobilization and the 
electoral success of individuals and parties with Leftist ideologies. The aim was to punish and 
terrorize any political preference or social mobilization that went against the government by 
making terror a dissuasive and demoralizing tool (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016). 
In the second period, from 1991 to 1995, 6,155 forced disappearances were reported, 
which indicates a moderate decrease in comparison to the previous period. However, this was a 
stage of transition characterized by the expansion and rearrangement of actors of the armed 
conflict. This moment could be considered as the prelude to the most critical period –the third 
period- of forced disappearances in the Colombian armed conflict that took place between 1996 
and 2005. During the second period, 638 municipalities registered forced disappearances, the 
majority of which were from 70 municipalities. Those regions included Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, 
Urabá and Magdalena Medio. Although demographic information regarding the victims’ profile 
is mostly unknown, from the cases in which sex was reported, 89,5% of the victims were males. 
From 1,980 victims with reported ages, 60,8% were young adults between 18 and 35 years old. 
In relation to perpetrators, from 3,062 cases, it was established that 34.3% were presumably 
perpetrated by paramilitary groups; 25,6% by guerrillas; 19,2% by state agents and the remaining 
cases committed by other agents (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016). 
This second period was also characterized by the paramilitary crisis in the Magdalena 
Medio, where paramilitary factions perpetrated forced disappearances against each other. In 
addition, large drug trafficking cartels disappeared, and the Political Constitution of 1991 was 
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implemented. In this context, the so-called self-defense groups were declared illegal, which 
complicated their relations with state agents. Furthermore, the extraordinary faculties that had 
been granted to the military forces were withdrawn. In addition, despite that peace talks in 
Caracas and Tlaxcala with the FARC and ELN failed, the demobilization of four guerrillas (EPL, 
M-19, PRT and MAQL) during this time period reinforced the legitimacy of the new Political 
Constitution (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016). 
The third period of 1996 to 2005 registered the highest number of victims of forced 
disappearance in Colombian history. Over 32,000 cases were reported, from which the majority 
was registered in 2002 with 5,124 cases. That year, “an average of one person was disappeared 
every two hours” (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016, 24). This period is divided in 
two phases: one from 1996 to 2002 that witnessed an increase in the number of cases, followed 
by a phase between 2003 and 2005 when the number of cases decreased. One notable 
characteristic of the third period as a whole includes the emergence of collective disappearances 
with four or more victims per crime. The case of the 26 militants of the Patriotic Union 
disappeared in Murindó, Antioquia in 1998 was one of the most emblematic. Furthermore, 
during this period disappearances spread through 920 municipalities, mainly affecting the towns 
near the cities of Bogotá, Medellín, Santa Marta, Valledupar, Montería, Villavicencio, Florencia 
and San José del Guaviare. In terms of demographics, males continued to be the main victims 
(88,2%) in comparison to females. From 11,189 cases with known ages, the majority of victims 
were young adults between 18 and 35 years of age (6,673 cases) (Centro Nacional de Memoria 
Histórica 2016). Although the occupation of victims is widely unknown, the available 
information indicates that most of them were merchants, drivers, motorists and street vendors, 
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which responds to the paramilitary logic of territorial control that aimed to subordinate and 
neutralize certain economic sectors in order to cut off the enemy’s supplies and intelligence 
networks, by imposing stigmatizing identities on their enemies and thus justifying their 
disappearances. Additionally, massacres and selective assassinations increased against political 
activists, trade unionists, community leaders, and teachers, among others.  
Of the total number of forced disappearances registered in this period, 48,2% did not 
identify a presumable perpetrator. Though, from the remaining cases, 64,4% were attributed to 
paramilitaries; 17,1% to guerrilla groups; 16,2% to unidentified armed groups; 3,2% to state 
agents (unspecified roles), and the remaining 0.6% were attributed to collaboration between state 
agents and paramilitary groups (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016). 
The escalation of forced disappearances responded to different interrelated factors: the 
expansion and increase of territorial control by the AUC, the consolidation of the illegal coca 
economy and the international politics in the war against terrorism. After the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 in the Unites States, both the European Union and the United States 
included all of the Colombian illegal armed groups in their lists of terrorist groups. The AUC 
considered that such declaration as a terrorist group would be an obstacle to their recognition as a 
political group. Therefore, the practice of concealment of violence became a priority that needed 
reinforcement. Hence, forced disappearance became systematic as a way of masking the reality 
of massive violence that paramilitaries were inflicting on the country, as it was inconvenient that 
civil society and the international community recognized them as the major perpetrators of 
violence in the face of a political negotiation with the government of Uribe Vélez. The political 
agreement that the paramilitary groups and the government signed produced a decrease in the 
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number of forced disappearances between 2003 and 2005 with about 3,200 disappearances 
registered during those three years (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016). 
The last period, from 2006 to 2015, registered 9,595 victims; a little less than one third of 
the number reported in the previous period. Forced disappearance impacted 722 municipalities, 
mainly affecting capital cities and rural areas of Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Cúcuta, Villavicencio, 
San José del Guaviare, Pasto, Bello, Buenaventura and Tumaco. As in the previous periods, 
information on the socio-demographic profile of the victims is precarious. Although males 
continued to be the majority of the victims (84,1%), females registered a greater proportion in 
comparison to previous periods, representing 14,8% of the victims. Of 5,174 victims whose age 
is known, 2,905 were between 18 and 35 years of age at the moment of their disappearance 
(Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016).  
This last period has been characterized by two important events: the first involves the 
political negotiation with the paramilitaries that quickly led to the formation of post-
demobilization groups also known as Bacrim. These new groups recycled the middle-rank 
paramilitaries and continued to operate in the regions of the AUC, without managing to rebuild 
the AUC’s strategic corridors but still controlling important territories. These groups have 
perpetrated the most number of disappearances with a total of 2,631 (58%) followed by 
guerrillas with a total of 1,112 (25%) (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016).  
The second event was the participation of state agents in the disappearances and 
extrajudicial executions known as ‘falsos positivos’ (see chapter 3). Although figures of reported 
cases indicate that state agents are responsible for 379 forced disappearances (8%), this number 
might increase as more information on the context of additional cases is revealed. Finally, the 
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peace process that started in 2012 with FARC also contributed to the reduction in the number of 
forced disappearances, since unilateral gestures such as the FARC ceasefire brought down 
violence levels unprecedented in the last thirty years.  
Figures and data presented in this chapter respond to a study conducted by the Centro 
Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2016) from which some trends on forced disappearance can be 
analyzed (Figures 5 and 6). Although this study indicated that there had been almost 60 thousand 
victims of forced disappearances up to 2015, an updated report by the same institution that 
extended the period of analysis from 1970 to November to 2017 and included a new source of 
information (Information System of Justice and Peace from Fiscalía) updated the figures to 
82,998 total cases of forced disappearance. According to the INMLCF, 6,670 persons were 
reported as disappeared in 2017 indicating that the phenomenon has not ceased (El Heraldo 
2018). Of those cases with reported information on the perpetrator (42,471 cases or 52% of the 
total cases) the distribution of responsibility is as follows: paramilitary groups: 26,475 cases 
(62,3%), guerrillas: 10,360 cases (24,3%), post-demobilization groups (both paramilitaries and 
guerrilla members): 2,764 cases (6,5%), state agents: 2,484 cases (5,8%), and state agents in 
association with paramilitary groups: 388 cases (0.9%) (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 
2018). 
 
The complexities of counting the disappeared  
Although it is possible to indicate that the figures of forced disappearance in Colombia have 
been much higher than those from the military dictatorships of the Southern Cone, especially if  
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Figure 5. Trends of forced disappearance in Colombia from 1970 to 2015 (Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Histórica 2016). 
 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of victims of forced disappearance in the context of the armed conflict 
according to alleged perpetrator. Colombia 1970-2015 (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 
2016). 
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one takes into consideration that these have occurred within a democratic context (Centro 
Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016), the unification of data on the phenomenon of forced 
disappearance has been a virtually impossible endeavor. Up to 2016 there were no consolidated 
figures that covered in a single study the multiple figures provided by different official 
institutions. The study mentioned above by Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2016) 
conducted a thorough process of comparison of the existing databases trying to cope with the 
disparity of figures found in the official records until 2016 and among which are those of the 
Single Registry of Victims (Registro Unico de Víctimas) administered by the Unit of Victims 
(which reported a total of 94,275 disappeared between 1938 and 2014), and the Information 
System Network for the Disappeared and the Deceased (SIRDEC) of the INMLCF (which 
reported a total of 78,319 disappeared between 1970 and 2012). Moreover, it illustrates the 
limitations inherent to official records (Rozo Alvarez and Puerto Valdivieso 2017). For example, 
one of the most preoccupying issues regarding official figures is the problem of underreporting. 
The Fiscalía had already declared in 2010 that there were about 60 to 65% cases of 
disappearance that were underreported at least in those areas highly affected by the violence. 
Furthermore, fear was one of the main disincentives for victims to report the disappearances 
(Rozo Alvarez and Puerto Valdivieso 2017). 
The underreporting of cases has illustrated the lack of guarantees for the victims to report 
the crimes, and has revealed the means that the government has prioritized in order to find 
information on the whereabouts of the disappeared. In fact, as discussed in the introduction, 
Fiscalía ended up searching for information on the disappearances mainly in the testimonies of 
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the perpetrators in the framework of the LJP. This law revealed testimonies that did not provide 
the quantity and quality of information expected about assassinated persons and the places of 
disposition of their remains (Rozo Alvarez and Puerto Valdivieso 2017). This particular situation 
will be examined in the next chapter. 
In this chapter I explained the birth of international instruments related to forced 
disappearance and underlined how the relatives of the disappeared, both nationally and 
internationally, have played a fundamental role in the definition of the crime. Unfortunately, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 7, the way in which forced disappearance has been defined in 
Colombia, where the greatest responsibility is placed on third parties or in armed groups and not 
on state agents as international legislation does, is intimately related to how victims perceive 
forensic networks (otherwise state networks) and how victims evaluate those networks in 
response to the needs of justice, truth or reparation by families. 
In addition, I described the periods associated with the practice of forced disappearance in 
Colombia, where the period between 1996 and 2005 saw the disappearance of some 32,000 
people almost exclusively at the hands of the paramilitaries and suspiciously not in complicity 
with state officials according to official figures. In the next chapter I examine if in the framework 
of ‘Justice and Peace’ forensic agencies followed an efficient methodology to locate, identify and 
return the remains of the disappeared. In addition, I explore the role of families and their 
participation in the forensic process since the implementation of the LJP and the National Search 
Plan for Disappeared Persons. 
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CHAPTER 6. FORENSIC INTERVENTION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ‘JUSTICE 
AND PEACE’ 
 
Before the Justice and Peace process began, and with it the confession of the whereabouts 
of disappeared victims by the paramilitaries, officials of different institutions19 already conducted 
exhumations due to the need to recover human remains within the framework of the armed 
conflict. As pointed out by a forensic odontologist of the CTI, by 2003 there was a lack of local 
protocols to conduct exhumations and medical examiners and odontologists were in charge of 
conducting them. The headquarters of the CTI, DAS and SIJIN in peripheral regions lacked 
anthropologists, thus “we used to go [to the exhumation site] in public transportation and 
brought shovels with us. I remember being by myself with the family member. I used to do a 
sketch map [at the burial site] badly done of course; we recovered the remains, took them to the 
office, washed them on the terrace and let them dry under the sunlight [...] But we did not know 
there was another way to do it: it was instinctively what we thought was the right thing to do” 
(Interview, March 1 of 2017, translation from the Spanish). 
In 2005, when the LJP was implemented, the application of forensic intervention, 
positioned at the center of the transitional justice process, experienced substantial changes 
throughout the following years. In this chapter, I explore the approach taken by the Fiscalía to 
locate the remains of forcibly disappeared persons and examine if there was a consistent and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19 At that time, forensic teams were beginning to be formed in the DAS, the SIJIN (Judicial 
Investigation Section of the National Police) and the CTI. 
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efficient methodology to find and identify the disappeared. I unfold the complexities encountered 
by forensic practitioners at the different stages of the forensic process, focusing mostly on the 
tasks performed by forensic anthropologists given their necessary presence at exhumations and 
in the analyses of the remains, which, due to the passage of time, have been recovered in 
advanced stages of decomposition. Finally, I discuss the evolution of the return of remains as a 
formal procedure implemented by the Fiscalía, and evaluate the participation of victims 
throughout the forensic process. 
 
The process of Justice and Peace urges the need to find the remains of disappeared persons 
presumed dead 
 When versiones libres began and the paramilitaries started to confess their crimes, the 
Fiscalía and the different institutions that conducted forensic work acknowledged the need to 
create a technological tool that could centralize the exhumation requests by the prosecutors and 
the associated identification processes. This is how the SIRDEC was created and within it, the 
Unique Virtual Identification Center (CUVI), where the requests of different forensic analyses 
by the Fiscalía were registered in association to the data reported as a result of the postmortem 
examinations of cases presumed to be forced disappearances. In addition, the contextual 
information of the cases was registered in the CUVI. At the same time, the laboratories and the 
Identification Groups of the CTI were supported with more personnel, more lab equipment and 
more specialized training supported by foreign cooperation agencies such as the International 
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program from the United States Department of 
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Justice (ICITAP), the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ) and the ICMP 
(Hidalgo 2015). Forensic anthropologists started to receive training in methods to recover human 
remains from clandestine burials, as well as in osteology and bone trauma analysis. Ultimately, 
international cooperation programs served to improve standardization and advance forensic 
practices by strengthening the skills and competency of various forensic practitioners, not only 
anthropologists (Guzmán and Sanabria Medina 2016).  
 The changes in forensic intervention were prompted by the advancement of the 
confessions by the paramilitaries. In short, a specialized unit was created within the Fiscalía 
called the Unidad Nacional de Justicia y Paz (National Unit of Justice and Peace) –now called 
Unidad de Justicia Transicional (Transitional Justice Unit)- with exhumation prosecutors in 
about 12 cities. These prosecutors worked hand in hand with investigators who gathered the 
information on the location of clandestine graves as a result of the confessions. Subsequently, 
prosecutors began to organize exhumation activities by arranging groups led by a forensic 
anthropologist, a topographer, a photographer, anti-explosive personnel if necessary, military or 
police security, and sometimes a forensic odontologist.20   
 As explained in chapter 1, when the final draft of the National Search Plan for 
Disappeared Persons came out in 2007, it recognized the necessity of incorporating testimonial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20 According to Law 600 of 2000, the prosecutor had to go to the exhumations as a witness. 
However, since the implementation of Law 906 of 2004 with the New Penal Process System, 
which came into force in 2005, exhumations could be conducted without the prosecutor 
regardless of the office that requested the exhumation. However, in the framework of the LJP, 
the presence of the prosecutor remained active in order to have a witness during exhumation 
procedures. 
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information not only from perpetrators but also from different sources, including families and 
local communities to locate disappeared persons presumed to be dead. The plan consisted of four 
phases (Figure 7): the investigative, divided into the collection and the verification of 
information; the recovery and identification and the final return of the remains. Although the 
institutions did not have local Standard Operating Procedures for archaeological recoveries or 
anthropological post-mortem examinations, the Plan suggested forensic practitioners follow the 
Istanbul and Minnesota protocols (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 2004; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2017).  
The Plan appeared to be a solid tool that also followed the recommendations provided by 
the EAAF, which involved a strong investigation prior to exhumations and laboratory work 
(Fondebrider 2002). Additionally, the Plan acknowledged the need to have a participation 
strategy for victims in the framework of search activities. 
Unfortunately, the implementation of the search plan, especially its investigative phase, 
was almost skipped. As indicated by the various forensic practitioners from CTI and exhumation 
prosecutors that I interviewed, the main source of information became the confessions by 
paramilitaries, which represented a massive volume of information in terms of potential burial 
sites. Thus, the data provided by paramilitaries in response to the questions: who was/were the 
disappeared, where could they be, and what were the circumstances of the disappearance was 
not compared to other sources and, therefore, was not verified. Instead of using the statements of 
perpetrators to compare versions from additional informants and perhaps evaluate the existence 
of revised versions by the perpetrators (Wright 2010) and ultimately build a strong investigation,  
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Figure 7. National Search Plan for Disappeared Persons (EQUITAS 2015). 
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the confessions by paramilitaries were taken at face value by the Fiscalía. Furthermore, a big 
methodological issue was that most cases did not have a presumptive identity when the forensic 
team accompanied by the perpetrator headed to the sites indicated by the paramilitary. 
Some time later, as noted by a forensic anthropologist from CTI, the Fiscalía issued a set 
of internal guidelines that stated that cases had to have a presumptive identity before exhuming 
the remains. However, as it often occurs in Colombia, a law or a decree is issued but it does not 
circulate to the periphery and ends up being applied by only a few. Thus, many officials from 
Fiscalía refused to apply such resolution. As stated by the anthropologist, certain exhumation 
prosecutors would sarcastically ask: “so, if the dead do not show us their IDs in the grave we are 
not going to exhume them?” (Interview, April 12 of 2017, translated from the Spanish). Thinking 
about how processes were conducted at the beginning of the implementation of the LJP, 
reminded my interviewee that there was full confidence by the Fiscalía in the confession of the 
paramilitary, and that it did not matter who or whom would be exhumed because the significance 
of the exhumation relied on the final statistic reported to the Unidad Nacional de Justicia y Paz 
by the end of the exhumation, and the more remains exhumed, the better the work would look.  
For those forensic practitioners whose work was mainly concentrated in the laboratories, 
especially those at the INMLCF, the massive arrival of human remains for analysis suggested 
that at least with regards to the location of bodies of disappeared victims, the LJP was being 
successful. However the lack of presumptive identities already revealed that the investigations 
were weak or absent because the information provided by the postulados was too vague in terms 
of the identification of the victims, which resulted in massive numbers of remains stored in 
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laboratories without identification. In other words, “[the process of] Justice and Peace sent us 
directly to the exhumations scenario omitting the investigative phase” (Interview with member 
of EQUITAS, February 12 of 2017, translated from the Spanish).   
The gaps in the investigative phase were not only pointed out by forensic practitioners of 
the Fiscalía or EQUITAS. This research revealed that legal representatives of victims such as the 
CCJ and Familiares Colombia have also been emphatic to suggest that the Fiscalía has not 
followed the National Search Plan for Disappeared Persons, and this was especially obvious in 
the first five or six years after the commencement of confessions. The Fiscalía was “digging up 
holes for the purpose of digging but not following a timely methodological route to achieve 
tangible results (…) Justice and Peace showed the precariousness of their work (of Fiscalía) as 
they ended up basing their searches on the testimonial evidence without verifying the 
information provided by the postulados” (Interview with member of CCJ, January 12 of 2017, 
translated from the Spanish).   
The breach of the preliminary phase, or the failures at this stage, were also associated 
with factors such as the lack of personnel to investigate in addition to the absence of strategies by 
the Fiscalía to collect information that could complement or contrast the testimony by the 
postulados. However, it is necessary to recognize that when the LJP came into force many 
victims did not report their cases to the authorities due to fear or retribution. Though, the Fiscalía 
could have offered witnesses protection to families or could have infiltrated investigators in the 
regions to get information on the whereabouts of many disappeared victims presumed dead. 
Nonetheless, the existence of a single investigator assigned to 500 cases of forced disappearance 
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revealed -and still reveals- the big institutional vacuum in the Fiscalía regarding the availability 
of personnel to carry out different tasks, including investigations (Interview with forensic 
anthropologist from CTI, December 8 of 2016). Furthermore, the interviews conducted by the 
investigators of Fiscalía often revealed that investigators did not have the necessary training to 
ask key questions in relation to potential clandestine gravesites or to collect antemortem data that 
could be valuable to the identification of human remains. As stated by Hildago (2015), it was 
very frequent to deal with incomplete or outdated information on the cases, which not only 
complicated the location of the graves but also made forensic teams travel to conduct forensic 
searches to places where other teams had already recovered human remains, thus wasting time 
and resources. 
 
Problems with confessions and other issues in the field 
One important methodological gap in the procurement of information on the part of the 
postulados was that during the versiones libres, paramilitaries limited themselves to enumerating 
crimes and offering a very brief account of who the victim was, if she or he was disappeared 
and/or murdered and where. However, accounts with detailed information that could help with 
the location of the bodies and the identification were almost always absent in the judicial 
scenario. Therefore, since confessions were almost exclusively the only information product of 
the investigation, the forensic teams went to the field with very little information about who they 
were looking for and the contextual data on the cases.  
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In 2015 I assisted as observer to three hearings of versiones libres of members of the 
Bloque Centauros from the AUC. In those hearings I noticed that the dynamics of the confession, 
given the multiplicity of crimes perpetrated occurred in two ways: one where the postulado 
elucidated details about the organization of the paramilitary block to which he belonged and the 
region where the block operated in a chronological narrative; and a second part focused on the 
crimes committed prior to the demobilization. In this particular case, crimes could range from 
1996 up to 2006. During these hearings, the postulados referred very briefly to at least twenty 
crimes perpetrated by each of them, including kidnappings, false positives, homicides and 
disappearances. From the homicides in particular, all confessed to having killed members of their 
own group, thus accounting for the internal conflicts experienced in the organization. 
When confessing selective assassinations or forced disappearances, the three postulados 
indicated having perpetrated these crimes against peasants and civilians whom they accused of 
being guerrillas or whom they thought were supporters of the guerrillas, but they never took on 
the task to make sure that the victims were indeed guerrilla members or allies. During the 
hearings, the postulados offered very imprecise demographic data about their victims, perhaps 
because more often than not, paramilitaries did not even know the names of their victims. The 
information provided during hearings included partial information on height, skin color, sex, 
approximate age of the person, and perhaps the nickname if the person had one but no details 
that could help establish the identity of the victims. The prosecutor of the tribunal never 
questioned the postulados about contextual details of each case or about specifics on the location 
of the three or four clandestine graves that they confessed having opened to bury the victims. 
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Though, one of them confessed to have thrown one of his victims into the river. From the days 
that I observed the hearings, it became clear that the postulados’ memory can fail because of the 
time elapsed between the moment of the crime and the time of the confessions, in addition to the 
multiple crimes committed, which make them forget specific details on each of their offenses. 
Along the same lines, an additional problem highlighted by some forensic practitioners is 
that although the perpetrators could remember the location of the burial sites, their memory 
regarding areas of interment of bodies failed when the time between the inhumation and the 
exhumation was very prolonged. Often times the postulados accompanied the exhumations but 
other times they provided the exhumations prosecutor with a sketch map of the location of the 
gravesite(s). Natural factors or human intervention could have altered the natural landscape, thus 
modifying the characteristics of the area that the postulados initially remembered. Other times, in 
their eagerness to obtain legal benefits such as reduction of the sentence, the paramilitaries that 
had already been convicted by the civilian justice system began to negotiate the information of 
the location of graves with those who had demobilized later through the LJP (Hidalgo 2015). 
This situation affected the possibility of finding the remains of disappeared victims because once 
in the field with the paramilitary, it was evident that the information did not come from the 
primary source and had not been verified.21 
 The verification activities in the field that could account for the reliability of the source 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21 Forensic teams from the CTI are not exclusive to the Unidad Nacional de Justicia y Paz from 
the Fiscalía. They also support exhumations requested by the offices of Human Rights, 
Demobilized and Victims, among other offices inside the Fiscalía. Hence, by assisting other 
offices the problem of the ‘graves business’ became evident to forensic practitioners. 
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or the possible alterations that the site could have suffered, would have helped forensic teams to 
plan the logistics of the activities better. These include taking the necessary measures to deal 
with weather changes; to plan on the proper means of transportation to get to the sites, as well as 
the amount of time that a prospecting or an exhumation activity could take. Instead, as pointed 
out by a member from EQUITAS, this has resulted in teams not finding the remains, and because 
this continues to be a recurring practice, “once in the field, the prosecutor very quietly tells one 
that he made all the efforts to come [to the site], but he just found out that the paramilitary was 
not here when the crime(s) took place and that the information that the postulado has regarding 
the location of the grave was provided to him in jail…. And all this happens in the middle of the 
mountain, with a team of forensic practitioners and the security team next to him. It is 
unbelievable that a prosecutor can tell us such a thing when we assume that there was a strong 
investigation and a verification of information prior to coming to the site” (Interview, February 
12 of 2017, translated from the Spanish). 
During my time conducting participant observation of exhumation activities there was 
only a single time when a paramilitary member who was in charge of indicating the location of a 
clandestine grave accompanied the forensic team. Exhumations in Colombia, as mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, imply resources and a very solid work on the logistics of all activities. 
Sometimes the prospecting or exhumation activities imply traveling hours by boat; walking six 
or eight hours in the middle of the jungle; taking helicopters or light aircrafts to get to the burial 
sites; or riding horses where there are no roads to take. In the four times that I joined the Fiscalía 
for exhumation activities, at least nine people were part of the forensic teams, which meant 
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transportation in two pickups that also carried necessary equipment, including total stations, 
shovels, tents, cadaver bags and tyveks, among others. Even sometimes the prosecutor brought 
dogs to accompany the work of the anti-explosive experts.  
The day that the forensic team and I arrived the National Penitentiary and Prison Institute 
(INPEC) to pick up the paramilitary, who was also accompanied by INPEC personnel during the 
entire search, it was eight o’clock in the morning. The administrative process to get him out of 
jail lasted about 45 minutes. The site, according to the paramilitary, was about 60 minutes away. 
We left in two pickups, in addition to the pickup of the INPEC. After almost two hours of 
driving back and forth on the same road, the man was never able to locate the site, forcing the 
forensic team to prospect an area that was clearly unknown to him. The prospected site was an 
area with plenty of vegetation located three or four meters away from the main road and 
separated by a water gutter that was flooded. Only the prosecutor, the postulado and a couple of 
men from the forensic team crossed the gutter to get to the side of the suspected burial site. The 
team found no alterations on the soil or any indication that there had been a body there. The 
prospection of the area took the team about an hour and later we went back to the INPEC to 
return the paramilitary to jail. Later, on our way back to the city, the exhumation prosecutor 
secretly told me that this was probably one of the many cases in which the paramilitary had not 
even participated in the crime, and that he had probably obtained some vague information on the 
location of a gravesite in prison from a third party. 
The absence of a rigorous investigation and its consequences in the archaeological 
recovery stage was exacerbated by issues related to the lack of training in excavation techniques 
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by the leading anthropologists who guided prospecting and exhumation activities in the 
following years after the implementation of the LJP. Part of the problem lies in the fact that 
forensic archaeology practitioners only have bachelor degrees in anthropology, which do not 
provide the necessary knowledge to conduct proper archaeological excavations. Thus, forensic 
practitioners have gained their expertise by performing forensic archaeological interventions on a 
regular basis since the number and diversity of relevant cases are quite significant (Guatame 
García, Puerto Valdivieso, and Buitrago Pérez 2015). Although the training that ICITAP started 
in 2007 was important to strengthen the work of anthropologists, mistakes associated with the 
absence of formal training in archaeological methods had already been made in the field by that 
year. In addition, not all the officers of the different institutions had the opportunity to receive 
training from ICITAP. In 2012, ICITAP ceased offering courses in forensic anthropology and 
forensic archaeology so practitioners hired afterwards have not had any formal training, 
especially those who do not work in capital cities. 
When I asked about errors made in the field, some of the forensic practitioners pointed 
out issues related to recoveries from mass graves where proper individualization of the skeletons 
was poorly done, thus creating chaos in the labs for those anthropologists in charge of the 
analyses. Furthermore, some admitted having articulated the remains together and photographed 
them in situ after the excavation, which could lead to further confusions associated with forensic 
malpractice. Time and experience, however, have allowed practitioners to learn from past 
incidents and not repeat these mistakes in the field. Yet, despite the technical and scientific 
improvements in excavations, imprudence still occurs on the part of exhumation prosecutors. For 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	   	  	  
108 
example, sometimes when the family has not been able to accompany the exhumation, the 
prosecutor occasionally calls the relatives after having exhumed a body and assures the relative 
of the person disappeared that “he has recovered the body of their loved one (…) when 
postmortem analyses have not even taken place and when there is no forensic genetics report yet. 
There are very hasty [exhumation] prosecutors who make these kinds of statements that have 
very strong implications for people (families) who have expectations that are very different from 
reality” (Interview with member from EQUITAS, February 12 of 2017, translated from the 
Spanish). This situation indicates that there are still components related to the recovery phase 
that need attention, especially if the activity is accompanied by the families: not simply in order 
to follow the international guidelines and protocols, but also to not to generate in the relatives the 
expectation that the forensic process is a short and agile process. 
Continuing with field activities, exhumations are not the only process that has lacked 
specialized knowledge and technology. For example, in order to establish potential sites of 
interment of human remains, forensic teams are still almost exclusively relying on rudimentary 
tools, including probes, bores, shovels and trowels. The prospecting methods are mostly limited 
to the pedestrian search, where the forensic team walks looking for possible evidence or features, 
such as changes in the soil and the vegetation, that may indicate decaying organic matter (To 
2017). Additionally, teams apply invasive techniques in prospection by using bores and other 
tools to open wells of 12 to 25 cm in diameter and 1.20 to 4 meters deep. These invasive 
methods are used to find out if the site’s stratigraphy has been altered. However, as pointed out 
by Hidalgo (2015), a former forensic anthropologist from CTI, in the planning of activities in the 
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field, it is surprising that Fiscalía still had not supported prospecting activities based on 
geophysical methods, 22  electric resistivity, remote sensing methods, or even Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) to build predictive models that could account for possible burial sites.  
In this regard, EQUITAS has already proposed the combination of predictive statistical 
and spatial modeling in order to find disappeared persons under a regional pilot plan applied in 
the municipalities of Chámeza and Recetor in the department of Casanare (EQUITAS 2015). 
Although the project has the practical application phase pending, it has advantages as it uses 
different variables, such as information on the areas of detention of disappeared persons, zones 
where bodies have already been exhumed, location of paramilitary bases, access routes and other 
information based on cartography to identify potential gravesites. My interviewee from 
EQUITAS indicated that the work to convince organizations that represent victims and the 
Fiscalía regarding the potential of this scientific approach has been arduous. However, some 
organizations of victims have come to realize that this work is essential to begin the 
implementation of new knowledge and technologies to facilitate the location of the disappeared 
and thus stop basing searches exclusively on testimonial information (Interview with member 
from EQUITAS, February 12 of 2017). This is especially necessary now, as the time elapsed 
since the perpetration of the crimes to the present has affected the survival of testimonies: those 
who may have had information about the crimes could have moved (or could have been forcibly 
displaced) to other areas or may have already died (both perpetrators and family members), 
which makes the task of locating the remains much more complex.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22 Only two years ago the anthropologists from CTI- Bogotá began to be trained in the use of the 
ground penetrating radar, therefore its implementation is still a work in progress.  
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An additional element to consider in the difficulties of locating remains of disappeared 
persons presumed dead has been the modus operandi, more on the part of the paramilitaries than 
on the part of the guerrillas. In their eagerness to hide the amount of crimes that they were 
committing and thus offer a rhetoric based on the idea that they were not terrorists as opposed to 
the guerrillas (as explained in chapter 4), the paramilitaries began to hide the evidence of their 
crimes beginning with the concealment of human remains. In some of the versiones libres, the 
postulados have indicated having thrown dead bodies into the rivers or crocodile hatcheries; and 
having incinerated bodies in crematories made by themselves (Osuna 2015; Verdad Abierta 
2015a). However, as a forensic anthropologist from the CTI explained to me, although the 
version of the paramilitaries is set, technically that version has not been corroborated because the 
forensic teams have not found the evidence. That is to say, they have not found remains of 
bodies thrown into the river; and although the sites of crematoria exist, the Fiscalía has not found 
biological evidence inside them. In addition, the paramilitaries dismembered many of their 
victims before burying them, thus the associated graves tend to be smaller and more difficult to 
find. In fact, it has been very difficult to detect them in the work conducted during the 
prospections, especially because many paramilitaries have failed to remember the exact location 
of the burials (Interview with member from CTI, April 10 of 2017). 
A final topic of necessary consideration with regard to the way in which fieldwork has 
been carried out in the search for the disappeared has been having to search for human remains 
in the midst of the armed conflict. As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, forensic 
intervention became a central part of the process of transitional justice between the paramilitaries 
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and the government, yet this negotiation did not prevent teams from having to exhume bodies in 
minefields or in the middle of the crossfire between the army and the FARC or the ELN 
guerrillas. All but two forensic practitioners that I interviewed from the Fiscalía and the DIJIN 
narrated at least one event in which they felt that their lives were at risk. Forensic teams in 
Colombia always use a security team provided either by the army or the police. Thus, many 
illegal groups, including the Bacrim, have felt threatened by state security members and 
therefore have used explosive devices to scare teams away or have harassed the teams by 
sending death threats with messengers. In this regard, one of the exhumation prosecutors 
indicated that part of the problem is that in many of the areas where teams exhume, the police are 
the number one enemy of the illegal groups that control the zones, hence when the police 
accompany the teams, the guerrillas begin to harass the entire group (Interview with exhumations 
prosecutor, April 1 of 2017).  
One of the accounts that surprised me the most about risking one’s life in the field was 
that of a forensic anthropologist from CTI who described his first exhumation activity as a 
nightmare. As he began talking, his facial expression changed and his breathing stirred. His 
statement reads: 
“We were in Antioquia, and we were going to exhume some remains so we began our 
journey in Medellín. The prosecutor, an assistant and… I do not remember who else ... maybe 
the investigator ... took the same helicopter but these members of the team arrived the next day. 
The fact is that before landing the guerrilla began to shoot from afar and we could hear the 
shots. We were flying over the jungle and suddenly the army soldiers that accompanied us told 
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us: “jump!” [from the helicopter]. The helicopter was two meters away from the ground (…) it 
was a movie moment. I think of that situation and remember that I felt like in Vietnam. So we 
finally landed safely. On day one we got to sleep in our camp and the remaining part of the 
group [from the exhumation team] could not arrive because of logistics issues. All we heard that 
night was “pah pah pah ...” all night long. The guerrillas fired to intimidate us, you know? 
playing with our minds (…) and I thought: “Where am I?” And that’s how it was for ten days. 
The guerrillas intimidating us all the time as we were doing our job (…) And the ‘pisahuevos,’ 
do you know what ‘pisahuevos’ are? They are guerrilla members who walk barefoot or wearing 
boots in their underwear, and you can’t hear them or feel them. They are trained to move like 
ghosts. They take a special training where they walk on the leaves of the trees, on wood… 
anywhere and nobody sees them or hears them. They are suicidal, they hide and throw explosive 
artifacts including grenades to kill the army, the police or what have you. So that night, one of 
the young soldiers that accompanied us (….) killed a pisahuevos. Imagine! there was this 
pisahuevos hidden inside our camp who could have killed us! (…) And this young army soldier 
without any experience, he heard him and killed him. I do not know how he saw him. We were all 
stupefied and in shock. My first dead body…! the first body I had to deal with was not even 
skeletonized! It was a fresh cadaver of a guerrilla member who wanted to kill us. The young 
soldier, without any experience killed him. I do not know how he managed to see him. I thought 
we were never going to leave that camp. I thought I was going to die in there.” 
The situation of insecurity has been a recurrent issue in forensic activities of recovery in 
the country. The pressure to conduct prospections or exhumations in a short period of time 
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(sometimes hours) due to adverse situations of public order or given the rush to exhume 
numerous bodies has meant that the protocols cannot be strictly followed. In 2015, the Fiscalía 
approved a protocol for collecting information prior to recoveries that also included exhumations 
and identifications and final return of remains based on the National Search Plan for Disappeared 
Persons. However, as indicated above, when the process of Justice and Peace began, the teams 
were simply applying the Minnesota protocol (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights 2017) as best they could.  
However, situations of insecurity have created gaps in the photographic documentation of 
the scene and other times a careful collection of physical evidence has been overlooked. For 
example, there is often no time to sift through the soil from which bone remains have been 
exhumed. This can result in missing bones and other crucial evidence, such as bullets or clothing. 
In addition, it is still very common that the description of field activities with their respective 
photographic support and maps are very poor as a result of a rushed exhumation. Although the 
peace negotiation with the FARC has improved the security situation in some areas of the 
country, as I experienced traveling both alone and accompanied by the Fiscalía in the department 
of Meta without harassment, there are still areas where the prevalence of drug trafficking, the 
Bacrim, the ELN and FARC dissidents and other actors continue to make the work of recovering 
human remains an enormous and dangerous challenge. 
 
 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	   	  	  
114 
Disappeared persons buried in municipal cemeteries as unidentified cadavers  
Between the years of 2004 and 2009, the Corporación Colectivo Sociojurídico Orlando 
Fals Borda (legal representatives of victims who also make psychological accompaniment to the 
relatives of the disappeared) began to receive complaints from people who had their relatives 
disappeared. The cases mostly came from the Bajo Ariari region in the department of Meta and 
the context of the cases indicated that these could be extrajudicial executions or false positives. 
Due to fear, the majority of the victims never dared to file a report before the authorities, thus the 
Corporación began to investigate the cases of the families that approached them, finding a 
pattern amid all stories: the dates of the disappearances coincided with dates in which the 
military had reported combats with the guerrillas. By legally representing the families, the 
Corporación managed to consult the military files in order to investigate military operations in 
different areas of Meta, finding that the army had reported killing one or more guerrilla members 
in those combats. As indicated in the military files, those killed in combat were taken to the 
municipal cemeteries. This finding began to reveal the phenomenon of disappeared persons 
buried in municipal cemeteries as unidentified cadavers (Interview with member of Corporación 
Colectivo Sociojurídico Orlando Fals Borda, June 13 of 2017, translated from the Spanish). My 
interviewee from the Corporación explained how the unveiling of the problem of unidentified 
dead bodies began: 
 “In 2009 we began to follow up the increase of unidentified persons in these cemeteries, 
particularly the Macarena cemetery in Meta, and we filed a complaint before the Special 
Investigations Unit of the Attorney General’s Office noting that it was quite suspicious that the 
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army had been going to the cemetery to bury bodies without following any protocol. Because the 
situation was very complex due to the level of violation of human rights, the least we could do 
was report the situation here [in Bogotá] but in the Meta region the pressure was enormous. 
Human rights defenders were being persecuted and social leaders were assassinated and 
reported as false positives so what we decided was: let’s look for our congressmen, let’s find 
some human rights defenders who can support the communities to make this a public complaint. 
Finally, on July 22 of 2010, we held a public hearing in Macarena convened by the Congress’ 
Commission of Peace.” 
As indicated by my interviewee from the Corporación, initially the gravedigger from the 
Macarena cemetery indicated to the Corporación that there were around 2,000 unidentified 
bodies buried in the cemetery (Interview with member of Corporación Colectivo Sociojurídico 
Orlando Fals Borda, June 13 of 2017). However, it was determined later that a total of 2,000 
bodies were inhumed and it was necessary to establish how many of those were unidentified. 
Traditionally, before an unidentified body is inhumed, a medico legal autopsy is performed by 
the INMLCF or by a rural physician. If it is not possible to establish the identity of the remains 
after the post-mortem examination, the INMLCF delivers the body to the state cemetery, where 
the gravedigger buries the remains. The unidentified remains are usually buried with a 
plasticized document or a stainless plate that has an engraved number associated with an autopsy 
report in case the body can be identified in the future and returned to family members.  
Before carrying out these burials it was always assumed that there was a systematized 
documentation of the graves and that the persons in charge of the cemeteries always knew about 
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the location of the graves inside the cemeteries. However, the reality of the Macarena cemetery 
and at least 300 additional cemeteries is that those officials in charge of municipal cemeteries are 
unaware of the spatial location of the more than 29,000 unidentified human remains that exist in 
Colombia. The reason is because the authorities in charge almost never systematically 
documented the areas where these bodies were inhumed or designed databases to enter this 
information, thus creating administrative chaos across the country (Sanabria Medina and Osorio 
2015). 
 In order to solve the issue of the identification of these remains and to investigate which 
of these could be cases of forced disappearance, the Corporación turned to various congressmen, 
including Iván Cepeda, who, with the Ministry of the Interior, managed to generate an inter-
institutional agreement (Agreement 01 of 2010) between the INMCLF, the Registry (entity in 
charge of processing IDs for Colombian citizens) and the Ministry of the Interior in order to 
initiate the identification of the remains. This work would be done by comparing the fingerprints 
of the unidentified bodies taken during the autopsies with the fingerprints registered in the IDs 
taken by the Registry of those people who could be candidates for a match based on contextual 
information. On the other hand, the Fiscalía had to begin an intervention starting with five 
cemeteries in the Meta region with the aim of documenting the number of unidentified bodies. 
However, to complete such task, the Fiscalía had to exhume the cemetery areas where it was 
presumed that these cadavers were buried. Subsequently, the INMLCF began carrying out 
‘second autopsies’ to compare the physical evidence reported in the first autopsy with a second 
post-mortem examination (paying especial attention to those remains that had no physical 
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numbers that could identify them either because they had no plate or because the plasticized 
document had disintegrated and decomposed) or to conduct genetic analyses to complete the 
identification process and return the remains to their families (Sanabria Medina and Osorio 
2015).  
Many times the remains that needed a second post-mortem examination for identification 
purposes were not skeletonized but in advanced stage of decomposition at the moment of 
exhumation. I remember from my time working at the INMCLF that the way we approached 
those cases was by comparing the biological profile (age, sex, stature and ancestry) as well as the 
perimortem findings to those of the first autopsy and thus confirm or exclude that the remains 
analyzed corresponded to those analyzed in the first autopsy. Later in this chapter I will outline 
some of the difficulties encountered by forensic practitioners during second autopsies and during 
post-mortem examinations in general.  
In 2010, the Fiscalía arrived at the Macarena municipal cemetery in order to assess the 
area where the unidentified remains could be buried. The Fiscalía started a systematic work and 
found an initial area of 600 square meters where archaeologists found approximately 400 
demarcated wooden boards with a burial certificate number and its associated date, which 
suggested that there were 400 bodies inhumed between 2003 and 2010. Nonetheless, in order to 
confirm the number of remains, these had to be exhumed. It was then when a first prospecting 
activity was conducted and the wooden boards and soil features were documented. This allowed 
topographers to create a detailed map of the area where unidentified bodies could be buried 
(Interview with forensic anthropologist from CTI, December 10 of 2016).  
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During my participation as observer during fieldwork activities, I went to Macarena for a 
few days to observe the work conducted by the Fiscalía. The Sierra de La Macarena comprises a 
mountainous system located east of the Cordillera de los Andes and separated at its northern end, 
about 40 km from the Eastern Cordillera (Figure 8). Due to the complex geography of this area 
and the lack of paved roads, the Fiscalía always arrives to Macarena in small airplanes of local 
and also very expensive airlines. My journey began in Bogotá going to Villavicencio by car, and 
the next day I took a small plane that took me to Macarena in about an hour. The day that I 
arrived was the fifth day of work for the forensic team, which by then had already exhumed 23 
bodies. 
 
 
Figure 8. Aerial view of the route towards the Serrania de la Macarena. Photo by author. 
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As for the intervention of the cemetery of Macarena (Figures 9 and 10), this was the fifth 
time that the Fiscalía had taken their teams to perform the task of exhuming unidentified bodies 
since the mapping conducted in 2010. As pointed out by the forensic team leader, that is, the 
anthropologist, he had been going to the cemetery to direct the exhumations in order to guarantee 
a systematic and continuous work in the field since the initial mapping of the cemetery 
(Interview with forensic anthropologist from CTI, April 26 of 2017). The forensic team, 
composed of nine members besides the exhumation prosecutor began activities at 7:30 in the 
morning until 2:30 in the afternoon because torrential rain is very frequent in the evenings in this 
mountainous area. Although I noticed that the work and the coordination between the members 
of the team was very good, I was surprised by the lack of collaboration on the part of the local 
mayor to lend us some tents to cover the graves from the rain as well as to provide the service of 
a person who could cover with concrete the bóvedas23 where the remains would be buried later. 
The bodies exhumed were in graves of 80 cm deep; 60 cm wide and 2 meters long, each other 
separated by about 40 cm. All graves were individual except for one that contained three 
cadavers buried inside individual plastic bags. The logistics implied that once recovered, each 
cadaver had to be taken to the morgue of the cemetery with the task of recovering from the bag 
the card or plaque with the number associated with the first autopsy, perform a preliminary 
inventory, remove one or more bones to have as a reference sample for future genetic 
comparisons, and place the remains inside a labeled cadaver bag. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23 The bóvedas are concrete-made pits similar to mausoleums.  
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Figure 9. Entrance to the municipal cemetery of Macarena, Meta. Photo by author.          
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Figure 10. Bóvedas inside the cemetery of Macarena, Meta. The white painted construction on 
the right is the cemetery morgue. Photo by author. 
 
The bodies recovered from the graves were inside black plastic bags, which allowed the 
partial preservation of soft tissue, thus making the work in the morgue very challenging as the 
remains were in initial stage of skeletonization with remnants of adipocere. Yet, despite the 
difficulties each day the forensic team exhumed between four and six sets of human remains that 
sat in the cemetery’s morgue for at least seven days until the headquarters of the Fiscalía in 
Macarena could finally hire a person to cover the bóvedas where the remains would be reburied. 
These bóvedas are located in a special area of the cemetery where there is now total control over 
the documentation of these remains.  
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The technical work carried out during those days was complete: the photographers 
rigorously recorded both the field and morgue activities; the topographers took spatial 
coordinates from each grave and made the respective sketch maps; the assistants helped to shovel 
permanently despite the incessant weather (90 degrees Fahrenheit) and the humidity 
experienced; and the exhumations prosecutor was attentive to lead the logistics and fill out all the 
forms associated with each set of human remains. The field activity that lasted ten days allowed 
the team to recover and re-bury around 60 human remains. 
As illustrated in Figure 7, in the investigative phase the National Search Plan initially 
contemplated the search of information in the cemetery records to aid in the location of 
disappeared persons. However, the Fiscalía was far from imagining that the problem of the dead 
buried as unidentified in the municipal cemeteries would be so chaotic, considering that not all 
those deaths correspond to forced disappearances or deaths directly related to the armed conflict. 
The lack of administrative organization in the cemeteries has forced the Fiscalía to intervene in 
at least nine cemeteries, including five in the Llanos Orientales, of which 1,332 bodies were 
exhumed as of July 2016 and 830 were identified by fingerprints. Of the latter, 152 corresponded 
to victims of forced disappearance who were almost always reported by the army as killed in 
combat (Corporación Colectivo Sociojurídico Orlando Fals Borda 2016).  
The work of the Corporación in the search of the relatives of these remains has been key. 
My interviewee from the Corporation narrated: “We designed a campaign called: ‘Let’s tell the 
truth because all unidentified persons have a story.’ The aim of such campaign was to look for 
families through the use of graphic pieces such as posters, brochures, messages of local radio 
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stations, and activities in terminals and markets with families who had disappeared relatives (...) 
After the first wave of identifications made through the Agreement 01 of 2010, we arrived in 
Macarena with a poster that showed the photos of the first set of identified persons. The result 
was that many families began to recognize their relatives on the pictures. What we had was 
bodies looking for their relatives and not the other way around and such a campaign was 
essential to begin locating the families” (Interview with member of Corporación Colectivo 
Sociojurídico Orlando Fals Borda, June 13 of 2017, translated from the Spanish). 
Despite the fact that the work of the Fiscalía in Macarena and in other cemeteries has 
made progress in terms of the exhumation and identification of bodies, some experts have 
expressed great concern about the limited institutional capacity of the Fiscalía to respond to the 
problem of unidentified bodies and the establishment of how many of these could correspond to 
cases of forced disappearance (Corporación Colectivo Sociojurídico Orlando Fals Borda 2016; 
Sanabria Medina and Osorio 2015). Of the cases advised by the Corporación, around 100 
correspond to cases of extra-judicial executions for which there are currently around 55 military 
personnel in prison (Interview with member of Corporación Colectivo Sociojurídico Orlando 
Fals Borda, June 13 of 2017). 
 
Post-mortem examinations: identifying the disappeared 
At the beginning of this chapter, I indicated that my observations regarding the approach 
to the search and identification of disappeared persons would be mostly based on the work by 
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forensic anthropologists who have been essential to both the exhumations as well as the lab 
analyses due to the state of decomposition of cadavers exhumed within the framework of the 
LJP. However, I will briefly discuss the work of medical examiners, geneticists and 
odontologists in the three state institutions responsible of the forensic work. 
Since Justice and Peace was implemented and the problem of the unidentified remains 
buried in municipal cemeteries was revealed, laboratories and morgues were filled with human 
remains pending identification. Although the DIJIN and the CTI have laboratories and 
identification groups, the most arduous task fell on the hands of forensic practitioners of the 
INMLCF, as these professionals do not often conduct exhumations. Around 2010, this institution 
forced interdisciplinary groups to address the cases that were exhumed by the CTI with around 
10 to 15 anthropologists leading those groups. However, as will be discussed later, the number of 
forensic anthropologists was derisory to say the least, in comparison to the amount of remains 
exhumed. Each case was a different story, and because of the advanced degree of decomposition 
or skeletonization, the analysis of each case could take two or more weeks, depending on the 
speed with which the case was initiated and if the remains had perimortem injuries, which 
required more time for a detailed analysis.  
By that time, the INMLCF already had SOPs to perform medico legal necropsies on 
cadavers in an advanced state of decomposition. However, forensic anthropology labs did not 
have SOPs and therefore the analyses simply followed the recommendations of the Minnesota 
Protocol (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2017). The lack of 
infrastructure to approach these cases and especially the lack of laboratories equipped for the 
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processing of decomposing cadavers generated delays in the analyses and the delivery of reports 
to the exhumation prosecutors. For example, I remember that when I started working with what 
we now know as ‘Justice and Peace cases’ I was assigned to the city of Tunja, where at least 
during the first year I had to work with medical examiners whom had never performed autopsies 
on skeletonized cadavers and although I had enough physical space to work, I had no implements 
to process the remains. Hence, I decided to buy a pot and a stove from my own pocket in order to 
speed up the maceration of the remains because the institute did not provide me with these tools. 
Tunja was also a very cold and rainy city all year round, thus after washing the bones, 
they could take a week to dry, which slowed down the analyses and also put me in trouble with 
the institute, which expected me to complete the processing, analysis and the report of three 
forensic cases per week. Similarly, other colleagues may have had the implements but not the 
space to conduct examinations, as happened for many years in Bogotá, where there were about 
seven anthropologists, two odontologists and a secretary working in a laboratory of less than 50 
square meters. Despite the fact that the infrastructure conditions improved in the different 
locations of the country over time, when it came to the bioanthropological analysis (which 
includes the estimation of biological profile; trauma analysis and establishment of post-mortem 
interval) practically all anthropologists lacked training and adequate knowledge. With the 
exception of a few, we practically faced the analysis of human remains with very basic 
knowledge in human osteology but without having formal education in human anatomy, bone 
biology or statistics. 
Nowadays methods designed and/or validated to estimate the biological profile of 
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Colombian populations already exist (González-Colmenares, Sanabria Medina, and Báez 2016; 
Monsalve and Hefner 2016; Moore et al. 2016; Rivera-Sandoval, Monsalve, and Cattaneo 2018) 
even though the body of these studies is growing slowly. Nevertheless, these studies are products 
of the need to have local standards that allow Colombian demographic information to be 
recognized in bone and dental tissues during a medico legal autopsy and thus avoid the use of 
standards from foreign populations (Sanabria Medina and Osorio 2015). Although the training 
received by ICITAP did not fully prepare us for the complexity of the cases that we received for 
examination, it certainly made us aware of the need to validate methods of the biological profile 
estimation for Colombian populations. Nonetheless, from my interviews with the experts from 
each institution, I learned that the methods used to estimate the biological profile are not the 
same for anthropologists at each of the three forensic agencies. For example, some of the 
methods that are still used for age estimation at the CTI date to the 1920’s (Todd 1920; Todd 
1921) and although a guide was approved in 2016 to follow minimum standards in the search 
and identification of human remains (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses 
2016), the anthropologists of the three institutions continue to work in very different ways and 
therefore the application of validated methods for Colombian populations is still a challenge.  
Such is the lack of communication and inter-institutional articulation, that only the 
anthropologists of INMLCF and DIJIN perform trauma analysis, which is especially useful to 
help the medical examiner determine cause and manner of death. Cases alleged to be forced 
disappearances can be very complex due to the advanced state of decomposition in which they 
are recovered and because they usually present various perimortem trauma, including 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	   	  	  
127 
dismemberment, decapitation, blast injuries, or multiple ballistic type traumas. Therefore, the 
analysis has to be very careful because injuries require literature and peer consultation. In the 
opinion of an INMLCF anthropologist, not only was the money invested in the training of CTI 
anthropologists in bone trauma wasted -for they are only analyzing biological profile- but it is 
also an unfortunate situation, because while in the United States and other areas of the world it is 
clear what the job of the forensic anthropologist is, at the CTI it is the medical examiner who 
conducts this analysis on his/her own and whom otherwise does not have enough training to 
conduct an autopsy on skeletal remains (Interview with forensic anthropologist from INMLCF, 
June 20 of 2017). This is especially true for those medical examiners working at headquarters of 
the CTI far from capital cities where the medical examiners have acquired more knowledge and 
experience. The same lack of articulation exists when conducting –or rather not conducting- 
identification reports at the CTI and the DIJIN, but I will come back to this particular topic later.  
Due to the state of decomposition of the remains recovered in the framework of 
transitional justice, the work of genetics has been essential for the identification of those cases 
that had a presumptive identity and biological samples of family members available. In the 
process of adjusting to the necessity of identifying the remains, the INMLCF and the DIJIN 
opened new labs (for a total of seven labs) and hired more personnel. However, as explained by a 
geneticist from the CTI, by 2008, before the opening of new labs, the problems related to the 
identification had to do with samples that were highly degraded by taphonomic factors as the 
DNA extraction techniques applied were not as effective when the quality of the bone sample 
was not good. However, with time, DNA extraction techniques improved and today the 
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techniques applied include silica and phenol (Interview with forensic geneticist from CTI, June 2 
of 2017, translated from the Spanish). 
Currently, the guide for minimum standards in the identification agreed by the three 
forensic agencies indicates that for genetic analyses using bone samples, the sample has to be 
amplified until completing at least 23 Short Tandem Repeat (STR) markers. In degraded or 
scarce bone samples, or in cases where experts are dealing with unidentified bodies or previous 
exclusion results, two different bone samples must be processed or two extractions of the same 
structure must be carried out, if there is no other sample available (Instituto Nacional de 
Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses 2016). Usually, the identification involves the analysis of 
nuclear DNA, and if necessary it is combined with the analysis of the Y chromosome and/or 
mitochondrial DNA. Exclusion or non-exclusion results are based on probabilities determined 
from the allele frequencies of the Colombian population (Figueroa-Franco and Vicuña-Giraldo 
2015). 
A key factor in the use of genetics is that the genetic profile of the cases that remain as 
unidentified is uploaded to the National Databank of Genetic Profiles (BNPG) which is the same 
United States’ Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) platform that Colombia aquired from this 
country as part of the Plan Colombia.  The aim of implementing the BNPG was to strenghten the 
judiciary investigation. In Colombia, the BNPG carries out two types of searches: the first one is 
the search for comparison of genetic profiles of an evidence in a particular case with the genetic 
profiles of all the suspects included in the database. This search corresponds to the ‘crime 
module.’ The second type of search allows to establish possible matches between the relatives of 
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disappeared persons and the genetic profile of unidentified remains. This search belongs to the 
‘identification module.’ Each profile registered in the system includes microsatellite nuclear 
genetic markers (STR). In the beginning, 13 STRs were analyzed, but currently the databank 
allows the incorporation of up to 29 nuclear genetic markers. As of 2015, the database stored 
26,662 genetic profiles, of which 2,065 corresponded to allegedly disappeared human remains 
and 245,557 to relatives (Figueroa-Franco and Vicuña-Giraldo 2015). 
The BNPG is managed by an INMLCF administrator who makes comparisons between 
samples of relatives and profiles of exhumed remains that did not have a presumptive 
identification at the moment of examination. When carrying out the cruces (crossings) or 
comparisons of genetic profiles, the system displays a result of matches in a number of genetic 
markers. Then, experts at the INMLCF study the context of each case to confirm or reject the 
identification. 
On the other hand, though forensic odontology has not been essential to the identification 
of human remains in the context of forced disappearance, the odontologists of the three agencies 
have organized and systematized their work by agreeing on the use of a single dental chart as 
well as on the methods of age estimation for subadults and adults. Thus, there is similarity in the 
way these professionals work (Interview with forensic odontologist from INMLCF, March 1 of 
2017) unlike what has happened among forensic anthropologists. The comparison of postmortem 
and antemortem dental charts in Colombia has not been crucial for the identification since the 
majority of victims of the conflict do not have access to medical care and therefore there are no 
antemortem records available of dental charts for identification purposes. However, the work of 
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both dentists and geneticists cannot be productive when the cases do not have a presumptive 
identification. 
As I pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, the investigative work of the Fiscalía has 
had little rigor in the search for the disappeared thus the lack of contextual information has 
caused the anthropology laboratories and the INMLCF morgues to fill up with remains without 
presumptive identification. Therefore, the geneticists’ hard work to obtain a genetic profile is not 
very useful if there are no biological samples of relatives to make the comparison, thus case 
genetic profiles remain in the BNPG waiting for a possible match. According to the Fiscalía, as 
of May 31 of 2018, 7,128 bodies of 5,611 graves had been exhumed. Of these, 3,663 remains 
have been returned to their families. Of the remains pending to be returned, 1,592 have a 
presumptive identity, which indicates that there are 1,873 remains without a context that may 
provide clues to aid in their identification (Figure 11).  
To conclude the topic of identifications, one of the initiatives implemented by the INMLCF in 
2011 was the preparation of a final identification report as a result of the interdisciplinary 
approach of the cases. For the preparation of this report, the team synthesizes the genetics 
forensic report, the contextual information, and the bio demographic findings to complete a 
forensic identification report that is later submitted to the exhumations prosecutor. This initiative 
originated from the idea that genetics by itself does not identify a set of human remains. The 
identification should be an exercise where the different experts compare findings and contextual 
information of the case and reach an agreement over the identification. However, this practice 
was only established at the INMCLF as both the DIJIN and the CTI still send their respective  
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Figure 11. Consolidated figures of exhumations and returned remains to families from Fiscalía 
as of May 31 of 2018. White rectangles indicate located remains; purple circles indicate returned 
remains (Figure retrieved from fiscalia.gov.co, June 20, 2018). 
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expert reports to the Fiscalía and unfortunately it is the prosecutor and not the experts who ends 
up making decisions on the identification (Interview with forensic anthropologist from CTI, 
December 8 of 2016). This is especially problematic because forensic practitioners are the ones 
that have the expertise and knowledge to perform these analyses as opposed to prosecutors 
whose education is in the realm of law. There are no standards or guidelines followed by the 
prosecutor to conduct the identification, thus it is an exercise based on personal criterion. 
To summarize, the advances and setbacks of post-mortem examinations and 
identifications have relied on two main factors: 1. the problem of having very few teams of only 
around 130 people total to conduct analyses leading to the identification and the establishment of 
circumstances of death and 2. the absence of biological samples to be compared to bone samples 
to complete the identification because the majority of remains exhumed up to date do not have a 
presumptive identification.  
 
‘Dignified returns’ and the participation of families 
Despite the fact that the National Search Plan for Disappeared Persons implied the active 
participation of families with a psychosocial approach, it is undeniable that everything achieved 
in terms of the accompaniment of relatives to the exhumations and their involvement in the 
return of remains has been the product of a frontal struggle on the part of the families and the 
organizations that represent them. An important but no less surprising fact is that although the 
search for disappeared persons within the framework of the LJP mostly focused on the testimony 
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of the postulados, these were not the most important source of information to locate remains of 
disappeared persons. According to EQUITAS (2015), the postulados have contributed 
information to find 15,9% of the remains; families have contributed to find 24,5% of the remains 
and other sources including local communities, NGOs, the Catholic Church, the media and the 
academia, among others contributed with 53,2% of the cases (Interview with exhumations 
prosecutor, January 9 of 2017). Only 6.4% of cases were located through information provided 
by armed forces, demobilized illegal armed members prosecuted by the civilian system and 
police inspections (EQUITAS 2015).  
This finding indicates that if the investigative phase had been more organized and 
systematic, and the testimony of the perpetrators had been verified by the Fiscalía and compared 
to that of the families and the communities, certainly more remains of disappeared persons with a 
presumptive identity would have been located. As explained by one of the exhumation 
prosecutors, when families have detailed information on the cases of their disappeared relatives 
as a product of their own investigative initiatives, going with families and local communities to 
conduct the search in the field is almost always successful. Therefore what the state needs to 
keep doing is gaining the trust of the communities so that people feel comfortable sharing their 
testimony with the Fiscalía and ultimately use this information to aid in the location of other 
disappeared persons (Interview with exhumations prosecutor, January 9 of 2017). 
However, the idea of incorporating the families into the forensic process did not exist 
from the beginning. Initially there was absolute resistance because everything seemed to be 
handled in secret and only investigators and prosecutors had access to the files. However, the 
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pressure of the relatives and victims’ organizations imposed on the Fiscalía forced this institution 
to involve the families in exhumation activities, as well as in the return of the remains (Interview 
with forensic anthropologist from CTI, March 1 of 2017). As indicated above, although families 
did not have an active role in the investigative stage of the Search Plan, victims’ organizations 
played a fundamental role in demanding transparency and clarity for family members. Thus, 
despite the logistic difficulties of the exhumations, the prosecutors have learned to take families 
into consideration by taking them to the exhumation sites or communicate with them so that they 
arrive to the sites before exhumations take place. 
On the other hand, the relationship between the Fiscalía and the victims’ organizations or 
the associations that legally represent them has been very tense. The victims’ organizations have 
been doing a very strong job in educating families on their right to the truth, thus nowadays 
families ask that themselves and the organizations that represent them be taken to exhumations 
and have all their questions answered throughout the forensic process. Likewise, EQUITAS has 
been openly critical of the approach used by the Fiscalía in the search for disappeared persons 
and the lack of scientific rigor to ensure productive searches. This situation has created 
discomfort and distrust not only among exhumation prosecutors but also amid some forensic 
practitioners that see in these organizations a source of surveillance and criticism.  
On our way to one of the exhumations of a clandestine grave that I observed during 
fieldwork, I asked the exhumations prosecutor and his assistant about a case where the CTI had 
been doing archaeological prospections recently. I knew that families had been looking for a man 
that was disappeared in that region and I also knew that those families were legally advised by an 
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organization that I had recently interviewed. I asked him why he had not notified the 
organization so that they all could accompany the process of exhumation. His response was: 
“Alex, who am I going to call? It is the social representative of the town who has to notify them. 
He is the one who called me to conduct the exhumation.” His assistant added: “We do not have 
the obligation to notify them. We conduct the exhumation and respond to our bosses [at the 
Fiscalía]. They [the victims’ organizations] are the ones who should take care of the victims.” 
For its part, the relationship that has been established between prosecutors and victims is 
variable. There are victims who out of fear still do not approach the state directly to report the 
crimes to which they were subject, but there are also others who have done so and are very 
grateful to both the CTI and the forensic teams that conduct the post-mortem analyses. However, 
the incorporation of relatives into field activities has not been an easy process: from the logistics 
handled by the prosecutor where it is necessary to take into account the transportation of the 
relatives to the exhumation sites and offer security to the confrontation of situations of intense 
pain on the part of relatives, the incorporation of relatives been a convoluted experience. For 
example, there are no protocols or guidelines for the accompaniment of relatives to prospecting 
or exhumation activities, hence, when families experience discomfort or anxiety the forensic 
teams are not prepared to handle these situations. Thus, there is no psychosocial support supplied 
by the government during field activities. 
One of the exhumations that I observed and struck me the most was one carried out in a 
municipal cemetery near the city of Sincelejo. The team was going to exhume the remains of a 
16-year-old teenager who had been disappeared in 2007. He was presented in the newspapers as 
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a guerrilla member killed in combat by the army. When this happened, the INMLCF did the 
autopsy, though the body was not identified at the time and was buried in that cemetery as an 
unidentified body. His mother, father and sisters, came to the exhumation as they had conducted 
their own investigation for years following the media records and asking permission at the 
Fiscalía to read the case file multiple times. It had taken ten years for the Fiscalía to exhume the 
remains in the cemetery and initiate the identification process. Since the remains were in a 
bóveda, the exhumation was fast. The mother never approached the bóveda, as she was lying 
outside the cemetery in tears.  
As I walked back inside to observe the exhumation and the participation of the remaining 
relatives, the anthropologist took out the remains and belongings from the red bag in which they 
were contained. He also took out a pair of boots and a rosary that were immediately recognized 
by his sisters who began to cry and scream. As they kept sobbing in pain, the prosecutor 
whispered in my ear that this was perhaps one of the multiple cases of false positives, or 
extrajudicial executions, where the army disappeared young men, and then hundreds of 
kilometers away from their homes, presented the deceased as guerrilla members killed in 
combat. I was surprised by how the mother of that child had become a sort of private investigator 
to find out who was behind the homicide of her son, as the civilian justice system had not even 
initiated a formal judicial investigation. The mother kept crying while she held the picture of her 
son in her hands. In the middle of a situation where the forensic team limited itself to technical 
duties, I realized that nobody was prepared to handle situations of critical pain experienced by 
relatives. I decided to go out and buy the mother a bottle of water and we spent the rest of the 
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morning chatting as the team finished with two more exhumations. 
In the next chapter I will discuss about the integral accompaniment provided by victims’ 
organizations throughout the forensic process and how families have perceived this 
accompaniment as opposed to the one offered by the Fiscalía. However, beyond a guide or a 
magical formula to manage the emotions and experiences of families in the field, the Fiscalía 
must strive to integrate the accompaniment offered by the victims’ organizations who not only 
are in permanent contact with the families and their stories but also take into account the needs 
and expectations of families during the forensic cycle. 
The process of returning the remains to their families has also been a constant struggle by 
relatives and their legal representatives. Before the search for disappeared persons began within 
the framework of the LJP, the relatives used to approach the facilities of the Fiscalía and some 
official gave them the remains in a small wooden box. Not only were there no protocols for the 
return of remains, but also no official was concerned about how that victim would go home or if 
he or she had the economic means to bury his/her family member. 
However, since 2010, at least five protocols have been approved, which the Fiscalía 
called ‘protocols of dignified return’ which assume the ‘official return’ to be a tool of symbolic 
reparation. It was called dignified return (entrega digna, in Spanish) because previously there 
was no care or attention to families. To dignify them through an official ceremony implied 
giving them value and showing respect towards them and the memory of their relatives. 
Ceremonies could be individual, where only one family participated or collective, with the 
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participation of multiple families. 
However, the protocols were almost exclusively designed unilaterally. That is, the 
families were never asked how they wanted the remains of their family members to be 
returned.  As indicated by my interviewee from CTI, collective return ceremonies held twenty or 
more families gathered in a luxury hotel, with photographs of their loved ones and with the 
participation of the press. Prosecutors from the Fiscalía and other public official figures arrived 
with their escorts to set up a show covered by the media. Instead of being at the center of the 
initiative, families and victims were overshadowed by the Fiscalía, which used the ceremony to 
blow it’s own trumpet regarding the work conducted in exhumations and identifications 
(Interview with forensic anthropologist from CTI, February 11, 2017). Perhaps the genuine will 
on the part of the prosecution existed, but in a rush to facilitate the logistics, it gathered families 
who did not know each other and perhaps did not share any other ties besides the fact that they 
had all been subject to the crime of forced disappearance. Thus, it turned an intimate situation of 
pain and reunion with the disappeared relative into a spectacle (Interview with member from 
EQUITAS, February 12 of 2017). 
The ceremonies of dignified return made by the Fiscalía raised awareness about the 
recognition of the existence of the disappeared and the right of their relatives to bury the 
remains. In fact, the protocols specified that the state would assign bóvedas in public cemeteries 
to fulfill this end. However, this was not enough. Family members needed to understand what the 
identification process had been like and be able to have questions about the circumstances of 
death answered. The organizations that represent the families began to educate the relatives on 
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what to ask and how to ask forensic practitioners. Thus, anthropologists, odontologists and other 
experts began to accompany the return ceremonies to be able to answer the inquiries of the 
families and explain the forensic findings. 
Some forensic practitioners confessed that they preferred not having to go to these 
ceremonies, since dealing with the pain of family members is something they do not know how 
to handle and makes them feel uncomfortable. Additionally, an anthropologist from the INMLCF 
pointed out that forensic scientists lack training on how to handle family members and how to 
simplify the technical language to answer their questions. However, for the most part, the 
forensic scientists who I interviewed expressed that the return of the remains was the highest 
point of satisfaction in their job because that is where their effort acquires value. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The research purpose for this chapter focused on explaining if there has been a consistent 
and efficient methodology or procedure practiced by forensic agencies to find and identify the 
remains of forcibly disappeared persons in the process of transitional justice and what role have 
families played in the forensic intervention, beginning with preliminary investigations and 
ending with the return of remains of their loved ones. In short, the answer to the first question is 
no. Despite the fact that the National Search Plan for Disappeared Persons practically arose at the 
time with the implementation of the LJP, the Fiscalía did not implement the Plan as it should 
have despite having participated in its design. This finding is indicative that state institutions, 
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including the institutions of forensic intervention, can be very proactive in the creation of 
multiple documents that do not play out in real life. 
As previously revealed, the Fiscalía focused the search for the disappeared on the 
information provided by the postulados, which were assumed as true because their confessions 
were not verified. However, despite the boom of exhumations associated to confessions, it was 
not the postulados who provided the most valuable information to find more remains of 
disappeared persons but other sources including families, local communities and victims’ 
organizations. Thus, forensic practitioners almost immediately assumed the task of prospections 
and exhumations and faced problems ranging from security issues to the lack of strong technical 
and scientific knowledge to address the archaeological searches and recoveries. Nevertheless, 
today it is clear that there are no teams in the country that know more about the complex 
geography, the logistics and the complexities of working with different stakeholders in the field, 
than those groups of the CTI and the DIJIN. Although there are factors to improve the technical 
aspects and the monitoring of protocols, the experience that these practitioners have gained 
during these years is invaluable for the future work to be conducted in the framework of the JEP.  
The identifications of the disappeared for the most part have been negatively affected by 
the shortcomings in the investigative stage because although there are reliable methods available 
for positive identification and labs were strengthened with infrastructure and personnel, the task 
cannot be completed if there are no biological samples of relatives available for genetic analyses. 
Put another way, the forensic intervention in the framework of transitional justice did bring 
investments in technoscience, particularly focused on the advancement of positive identifications 
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and improvements in post-mortem examinations. Yet, such investment was not part of an 
organized and efficient methodology in the search and identification of remains of disappeared 
persons. 
An additional factor to take into account is that unlike the forensic work done in other 
international contexts, which has been either humanitarian (to identify the disappeared) or 
judicial (to find physical evidence to prove a series of crimes), the forensic work carried out in 
the framework of Justice and Peace had a different approach. On the one hand, it was clear that 
the remains that were being exhumed had to be identified; nonetheless the forensic evidence of 
the post-mortem analysis in what could clarify the circumstances of the death was never used to 
corroborate the versions of the postulados. In addition, the success of the Justice and Peace 
process ended up being measured by the number of exhumed and identified remains; hence the 
tabulation of forensic cases completed was and is still the criterion to measure the effectiveness 
of forensic practitioners regardless of the complexities of each case. 
On the other hand, despite the willingness to incorporate the families into the forensic 
process, their participation has been very modest and has been limited to the attendance -not 
always guaranteed- to the exhumations; to their role as donors of biological samples and to their 
participation in the ceremonies of return of remains. However, they have never been key to the 
decision-making process in forensic intervention. Their opinion has not been taken into account 
in the search processes and until very recently they finally began to position themselves at the 
center of the return ceremonies per the demands of families and victims’ organizations. 
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To conclude, there are two major problems pending resolution in the approach taken by 
state forensic intervention. The first is that Colombia did not and does not have the institutional 
capacity to account for the disappeared: there is no formal education in Colombia that trains 
forensic anthropologists and there are not enough human resources in forensic agencies to 
exhume, identify and return thousands of remains to their families. Finally, there is no real 
political will to search for the disappeared. If there had been such determination in the past, there 
would be stronger institutions in all aspects to respond to the problem of finding the disappeared. 
A plan to search for disappeared persons requires commitment from governments and budget 
support so that continuity is guaranteed in the application of such a plan (Ramírez 2016). 
Unfortunately, the agencies that carry out the forensic processes are state institutions and 
therefore depend on the interests of the government in office. 
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CHAPTER 7.  ASSUMPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS OF FORENSIC 
INTERVENTION 
 
As outlined in the introduction, the work of forensic practitioners has been pivotal to the 
mainstream discourse of transitional justice that identifies forensic intervention as part of a 
toolkit to find ‘the’ truth and achieve social repair (Hinton 2010b). As I indicated in the previous 
chapter, the success of the LJP was measured on the number of exhumed and returned human 
remains, more often based on the former than the latter. Tabulating efficiency and quantifying 
transitional justice (personal communication with Sarah Wagner, April 11 of 2018) through the 
number of graves located and exhumed became imperative to demonstrate tangible results to the 
media and Colombian society. 
This chapter explores if perceptions and expectations of families of the disappeared 
concerning truth, justice, reparations and the construction of memory have been fulfilled by state 
forensic networks in Colombia in the framework of the LJP. With this analysis I do not intend to 
generalize about the opinions or positions of the relatives of all the disappeared in the country, 
but to problematize the assumptions that have been made from a top-down approach about the 
experiences and needs of the families in the framework of transitional justice. 
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Assumptions from above 
As stated by the LJP, the victims have the right to know the crimes committed by illegal 
armed groups in addition to the whereabouts of the people kidnapped or forcibly disappeared. 
Victims also have the right to learn about the results of the criminal investigations. For that 
matter, the postulado must make a complete and truthful confession about his/her crimes in 
which he/she confesses about the authors or participants in the execution of the crimes. In terms 
of justice, the law indicates that there must be punishment for the serious crimes attributed to the 
members of demobilized groups and all measures must be taken to prevent the repetition of the 
crimes. Finally, the reparation involves access to judicial and/or administrative reparation and 
acts of symbolic reparation as part of the integral reparation process. 
 As indicated in chapter 4, searching for the disappeared in the framework of the 
negotiation with the paramilitaries was not part of Uribe’s government interests and thus was not 
included in the draft of the LJP that finally passed in Congress. The following year, after the 
demands made by families and human rights organizations, among other groups, the 
Constitutional Court issued the Statement C-370 of 2006 that modified some articles of the law 
and included the establishment of the whereabouts of the disappeared as one of the eligibility 
requirements to obtain the benefits offered by transitional justice to the postulados. Concerning 
forced disappearance, at least in rhetoric, the law expected the postulado to confess complete 
truths in relation to crimes perpetrated, in order to satisfy the victims’ right to the truth, thus 
prioritizing the judicial truth, a topic that I will explore later in this chapter. 
The subject of search, identification and return of human remains was key for the 
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government to promote a narrative of symbolic reparation where finding a body meant that 
families would close a grieving process and would be able to rebuild or restart their lives. The 
approach taken by the Fiscalía regarding the investigation and the search for the disappeared 
assumed a triangulation process that began with the confession of a ‘complete truth,’ where the 
postulados would successfully identify all the burial sites of their victims. Subsequently, forensic 
practitioners would step in and their job would culminate with the delivery of the remains and 
therefore the symbolic reparation of families. Finally, relatives would be satisfied with the short 
sentence imposed on the postulados, since they would not have reasons to demand more in terms 
of justice. It seemed that satisfying victims expectations meant providing them with the truth 
given during confessions and recovering and returning the remains of the disappeared relatives. 
However, some time after the application of the law, confessions started to be questioned 
concerning their debts to victims in terms of truth (Verdad Abierta 2015a) as explained in 
chapter 4. In response, state institutions began to change the discourse by circulating the idea that 
the truth did not and does not necessarily matter. Some of the official agents that I interviewed 
for this project indicated that the complete truth in a process of transitional justice has no weight 
because “we all know that no one here is going to tell the truth as it is,” suggesting the idea that 
Colombian victims and society overall need to take the hit and move on. In my interview with 
one of the exhumations prosecutors he indicated that what is important is not the truth, but the 
non-repetition of the crimes. Such should be the center of a peace process because demanding 
truth is in the end opening the sores or the wounds of the past (Interview with exhumations 
prosecutor, February 1 of 2017, translated from the Spanish). 
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Later, I will unfold the complex issue of truth and how families feel that forensic 
networks respond to their expectations of truth. However, I would like to point out that the first 
assumption that the state makes regarding forensic intervention, which needs some 
deconstruction, is the idea that every family needs to find their disappeared. First, it is important 
to recognize that families (also called victims or survivors) are not monolithic. Families have 
different life projects, needs, desires and opinions (Congram, Fondebrider, and Fernández 2016). 
This also applies to their interests concerning the location of their disappeared loved ones. In my 
fieldwork experience with the victims, there was not a single family for whom locating the 
remains of their loved one was not a priority, regardless of the work conducted by the Fiscalía at 
that point concerning the location and/or identification of their disappeared relative. The families 
indicated that finding their relatives and not having the pain and anguish of not knowing where 
they are was of utmost importance as similarly highlighted by Mladina (2016) and Kovras (2017) 
in other international contexts.  
Nonetheless, as my interviewee from ASFADDES explained, there are families who live 
with contradictions: one day they believe the story that having the remains of their relatives will 
help them close their grieving process, but the next day they do not want their family member 
found. Many families have created the hope that their loved ones will return alive, and such is 
the motor of their life (Interview with member from ASFADDES, December 11 of 2017). 
Although this is a strong political position, similar to that of the Mothers of Asociación Vida in 
Argentina (Rosenblatt 2015), there are relatives of disappeared persons in the country, such as 
those associated with ASFADDES, who demand the state to find their disappeared relatives, but 
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also follow the slogan of ‘Vivos se los llevaron, vivos los queremos’ (they were taken away 
alive, therefore we want them back alive) which expresses the multiple contradictions and 
subjectivities in which forced disappearance is inserted and, consequently, forensic intervention. 
 
Truth expectations 
 International post-conflict experiences have demonstrated that in the efforts for coping 
with past human rights abuses there is no single truth that comes to light. In fact, ‘truth’ is a very 
convoluted concept that must be used carefully. “Truth, in the form of narratives, is never simply 
uncovered, but is partially constructed and affected by numerous processes and actors” (Mobekk 
2005, 265). My fieldwork and particularly my experience with families and other interviewees 
allowed me to identify and propose a typology of truth that emerges from conflict and post-
conflict experiences. I divide truth into various types: a judicial truth that comes from the version 
of the perpetrator who confesses his/her crimes; an official truth from the establishment that may 
or may not coincide with the truth of the perpetrators, especially if these are state agents; the 
truth of the victims and the narrative they have constructed surrounding their experiences, and a 
forensic truth built through the analysis of a dead body and physical evidence that may help 
account for different forms of killing or particular forms of violence. 
 In the process of Justice and Peace and the way the crime of forced disappearance has 
been handled, families feel that there are huge gaps in the truth provided by the postulados, that 
is, in the judicial truth. My work with the relatives took place in Meta, the area of operation of 
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the Bloque Centauros from the AUC, which by the year 2000 had already controlled much of the 
Meta and the Casanare regions but by 2006 had demobilized for the most part. The Bloque 
Centauros unified the paramilitary structures that previously existed in Meta and Guaviare. In 
these departments there was a tradition of paramilitary organizations, based in the municipalities 
of Cubarral and El Dorado. Initially, these groups had been organized by emerald traffickers of 
Boyacá, and later by drug traffickers -especially those associated with the Medellin Cartel- who 
controlled illicit crops and laboratories for the production of cocaine (Verdad Abierta 2009).  
Before their demobilization during the Uribe Velez government, the Bloque Centauros 
was extremely divided by internal conflicts and external disagreements with the Peasant Self-
Defense Forces of Casanare due to the dispute over territories. This resulted in some of their 
groups not demobilizing, thus keeping to themselves a good part of the truth that their victims 
still claim. All the families that I interviewed for this project were forcefully displaced from rural 
areas near Acacías, San Martín, Puerto Concordia, El Castillo, Medellín del Ariari and Vista 
Hermosa in Meta (Figure 12) by paramilitary commanders of the Bloque Centauros. Although 
some families stated that they did not have a complete understanding of the development of 
paramilitarism in the areas where they resided, most of them were clear about when and how 
paramilitaries operated and knew especially what army battalions or police units aided the 
paramilitaries and/or worked in acquiescence with them. 
Of the group of families I interviewed, only one mother had been called to attend the 
confessions of the alleged perpetrators of the disappearance of her daughter, all of whom were 
part of the Bloque Centauros. Her daughter was taken off a vehicle on April of 2004 at a military  
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Figure 12. Map of the Meta department (Retrieved from 
https://tierracolombiana.org/municipios-de-meta/, July 1 of 2018) 
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retén24 located in the municipality of El Retorno in Guaviare. The vehicle was covering the route 
from Granada, Meta to San José del Guaviare. In the confession by the paramilitaries during 
versiones libres, little was said about her daughter’s case. Some postulados said that they saw 
how her daughter was killed but they did not participate. 
A paramilitary indicated knowing about the location of the grave but after going with the 
Fiscalía, the postulado could not recognize the site. Thus, in her eagerness for truth, Rosa25 went 
to San José multiple times seeking answers for her questions. Despite having been threatened by 
several men who asked her to stop looking for answers and leave, she looked to the community 
in El Retorno for details of what happened. According to the community, her daughter, who was 
a nurse and worked at the only medical center in the municipality of Calamar, had been raped, 
tortured, murdered, and dismembered and her remains hidden where neither her mother nor the 
Fiscalía have yet discovered. As stated by Rosa, her daughter was disappeared after being 
accused of working as a guerrilla collaborator since both guerrillas and paramilitaries arrived 
regularly at the center seeking medical attention and she always took care of all patients 
regardless of their group affiliation (Interview with family member, April 1 of 2017). 
Unlike other relatives, Rosa is a woman who has taken the task of finding the mortal 
remains of her daughter as a personal challenge. As a result of her own investigation following 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24 A retén is a group of military personnel prepared to reinforce one or more security posts. 25 Rosa is the name I gave this mother to protect her identity. 	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the clues of what the local community in El Retorno said, and the confessions by the 
perpetrators, Rosa went directly to search for answers at the military battalion that was 
associated with the paramilitaries in that area. It was no coincidence that it had been precisely at 
the military retén that the paramilitaries took their daughter away. Despite the fact that the 
postulados never confessed to have acted in complicity with any state agent, the military of the 
area assumed their responsibility in private, although without providing her with details on the 
case. Though there are no members of the armed forces investigated or imprisoned for this 
crime, several times military generals have invited Rosa to the inauguration of monuments in 
honor of the victims, including her daughter. However, Rosa has responded that she does not 
identify with their acts of memory and that she would only receive help from them if it had to do 
with searching for the remains of her daughter.  
No other family that participated in my project attended the confessions by the Bloque 
Centauros, which could have been the responsible for the disappearance of their loved ones 
based on the context of the crimes. According to the families, the Fiscalía never contacted them 
to attend the hearings, demonstrating once again the flaws in the application of the LJP, 
particularly in the investigative phase of the judicial process. In short, while some relatives have 
taken the task of investigating the circumstances of the disappearance of their loved ones on their 
own, the truth is that the LJP has been a resounding failure in the procurement of the judicial 
truth, especially in the uncovering of the regional ties that existed -and still exist- between the 
state and the paramilitary forces. 
Furthermore, by not attending the versiones libres (and even when they attended) the 
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truth of the victims was never taken into account to corroborate the version given by the 
postulado and create a narrative that included different voices in the construction of a social 
truth, a truth category identified by my interviewee from ASFADDES, which I will describe 
below. For their part, families demand to know why their relatives were disappeared; who 
executed them; who gave the orders; what were the interests of taking that person away, and 
what political project were the perpetrators aiming to truncate. As my interviewee from 
ASFADDES indicated, it is necessary for the perpetrators to tell the truth, both to their victims 
and to the community and society overall, so that people understand the dimension of forced 
disappearance particularly at the political level (Interview with member from ASFADDES, 
December 11 of 2016).  
The breaches in the judicial truth are directly related to the way in which forced 
disappearance has been legally defined in Colombia. As I explained in chapter 5, the definition 
adopted in the Colombian Penal Code is contrary to the definition by The International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and to the definition 
given by the Inter-American Convention of Forced Disappearance, which indicates that the 
responsibility of this crime falls on state agents or individuals who act in complicity with the 
state. In the Colombian Penal Code, the responsibility rests primarily on individuals, and when 
there is participation of agents of the state, it turns into an aggravated conduct, leaving aside the 
state’s primary responsibility (Corporación Colectivo Sociojurídico Orlando Fals Borda 2016).  
As revealed by the historical periods described in chapter 5, forced disappearances have 
been almost exclusively attributed to the paramilitaries, but no greater responsibilities by the 
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state agents have been established. In the opinion of one of my interviewees from the MOVICE, 
the little progress in the investigations on the participation of state members carried out by the 
civilian justice system is related to the state not wanting to be held responsible, especially taking 
into account that Colombia is a democratic country not living under a military dictatorship which 
leaves little room to explain the massive number of forced disappearances that have occurred 
throughout the territory (Interview with member from MOVICE, June 20 of 2017). This also 
explains why the judicial truth that emerged from the Justice and Peace process has been merged 
with the official truth that understands forced disappearance as a crime predominantly 
perpetrated by paramilitary groups but removes the responsibility from the state, suggesting that 
the cases where state agents have been convicted for participating in such crime are simply the 
result of a few rotten apples. 
In this regard, I was surprised by how the discourse that takes responsibility away from 
the state in the disappearances was repeated and promulgated by a few forensic practitioners 
from the Fiscalía. A member from the CTI stated the following: “Here [in Colombia] the people 
whom the government disappeared were not more than 1% of all the disappeared. Yes, that is 
because the government has not had good coverage and presence across the country. This is 
true, but let’s not exaggerate (…) we are a bad society. Moreover, forced disappearances have 
been mostly committed by guerrillas, the paramilitaries, the Bacrim, the husbands against their 
wives, and business partners against each other. Thus, they are associated with personal 
decisions. Knowing the context of forced disappearance, I do not believe that this crime has been 
a state policy, not for me. The state has responsibility for many things, but in this case its 
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responsibility lies on its non-operance” (Interview with forensic practitioner from CTI, January 
26 of 2017, translated from the Spanish). The words of my interviewee perhaps only reveal the 
tip of the iceberg of a bigger problem: that having become used to the fact that the judicial 
investigations against members of the state or the government do not prosper, the official version 
is assumed to be true.  
As noted earlier, the LJP indicated that the victims had the right to know the truth about 
the crimes and the circumstances of the disappearance of their loved ones, but it is clear that this 
right was almost never guaranteed from the judicial scenario. On the other hand, the forensic 
intervention to account for the whereabouts of their relatives materialized in a search without a 
clear methodology by the Fiscalía. This resulted in the exhumation of thousands of remains 
without a presumptive identity that now may have to wait many more years to be identified. 
Now, regardless of identifications, what emerged in terms of forensic findings from the post-
mortem analyses made by forensic anthropologists and medical examiners was key to 
demonstrate to some extent the occurrence of some of the crimes confessed by the paramilitaries 
that many academics had already documented as a result of ethnographic and historical research 
carried out in different regions (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2014b). For example, an 
essential finding in the post-mortem examination of hundreds of remains was dismemberment as 
a cause of death and form of torture (Morcillo-Méndez and Campos 2012) associated with the 
modus operandi of some paramilitary groups. This indicates that due to the complexity that 
recovered cadavers represented, not simply because of their state of decomposition, but also due 
to the injuries associated with death, forensic practitioners improved the quality of their analysis 
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with the aim of responding to the victims’ questions regarding the circumstances of the death of 
their loved ones. Although the purpose of my study does not aim to generalize, answers to these 
questions are usually important to families in order to understand the last moments of life of their 
loved ones.  
Unfortunately, much of the forensic truth that stemmed from the work of various 
practitioners remained in the reports that were sent to the authorities, because those findings 
were not systematically used to corroborate or contrast the version of the paramilitaries since it 
was assumed that by being in a process of transitional justice, the postulados would tell the truth. 
Therefore, the forensic findings that went from the discovery of mass graves, to the unveiling of 
different forms of killing and torture stayed in the archives of the DIJIN, the INMLCF and the 
Fiscalía. Despite the fact that the media randomly covered some of these findings forensic 
sciences were never part of a historical narrative that could account for the horrors that thousands 
of populations experienced in those areas where the paramilitaries imposed their law and order 
(Interview with member from ASFADDES, December 11 of 2016). Therefore, in general terms, 
forensic science networks and the advances made in technology, knowledge and infrastructure 
that interest STS scholars, instead of getting the forensic truth to come to light to evidence past 
crimes and help establish responsibilities, has been ignored by the government and only used to 
account for statistics and tabulations of human remains as the logic of success of transitional 
justice. 
The importance of forensic expertise for many families is precisely the acknowledgement 
that those findings from the forensic technoscience should not be lost in institutions like the 
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Fiscalía but be socialized as part of an exercise of historical memory and commemoration of the 
victims. As explained by my MOVICE interviewee, the forensic process should not end in the 
delivery and burial of the remains of the disappeared. In her concept, it is important that family 
members have the education to ask forensic experts how their family member died, or if there 
was evidence that he/she was tortured, for example. These questions must account for an 
investigation that is also concerned with inquiring who was the responsible. Furthermore, though 
families cannot be forced to become activists and human rights defenders, it is important that 
they demand that the right to the truth be guaranteed unconditionally (Interview with member 
from MOVICE, June 20 of 2017, translated from the Spanish). 
Furthermore, for the cases of forced disappearance and false positives that I described in 
the previous chapter handled by the Corporacion Colectivo Sociojurídico Orlando Fals Borda, 
the findings of the forensic scientists have been vital to document the crimes and establish 
criminal lawsuits against military officers involved in cases of forced disappearance. However, 
the majority of families that are victims of forced disappearance have very limited knowledge 
about what their rights are and how to demand them, which further fuels the impunity enjoyed by 
the perpetrators. In my work with families, almost all of them equated their rights with getting 
the remains of their family members back and providing them with a burial according to their 
beliefs. However, five families explained their rights to me very clearly and told me how they 
have integrated with grassroots communities to demand those rights. For example, many 
relatives have requested advice and accompaniment from the Interecclesial Commission of 
Justice and Peace, the MOVICE and EQUITAS, demanding transparency in the explanation of 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	   	  	  
157 
technical and forensic findings and seeking answers about the responsibility of the state through 
criminal lawsuits and historical memory projects, as I will explain in the next pages. 
 
Justice and Symbolic Reparation 
Just as families are not monolithic, their ideas of justice are not either. A key aspect to 
understand some of the notions of justice according to families, is that within the framework of 
transitional justice few victims understood what short prison sentences mean in comparison with 
the sentences of 50 or 60 years associated to the retributive justice with which the civilian justice 
system operates. None of the families I interviewed understood why the paramilitaries were 
paying such short sentences. In fact, most relatives expected them to be sentenced to penalties 
according to the damage caused. With great sorrow, many of them expressed to be aware that all 
the money in the world would not give them their loved ones back, as “money does not replace 
lives.” However, many would prefer to see the perpetrators paying 40 years in jail and feeling a 
bit of the pain that they caused, as their actions destroyed homes, displaced families and through 
the perpetration of forced disappearance, took a piece of the lives and souls of mothers, children, 
wives and siblings (Interview with family member, April 1 of 2017). Because many relatives 
understand the FARC as an illegal group and the paramilitaries as organizations created by the 
state, then, in their perception, it is incoherent that groups allied with the state receive judicial 
benefits. In the words of Yeimy26, “if the responsibility of the state is to keep the community safe 
and not attack it, it is inexplicable that paramilitaries were given a short sentence when they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26 Yeimy is the name I gave her to protect her identity. 
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knew what they were doing: stripping the lands away from people; killing the peasants; 
disappearing children, women and men. So, no one here understands the negotiation with the 
paramilitaries because such idea of 8-year sentences does not make sense for us” (Interview 
with family member, June 21 of 2017, translated from the Spanish).  
Likewise, the notions of justice when there is no truth can be very complex. In Colombia, 
families, human rights organizations and victims associations demand accountability. Yet, this is 
unlikely to occur when the tools of transitional justice have only made visible the official truth, 
masking the forensic truth and neglecting the victims’ truth. While in other international 
contexts, courts or truth commissions have been applied prioritizing justice over truth or vice 
versa, families of the disappeared in Colombia feel that there has been neither one nor the other. 
Besides, while the forensic apparatus and forensic networks may respond to factual questions, 
such as where are the disappeared and what injuries caused their death, they cannot respond to 
demands of accountability when forensic findings are not used to evaluate the versions given by 
the perpetrators and question the truths that are given importance and lifted up by the discourse 
of transitional justice.  
In addition, one could problematize the use and application of forensic science by state 
institutions. In the growing literature of STS and its examination of forensic sciences at the 
service of different participants and serving various goals, one of the expectations regarding the 
use of forensic evidence is that it needs to be properly recovered and handled particularly if it is 
going to be used for legal ends. The courtroom setting “demands systematic control over 
archaeological methods and handling of evidence as well as over the documentation of the 
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excavation process and results” (Crossland 2013, 126). Yet, in Colombia the lack of organized 
and systematic methodologies to search for the disappeared in the framework of transitional 
justice led to fast and destructive exhumations despite the progressive advances to follow 
international protocols. Even if prospection and excavation methods have improved, the truth is 
that hundreds of prospections and exhumations were conducted without much planning, possibly 
destroying the evidence. This is not to say that the process to search for the disappeared was an 
intentional failure, but that carrying out exhumations in the midst of conflict, without following 
SOPs and perhaps improperly collecting or even destroying evidence was a very convenient 
byproduct to cover impunity. In other words, instead of using forensic evidence as a powerful 
tool of justice (Smith 2017), ensuring that it was properly documented and collected, the Fiscalía 
did not care (or at least not initially) to conduct proper science. Instead, science was used as a 
performance, where the state decided how to do science, either right or wrong, and used it as an 
effective tool of power to ensure a broken system in which forensic evidence would not be used 
to investigate the role of the state in forced disappearances. Science, used as a kind of 
performance was only used to promote the narrative of success of transitional justice associated 
to number of exhumations and thus distract from impunity. If evidence is not collected, 
preserved or well-documented then forensic truth is incomplete and therefore cannot be part of a 
criminal investigative process that accounts for those responsible of different crimes. 
Furthermore, by using science as performance, the state bureaucracy controls knowledge 
production (Wagner 2013). In the Colombian context, the state has highlighted the official truth 
and has impeded the surface of a complete forensic truth that could help respond to the victims’ 
right to justice.  
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 On the other hand, a concept of justice that goes beyond the judicial and forensic scenario 
mentioned by many families that caught my attention was the idea that if the state is interested in 
claiming them as victims, it must recognize that relatives of the disappeared should be prioritized 
when designing and applying public policies of health, education and employment. Because they 
experienced disappearances, the dispossession of their lands, forced displacement and poverty, 
the victims demand that their needs be recognized and fulfilled first. Many families developed 
mental problems, tumors and even strokes as a product of the disappearances and today they do 
not have access to the Selection System of Beneficiaries for Social Programs (SISBEN).27 In 
addition to that, the victims suggest that justice should also mean that the state promote the 
development of productive projects that provide victims with job opportunities. In my interviews 
between El Castillo and Medellín del Ariari, members of the Interecclesial Commission of 
Justice and Peace indicated that all the families living in these towns had at least one family 
member disappeared by the paramilitaries. Thus, apart from breaking their lives, the violence 
experienced left them unemployed, because when they were forcibly displaced they lost their 
only livelihood, which was cultivating the land. 
According to Ramón,28 “justice would be the state giving us three or four hectares of 
land to work. My son is already finishing college, but what about the land? Are we going to 
leave the lands alone? The lands are the axis of the town. If we, the victims are supported by the 
state to help us work the land, we will see progress. We need to set up a small business to create 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27 SISBEN is a tool funded by the state that provides health benefits to its affiliates. 28 Ramón is the name I gave this relative to protect his identity. 
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our own products and sell them. We need for example fruit pulpers. The fruit here gets damaged 
very quickly because there are no pulpers so it becomes very cheap. If there were a pulper, it 
would be quicker to sell it: the fruit would be processed and taken to the markets. Things like this 
would help achieve justice and peace (...) because peace does not only mean surrendering 
weapons; peace is also offering or generating employment” (Interview with family member, 
June 10 of 2017, translated from the Spanish). Expectations of justice and reparation like 
Ramón’s are linked with expectations of improving their life quality. Transitional justice 
initiatives adopted to respond to victims’ rights should listen to the needs and expectations of 
victims, and Colombia is certainly not the only context where victims demand economic support 
to ensure livelihoods as a form of redressing past abuses as similarily noted by Thomas and 
Gardner (2014) in post-conflict northern Uganda.  
 For their part, either material or symbolic, reparations serve to recognize the legal 
obligation of a state to repair the consequences of human rights violations either because of 
direct participation or because it failed to prevent them. Reparations can be important to victims 
because these might be perceived as a “direct and meaningful way to receive justice” (The 
International Center of Transitional Justice n.d.). In Colombia, Law 1448 of 2011 insures 
integral reparations for victims of the armed conflict going back to 1985. However, all victims, 
regardless of the date crimes were perpetrated, have the right to symbolic reparations. The LJP as 
explained in chapter 5 bases the rights of reparation: administrative, judicial and symbolic, in 
Law 1448 of 2011. 
The state of Colombia has understood forensic intervention and particularly the delivery 
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of human remains of disappeared persons as a measure of symbolic reparation. And since getting 
the remains back is pivotal, many families agree on this measure as a form of reparation. 
However, as explained in the previous chapter, the dynamics and meaning of the return of human 
remains have changed substantially over time, although this does not mean that all relatives 
accept and value the way the Fiscalía assumes this task.  
The collective returns are made in a public space, with logos and banners of the Fiscalía 
as protagonists. The remains are presented on a large table in small wooden coffins with flowers 
adorning them. Usually, the remains return is accompanied by members of the army and the 
Fiscalía offers a Catholic ceremony to the attendees. The Fiscalía calls the relatives one by one to 
receive the remains of their loved ones. When returns are individual, similar logistics are applied 
but the ceremony is private (Interview with member from CTI, January 21 of 2017). 
In my conversations with groups of families that had received the remains of their 
relatives, some were clearly grateful to the Fiscalía for the ceremony and the care received 
during the days of the delivery activity. Other families were more critical of these ceremonies, 
pointing out that they did not understand why the return had taken so long since the body was 
exhumed; why the Fiscalía publicized the ceremonies as an ‘exhibition of human remains’ as if it 
were a party or a celebration; why the delivery was not understood as an intimate and painful 
moment, and why the army or the police accompanies the deliveries when they represent the 
state that disappeared their relatives in complicity with the paramilitaries. Such disapproval 
demonstrates that there are still claims by families who demand they be the ones to decide how 
they want these returns instead of having the state imposing conditions on them. Hence, despite 
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the fact that the dignified returns attempt to dignify and commemorate the victims, there are 
efforts pending to be implemented to make of the families the center of the remains return 
activity and not other actors. 
In addition to the returns of remains in terms of symbolic reparation, the Unit of Victims 
has been implementing memory and psychosocial care workshops for victims, including families 
of the disappeared. These activities foster collective memory, understood as a representation of 
the past shared by a group (Kansteiner 2002) that has familial, religious, ethnic or national ties. 
In this particular space families are organized around their experiences as victims of forced 
disappearance and the workshop seeks to make a reconstruction of life stories and social 
biographies and applies techniques of emotional support (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 
n.d.). Although these workshops of memory are the product of the recognition that the victims 
have achieved little by little, just as with the return of the remains of the relatives, it is necessary 
that the families actively participate in the design of symbolic reparation initiatives that allow 
them to build collective memory narratives from below. 
A group of families that I interviewed who had the opportunity to attend these workshops 
indicated that they could not identify with the workshop, not necessarily because the guides were 
state officials, but because of the difficulties by state agents in building bridges of empathy with 
the victims. According to some families, having a degree in psychology does not imply that they 
know how to do psychosocial work. The workshops, which impel families to tell their stories and 
draw their tragedy on cardboards, culminate with a hug between all participants and a medal that 
says “survivor” and a certificate that says “symbolically repaired” (Interview with family 
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member, June 21 of 2017). Yet, these are not measures that necessarily respond to the 
expectations of families even though there may be good intentions on the part of state officials. 
For example, for some of the relatives with whom I interviewed, these workshops of memory 
and psychosocial attention arrive many years late because the state was absent at the time of the 
disappearances or was the direct perpetrator. In these cases families had to become psychologists 
to one another to be able to cope with the pain.  
Other families understand and value symbolic reparation when coming from the forensic 
apparatus as long as it is one in which they have participation in both the exhumations and the 
return of remains and receive a comprehensive accompaniment from families or victims 
organizations. The families that I interviewed who have strong political foundations were those 
that had approached the Corporación Colectivo Sociojurídico Orlando Fals Borda two or three 
years ago to receive legal advice concerning their case of forced disappearance. By working 
hand in hand with EQUITAS, the Corporación offers technical advice regarding forensic 
procedures, because even if EQUITAS does not conduct the forensic work directly, it does 
accompany the relatives to the exhumations; it closely follows the identification process, and 
explains to the families what forensic analyses were conducted on the remains of their relatives. 
Furthermore, EQUITAS explains the kinds of questions that families can ask state forensic 
experts that accompany the return ceremonies.  
However, the forensic activities, especially the return of the remains has not always been 
perceived as a reparative experience.  Until very recently, some exhumation prosecutors used to 
tell the families that they were returning the remains of a guerrilla combatant and therefore a 
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terrorist. This might be associated with the idea of taking the confessions by postulados for 
granted or simply due to a careless attitude on the part of the prosecutor. This situation sparked 
conflict between the victims organizations and the Fiscalía, as the work of those who deliver the 
remains is not to make judgments against the dead. Although it is true that the Fiscalía has 
delivered the remains of guerrilla combatants to their families multiple times (in the general 
framework of the armed conflict), these types of judgments are dangerous when there is no 
evidence to demonstrate that the disappeared being returned were indeed guerrilla members 
(Interview with member from the Corporación Colectivo Sociojurídico Orlando Fals Borda, June 
20 of 2017). Although these situations have created a tense relationship between the Fiscalía and 
victims’ organizations, the work of the latter has been key to demand respect for the memory of 
the victims, and to make sure that the remains return dignifies the disappeared.  
Furthermore, the integral accompaniment to the families implies that the remains return 
must be a space where the families not just receive the remains but can speak and give the word 
to the organizations that represent them. In addition, it is their opportunity to be offered a 
ceremony according to family rituals and beliefs. In the words of a member of the Interecclesial 
Commission of Justice and Peace,  “The return of human remains is not simply a technical-
forensic act. It is a deeply symbolic and spiritual act. That is to say, although medical examiners 
naturalize death as other forensic scientists do, there is a rituality surrounding the ceremony 
which is not explicit but when it is collectivized around the beliefs of the victims, it generates a 
calmer, more intimate and more private environment that is essential to the families” (Interview 
with member from the Interecclesial Commission of Justice and Peace, March 2 of 2017, 
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translated from the Spanish). 
The symbolic reparation, when managed by grassroots communities such as the 
headquarters of the MOVICE in Meta, and accompanied by the advice from local organizations 
that develop the psychosocial approach, is a systematic methodology whereby families 
themselves document the testimonies of other families. This exercise is done with the purpose of 
giving this information to the organizations that aid them with legal advice, but also to weave a 
narrative of experiences to be translated into artistic initiatives that are at the same time 
constructions of historical memory (Figures 13 and 14).  
 
 
Figure 13. Wall of memory in Medellin del Ariari painted by victims of violence. The night 
represents the paramilitary incursion that forcibly displaced hundreds of peasants from the town 
and disappeared a number of civilians. Photo by author. 
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Figure 14. Wall of memory in Medellin del Ariari painted by victims of violence. The day 
represents the moment when families were able to return to the village after paramilitaries 
demobilized or left town. Photo by author. 
 
For example, some women I interviewed from MOVICE Meta, who are mothers with 
disappeared children, have a theater company called ‘El Tente’ and a play called ‘Announcing 
the Absence’ to which Rosa belongs. This play claims the state its responsibility in the forced 
disappearance of their children while it allows the mothers to express the pain of not having 
found the remains of their children yet. MOVICE has also been responsible for disseminating the 
initiative called ‘galleries of memory’ where the photographs of the disappeared and their stories 
are printed and displayed in parks, plazas and public universities as a way to narrate society the 
tragedy of forced disappearance. 
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To conclude with the topic of symbolic repair, the forensic networks that recover, identify 
and return the bodies to their families are definitely perceived by the families that I interviewed, 
as technologies of remembrance and memorialization (Wagner 2013). During the entire forensic 
process scientists, institutions, standardization processes, bureaucracy, organizations of family 
members, families and victims’ associations converge (Toom 2016) and so do interests, 
assumptions and perceptions of all kinds from different participants. On the one hand, the 
government understands exhumed bodies as the greatest accomplishment achieved so far by 
transitional justice; the forensic practitioners feel that the delivery of remains to their families 
represent the ultimate goal of their work, and families and the organizations that represent them 
see in the forensic cycle and especially in the deliveries, a way to dignify the memory of the 
disappeared and a source to be used in the construction of historical memory. 
 Of course, based on that perspective memory has a strong political component that not 
all victims have. Nevertheless, for some families being able to contribute to historical memory 
by converging different forms of truth is essential. Their own narratives of truth as victims, 
combined and compared with the truth of the perpetrators, the academic research and the 
forensic truth would build a social truth that needs to be told to Colombian society. Not just for 
Colombians to learn how and when many violent crimes happened, but so that society stops 
being indifferent before the crime of forced disappearance and begin demanding the state to 
assume its responsibility for this and other state crimes. 
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Achievements and limits of forensic intervention from families’ perceptions  
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, the forensic searches and identifications of 
remains of forcibly disappeared persons were assumed by the government to be a form of social 
repair within the framework of transitional justice. Therefore, the judicial truth that emerged 
from the confessions of the postulados, as well as the delivery of the remains to their families 
were understood as the mechanisms to respond to the rights of truth, reparation and justice to the 
victims. My experience with the families of the disappeared and some of the organizations that 
advise them, indicates that although the forensic intervention has been important to mitigate the 
state of anguish and uncertainty generated by not knowing where the disappeared are (Kovras 
2017), forensic networks by themselves cannot meet together the expectations of truth, justice 
and reparation of families, which are not univocal or monolithic. 
When unfolding the truths that emerge when addressing past abuses as my research 
revealed, there is a forensic truth that surfaces when transitional justice employs exhumations 
and postmortem examinations. In Colombia, there is a forensic truth that, had it not been masked 
and perhaps hidden inside the dusty archives of the institutions in charge of forensic work, would 
be key to understanding the different forms of violence experienced in the armed conflict 
(Muñoz Marín 2015). Unfortunately, the expectations of families regarding the development of a 
social truth where several truths converge are too aspirational when, from the courts and the 
official institutions, the state has only given weight to the official truth. This truth ignores the 
responsibility of the state in crimes such as forced disappearance thus suggesting that there is a 
hegemonic discourse that determines what can be officially remembered and what will remain in 
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oblivion (Kovras and Loizides 2011). 
On the other hand, forensic networks cannot respond to families’ expectations of justice 
when it comes to establishing responsibilities, since the forensic evidence was not used to 
corroborate the confessions of the perpetrators, which were assumed to be truth statements. In 
other words, there was not an articulated investigation where forensic, testimonial and overall 
contextual evidence oriented the investigation of the state networks that directed or facilitated 
forced disappearances. Furthermore, by conducting archaeological recoveries without following 
international standards and possibly destroying evidence, convenient consequences derived given 
that without evidence, it cannot be possible to prove the existence of past crimes or to establish 
responsibilities. Therefore, although forensic knowledge is capable of contesting and 
renegotiating interpretations of past and present violence (Moon 2013), such a role was neglected 
in the framework of Justice and Peace. Likewise, forensic networks cannot respond to other 
expectations of justice that have to do with the resolution of structural problems such as poverty, 
health, lack of employment and quality of life. These issues need the attention of public policy 
makers genuinely interested in the design and implementation of victim-centered public policies. 
 In terms of symbolic reparation, forensic networks have responded to the relatives’ 
expectations when the remains have been found and returned as forensic sciences have aided in 
the ‘dignification’ of the dead by restoring their names and allowing proper burial (Moon 2013). 
However, expectations of symbolic reparations have been fully fulfilled when families have had 
comprehensive accompaniment from different organizations. Feeling entitled to make use of 
their rights; demanding to be the center of ceremonies of return of remains and developing their 
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creativity in historical memory initiatives based on forensic findings and contextual information 
on the disappearances, has been essential for many family members to build strong support 
networks accompanied by grassroots communities.  
With this finding I do not mean to imply that the state needs to learn how to do a truly 
integral accompaniment like non-governmental organizations do, as these only advise 50 or 100 
cases of victims. The Fiscalía does not have the capacity to provide such detailed assistance to 
the thousands of families of the disappeared. Nevertheless, as some families point out, the state 
should support family organizations and local communities and articulate with them in addition 
to recognizing and supporting them financially so that they can ensure that the attention 
effectively reaches the victims. The families that are victims of forced disappearance identify 
with other families, and if symbolic reparation exercises starting with the remains returns are 
organized and led by the families themselves, then the attention to the victims improves and so 
does the relationship between relatives, human rights organizations, the Fiscalía and other state 
entities. A better relationship and articulation between all these participants would also imply in 
the future a successful integration in the search for more victims of forced disappearance.  
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 	  
The paramilitary project that had its peak in the late 90s and early 2000s was grounded on 
strong alliances between the political class, the military and drug traffickers. The frontal war 
against the guerrillas and their sympathizers became a fight for the control of the territories, the 
administration of justice and the regulation of the economy with the support of sectors of the 
civil society, businessmen, the Catholic church, the military and of course different politicians in 
various regions (Duncan 2006). What started with two small self-defense groups at the end of the 
1980s who organized to defend the territories from the extortion and abuse of the guerrillas, 
mainly the FARC, had become by 1997 an organization with more than 20 large paramilitary 
blocks operating in almost the entire country. The paramilitaries, in the company of drug 
traffickers, and in complicity with state networks, murdered hundreds of peasants and social 
leaders accused of being guerrilla combatants or collaborators; annihilated an entire political 
party, and murdered three presidential candidates. 
With the aim of promoting terror in their areas of settlement, the paramilitaries conducted 
massacres, selective homicides and forced disappearances on a daily basis. Forced disappearance 
registered its worst moments from 1996 to 2005 when the paramilitaries were the main 
perpetrators of some 32,000 cases reported, according to official figures (Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Histórica 2016). Likewise, in 2001 the massacres perpetrated by the paramilitary 
reached a peak with 170 occurring that year (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013). 
Due to the rapid growth of paramilitarism, some pure paramilitaries turned into big drug 
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lords when they inherited the routes and contacts of the 1980s cartels (Baquero 2014). On the 
other hand, some drug traffickers turned into powerful paramilitary commanders who justified 
drug trafficking under the excuse of needing it to subsist in their struggle against guerrillas. 
Moreover, although the Colombian government had been receiving financial support from the 
United States in its fight against insurgency and communism since the late 1940s, the 
implementation of Plan Colombia fueled the empowerment and strengthening of paramilitary 
organizations who have worked hand in hand with the military, who were the direct recipients of 
the financial aid provided by the United States. Nonetheless, the multiple internal disputes 
between the paramilitary organizations and the deep disagreements between the Castaño brothers 
forced the decline –although not the entire disappearance- of the paramilitaries. Many of the 
most important commanders negotiated their demobilization with the Uribe Vélez government in 
what would become the first process of transitional justice in Colombia known as the Justice and 
Peace process.  
This dissertation arose from my interest of evaluating the forensic intervention in the 
search for forcibly disappeared persons within the framework of the Justice and Peace process. 
Yet, long before the LJP emerged, state forensic agencies such as the CTI and SIJIN were 
already looking for disappeared victims in the context of the conflict without any kind of 
scientific rigor and without following any protocols. When the LJP was implemented, the search 
for the disappeared was not a priority for the Uribe Vélez government, because as I explained, 
the initial negotiation with the paramilitaries sought to demobilize them and grant them amnesty. 
Human rights organizations, and especially families associations like ASFADDES were key to 
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demanding the rights of the victims, since the proponents of the law seemed to be forgetting the 
thousands of victims that the paramilitaries had left behind. The pressure of different victims, 
including the families of the disappeared, demanded that the paramilitaries provide information 
on the location of the disappeared as part of their confessions in the judicial process. 
My interest, after twelve years of the LJP implementation, was on the one hand to 
establish whether an efficient methodology existed on the part of the Fiscalía in order to find and 
identify the remains of disappeared persons and to examine what role were families playing in 
the forensic process from the investigation to the return of the remains of their relatives. My 
results indicate that despite the fact that there was a solid instrument like the National Search 
Plan for Disappeared Persons prepared by the Fiscalía in the company of other organizations, 
including ASFADDES, the plan was irregularly and incompletely implemented. The Fiscalía did 
not have an effective methodology and the investigative phase proposed by the Search Plan was 
almost completely omitted.  
According to the Search Plan, before carrying out the searches in the field, the Fiscalía 
had to gather data from a series of sources, both testimonial and documentary, including the 
confession by the postulado. While it is true that the country was going through complex security 
issues associated with the conflict when the search for the disappeared began -which also made it 
difficult for the Fiscalía to obtain data from victims and communities- the Fiscalía rarely verified 
the confessions of the postulados and assumed those to be certain. The information product of 
the confessions required hiring more personnel, including forensic anthropologists, who would 
lead the searches in the field. Thus, the investigation was overlooked, forcing forensic teams to 
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search for individuals with no name, since the majority of disappeared persons that teams were 
looking for did not have a presumptive identity due to the lack of an investigation, in addition to 
the very poor information concerning the demographic profile provided by the perpetrators. 
In this context, the anthropologists, accompanied by exhumation prosecutors and their 
teams, traveled throughout the country many times wasting time and resources because the 
postulado could not find the gravesite. Other times, when teams found the graves, they had to 
face the challenge of exhuming mass graves when they did not have enough experience or 
methodological training to perform exhumations in such complex archaeological contexts. In 
addition, harassment by illegal armed groups was another difficult issue to handle. Hence, when 
forensic practitioners were putting their lives at risk, the prospections and exhumations hardly 
followed the Minnesota Protocol used for archaeological recoveries. Meanwhile, the laboratories 
of the CTI and INMLCF filled with remains awaiting analysis and identification when there was 
no human capacity or infrastructure to store and/or examine the remains. Although in recent 
years forensic agencies have agreed on a set of minimum standards in the search and 
identification of disappeared persons (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses 
2016), the implementation of such guidelines will take time, especially in the regions far from 
capital cities where the SOPs are produced. 
Another complication of the search that Fiscalía did not envision was the hundreds of 
disappeared buried as unidentified bodies in the municipal cemeteries of the country. The lack of 
administrative organization to systematically document the burials of all the dead in the 
cemeteries forced the Fiscalía to begin intervening in some cemeteries, starting in the department 
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of Meta, following the complaints of some victims’ organizations that argued that the cemeteries 
concealed victims of forced disappearance. The claims of families and victims’ organizations 
have proven to be correct since 152 of 830 remains recovered and identified from the municipal 
cemeteries in the Llanos Orientales correspond to victims of forced disappearance, particularly to 
false positives (Corporación Colectivo Sociojurídico Orlando Fals Borda 2016). 
In the analysis of the complexities of searching for the disappeared in Colombia, other 
scholars have already emphasized the lack of systematic governmental efforts to ensure 
continuity and quality in this task; the difficulties of carrying out exhumations in the middle of 
conflict; the lack of forensic experts in forensic institutions and the need of applying scientific 
approaches to support the search of disappeared persons (Gómez and Patiño 2007; Guatame 
García, Puerto Valdivieso, and Buitrago Pérez 2015; Guberek, Guzmán, and Vejarano 2010; 
Sanabria Medina and Osorio 2015). My research took an ethnographic perspective and reflects 
these concerns but also recognizes the expertise acquired in practice by the different forensic 
teams, who not only have learned from technical limitations in the field, but also from the 
management of situations where different interests converge, including those of the relatives, the 
state institutions, the organizations representing family members, and the interests of forensic 
practitioners alike. Put another way, despite the tensions that searching for the disappeared have 
permanently produced between families and victims organizations with the Fiscalía, there is a 
progressive acknowledgement that only by working together will it be possible to locate and 
identify more remains of disappeared persons. The complex history of the relationship between 
families and their representatives and state organizations to search for the disappeared 
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demonstrates the difficult ethical, cultural and political intricacies of forensic intervention in 
contexts of human rights violations (Kovras 2017; Rosenblatt 2015). 
Continuing with post-mortem examinations and efforts to identify the exhumed remains 
my findings indicate that these processes also suffered the consequences of poor or absent 
investigations because most cases did not have contextual information that could help in the 
identification process. However, when biological samples have been available, genetics has 
played an essential role in the positive identification of cases under the framework of the LJP. 
The lack of soft tissues to conduct fingerprint analyses, and the almost complete absence of 
dental antemortem records, has resulted in thousands of cases submitted to the seven genetic 
laboratories available in the entire country. Having no other method for positive identification 
approved by Colombian legislation, genetics has been the essential discipline to restore the name 
to the disappeared.  
On the other hand, the analyses conducted by medical examiners and forensic 
anthropologists to estimate mechanisms of trauma and thus aid in the establishment of 
circumstances of death posed many challenges to forensic practitioners due to the complexity of 
the cases, including those with multiple injuries associated to cause of death. The analysis of 
perimortem trauma implied more training and self- education through the use of different 
scholarly sources and consultation between peers to complete the analysis and the report that 
documented the trauma. Just as it happened with forensic archaeological intervention, the 
empirical approach to case analyses on a daily basis is what granted forensic anthropologists the 
experience acquired and not formal education programs in universities. This situation differs 
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from forensic pathologists, because the National University of Colombia offers a graduate 
program in Forensic Medicine that if not all, most medical examiners must complete to work at 
the INMLCF. 
In this regard, it is important to reflect on the need to establish graduate programs that 
offer training in forensic anthropology and archeology to aid in the search and identification of 
disappeared persons, which will be a decades-long task. It is clear that in these times where 
‘human remains tell stories’ and forensic evidence can be used to prove past criminal events 
(Crossland 2013), the academia in Colombia must seriously consider the need to train forensic 
anthropologists capable of applying methodologies to analyze human remains, and provide them 
with solid education concerning the challenges, advantages and limitations of forensic work in 
conflict or post-conflict settings where the interests of various parties are at stake. 
 The last finding of my work regarding the forensic cycle before the process of return of 
remains was that in the keenness to show results to the government regarding the operation of the 
LJP, exhumations and identifications became the measure of success of the law. This generated 
incorrect impressions about the complexity of searching, exhuming, analyzing and identifying 
human remains, since the National Coordination of Exhumations in Fiscalía, assumed that the 
forensic work meant ‘counting bones.’ This erroneous perception trivialized the hard work of 
forensic experts, did not recognize the technical and methodological difficulties in dealing with 
these cases, and focused on the number of bodies recovered and identified to evaluate the 
efficiency of transitional justice. Today, prospecting activities continue to be perceived as a 
waste of time because they do not generate remains recovered. Furthermore, forensic 
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anthropologists in charge of post-mortem examinations must still meet a goal of completed cases 
per month, thus their professionalism is measured in numbers and statistics and not in the quality 
of their work. Although it is important to give prompt response to the victims regarding the 
identification of their disappeared loved ones, this particular approach of evaluating results 
through the tabulation of bodies must change if forensic agencies do not want to fall in the same 
methodological and technical flaws that they experienced in the framework of Justice and Peace. 
On the other hand, despite the fact that from other international contexts attention has 
been drawn to the participation of the victims as a comprehensive experience that begins with 
their contributions to the search process (Fondebrider 2002), this has not been the case in 
Colombia. Relatives have been more passive than active subjects in the search process. Their 
participation has mostly centered on the phase of returning remains, demanding that these truly 
dignify the memory of their loved ones. However, they have gradually managed to get their 
loved ones to be the focus of the ceremony and not the Fiscalía. Yet, this has been an effort of 
more than a decade, just as happened with their struggle to have the crime of forced 
disappearance included in the national legislation. 
Both family members and victim organizations have struggled so much with bureaucracy 
that today there are multiple protocols for the delivery of human remains, including some that 
propose a differential approach (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones 2016). This 
approach focuses on taking into account the cultural beliefs and practices of indigenous and 
Afro-Colombian communities in the process of return of remains. However, like all protocols, it 
remains a challenge to put them into practice. A future direction of study that would be worth 
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undertaking would be to investigate the needs of minorities in forensic intervention; not just 
including the aforementioned ethnic groups, but also taking into account the opinion of Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, Transgender/Transsexual and Intersexed (LGTBI) populations and women, since 
in the phenomenon of forced disappearance, it was mainly the women who were left without 
their husbands, fathers, sons and brothers. Perhaps these populations have specific rituals, beliefs 
or practices that they would like to see implemented in the search, the delivery or the burial of 
disappeared loved ones. Carrying out an assessment of their needs with an anthropological 
approach could inform public policies designed to respond to particular necessities of minority 
populations. 
The second question of my research inquired if families’ perceptions of truth, justice and 
reparation had been fulfilled by forensic networks. Most of my fieldwork with families took 
place in the Meta region, and although my intention was not to generalize about the expectations 
of families of all the forcibly disappeared in the country, it would have been much more 
informative to have families from other regions contribute with their opinions and experiences to 
contrast the results obtained in Meta. Another limitation of my study is that due to logistics 
issues I did not have the opportunity to attend ceremonies of return of remains to witness directly 
the dynamics of such activities. That experience would have enriched the ethnography and would 
have better informed the concept of ‘dignified returns.’ Nevertheless, my findings from this 
second portion of my research suggest that recovering the remains and burying them according 
to personal beliefs is one of the positive aspects of forensic intervention according to relatives 
and the organizations that represent them. Nonetheless, notions of truth, justice and reparation go 
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beyond the technical and scientific exercise of recovering the dead and delivering them to 
families.  
In this research, I proposed a typology of truth that emerges in the efforts to address past 
abuses. That is, an official truth, a judicial truth, a forensic truth, the victims’ truth and a social 
truth. In the case of the LJP, the judicial truth offered by the paramilitaries was the truth that 
came to light in the context of the negotiation with the government. Such truth explained and 
almost justified the massacres, disappearances and selective killings as a result of the interest of 
eliminating the guerrillas and their collaborators, but was not verified by the Fiscalía. Moreover, 
the requirements to investigate state agents involved in the crimes have been archived in the files 
of the civilian justice system, but those investigations have not progressed (Verdad Abierta 
2015b). For the families, the fact that the paramilitaries did not meet the requirement of telling 
the truth including whom from the state networks they collaborated with leaves many gaps and 
disappointment in regards to their right to the truth.  
On the other hand, the forensic findings did not help to reveal responsibilities either. One 
of the great problems with forensic intervention in terms of the use of the evidence is that unlike 
other contexts where the findings have served to demonstrate the existence of mass atrocities, in 
Colombia the thousands of reports resulting from forensic analysis were not used to corroborate 
the confession of the postulado. While it was clear that this was a transitional justice process, the 
law required a corroboration of the facts by the Fiscalía, yet the forensic evidence only served to 
unveil a series of modus operandi of the perpetrators and perhaps tell the country that forensic 
anthropologists existed and that their job was important in the search for the disappeared. 
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Nonetheless, no complete investigations were undertaken where the forensic evidence was 
compared with contextual information that would account for the responsibility in the crimes. 
The exceptional cases where forensic evidence has been used to establish responsibilities beyond 
the paramilitaries have been those cases legally advised by organizations such as the CCJ and the 
Corporación Colectivo Sociojurídico Orlando Fals Borda where the Fiscalía has to share the 
forensic findings with the lawyers so they can investigate and establish lawsuits. Furthermore, I 
argue that the unmethodical recoveries conducted the first years of forensic intervention, served 
the state to use science as a performance to distract from impunity instead of using forensic 
evidence to investigate the disappearances and the state agents implied in such crime. 
This finding has implications that make me question the nature of the interest of having 
forensic sciences intervene within the framework of Justice and Peace at all. It seemed that 
identifications were the primary objective of forensic intervention. Yet, the state was very 
ambitious in trying to identify all human remains without the human capacity and infrastructure 
to achieve such endeavor. In addition, it seemed that establishing the circumstances of the 
disappearance and death of the victims was never truly relevant. The forensic scientists made the 
respective analyses concerning circumstances of death (even when many exhumations were not 
properly conducted) but these were not integrated into a deeper investigative exercise to explain 
how the crimes occurred and who was responsible for them. For many families, including those 
associated with ASFADDES, the recovery and socialization of a forensic truth emerging from 
various contexts of violence would have been key for a twofold process: 1. To respond to 
demands of accountability and thus to families’ perceptions of justice and 2. To explain how the 
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destruction of bodies and their concealment became a systematic practice and the epicenter of 
violence and conquest of the territory (Nieto 2015). Such a narrative is still pending to be told by 
the forensic sciences. 
 In short, the issue of truth cannot and should not be relativized. The LJP promised truth 
to the victims and they do not feel that this right has been fulfilled. In addition, in order to build 
historical memory, which is very important to many families, different truths have to be 
incorporated into the narrative of the various memories, including the truths of the victims that 
were not taken into account in the judicial process and that have only been revealed from 
academic research.  
Symbolic reparations are another macro category that can have several meanings for 
families. To some, “symbolic reparations may sound like a lame response to catastrophe, a magic 
show to replace real responsibility with abstractions that cannot feed or clothe or house or 
educate distressed and displaced victims of war” (Sommer 2015, 402-403). While this may be 
true, recovering the remains of loved ones is actually seen as a form of symbolic repair, one that 
ends the uncertainty of not knowing the whereabouts of the disappeared. And, although it does 
not replace the demands for truth and accountability, when the relatives become actively 
involved in the forensic process due to the demands of victim organizations to the Fiscalía, the 
reparation arrives in multiple ways and in a systematic manner. This happens because victims’ 
associations and local communities have built foundations based on the recognition of their own 
rights and exercises of collective memory where they recognize each other more than as victims, 
as survivors of forced disappearance. Furthermore, because families have access to forensic 
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findings from the Fiscalía and the family organizations, they interpret those findings and create 
narratives surrounding them that are later put at the service of historic memory initiatives. 
However, those ties in the communities are not woven in one day. The community that I 
met in Medellin del Ariari, where many families had at least one family member disappeared, 
had made use of legal and psychosocial accompaniment, an empowerment tool to demand that in 
the ceremonies of remains return, the dead were the center of the ceremony and their religious 
beliefs were respected. Also, many families have come together and traveled to different parts of 
Meta to socialize their stories. For many women, mothers of the disappeared, telling their story 
through artistic works, photography galleries and other community projects has been a way to re-
signify life. As indicated above, neither the forensic networks, including the Fiscalía, nor other 
governmental institutions have the capacity to respond with symbolic repair that also fosters their 
collective memory. However, the state could economically support those organizations and local 
communities to recognize that they themselves have the knowledge and experience to design and 
implement reparation and memory initiatives. In this regard, some research worth exploring 
through an ethnographic approach would be an evaluation of the impacts of other initiatives of 
symbolic reparation designed and employed by victims and grassroots communities affected by 
forced disappearance in other regions of the country. Furthermore, to examine if it would be 
worth it to bring those initiatives to many families in the country who have never had any sort of 
legal or psychosocial advise. 
To finish, I would like to refer to two important points that are worth some discussion. 
The first is that the assumptions of truth, justice and reparation by the government through the 
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use of forensic intervention were very ambitious from the beginning. Not only the state aspired 
to find thousands of human remains only through the confession of the postulados, but it also 
assumed that the delivery of the remains to their families would close the grieving process and 
repair the social fabric broken by the multiple horrors of the paramilitary activity. In this respect, 
as Duthie (2010) points out, these expectations go beyond transitional justice. The design of 
transitional justice mechanisms should have more modest and realistic goals. Second, the goals 
of truth, justice and reparation are more difficult to fulfill in a country like Colombia where 
transitional justice tools are being used while in the middle of conflict. Put in different terms, 
Colombia is experiencing a partial transition at best (Uprimny and Saffon 2011). However, the 
existence of multiple illegal armed groups and drug traffickers in combination with the absence 
of the state in many regions complicates the fulfillment of such goals, not to mention the 
aspirations of peace and reconciliation that the Colombian government also proliferates. Thus, 
the use and the scope of transitional justice can be very limited. As explained in this research, in 
the eagerness to demobilize the paramilitary groups, the government almost completely ignored 
the rights of the victims, thus perpetuating impunity (Delgado Barón 2011).  
Lastly, I would like to emphasize that in forensic intervention as an initiative for social 
reparation, there is no technoscience or forensic institution that can stop the perpetration of 
forced disappearance when the structural conditions that allow this crime remain unchanged. If 
there is no serious investigation where the state accounts for its participation in the crime of 
forced disappearance and state crimes overall; and tells the truth to Colombian society, forensic 
knowledge, techniques and advances in technology will not be of any help because by 
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themselves, they cannot offer guarantees of non-repetition. 
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QUESTIONS TO FAMILIES 
 
1. I understand that you have one or more stories of forced disappearance in your family. 
Could you please elaborate on those stories? 
2. What has the state done to date to give you an answer regarding your family member?  
3. Do you know that as a victim you have rights? 
4. Do you know what those rights are? 
5. What are your personal needs, demands and expectations in this process (LJP)? 
6. Do you think other families share the same demands? 
7. What is justice for you? Do you think there has been justice so far? 
8. Is/Are the perpetrator(s) responsible for the disappearance of your loved one in prison 
under the LJP? 
9. Have you had the opportunity to go to the hearing of confessions? If yes, have you had 
the opportunity of asking the perpetrators questions about your family member(s) 
disappeared? 
10. What do you think abut those confessions? Do you think former combatants are telling 
the truth about their crimes? 
11. What does the location, exhumation and identification of your disappeared family 
member mean to you? 
12. What does getting the remains back mean to you? 
13. Do you feel that you have been included (or given a place) in the forensic process? What 
questions did you have or you might still have that the forensic process could answer or 
answered already? 
14. What is your opinion regarding the time that Fiscalía and the Institute of Legal Medicine 
take for identification tasks? 
15. Do you think the armed conflict changed with the paramilitary demobilization? Do you 
want the armed conflict to be over?  
16. Do you support the peace process between guerrillas FARC and the government? What is 
your personal opinion about this peace process?  
17. What do you expect from that process? How would you like to benefit from that process? 
18. What does truth, justice, reparation and reconciliation mean to you?  
19. There is no reparation without justice? 
 
QUESTIONS TO THE OMBUDSMAN, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICE, 
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICIA Y PAZ  
 
1. I understand that you have one or more stories of forced disappearance in your family. 
Could you please elaborate on those stories? What is you specific role in the Justice and 
Peace Process? 
2. What do you think are some of the achievements of the law 1. in general and 2. in 
particular with regards to the article 10, specifically with the obligation of the 
perpetrators to reveal the whereabouts of the disappeared? 
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3. Do confessions by paramilitaries occur in specific ways? i.e.,  do you think former 
combatants are forced to tell the truth of their crimes in particular ways? If the answer is 
yes, how do you think this affects the process? 
4. Do you think throughout these 10 years former combatants have told the truth regarding 
their crimes? What about the crime of force disappearance? If your answer is no, please 
explain why. 
5. Could you please elaborate on your perception about the process of transitional justice so 
far? What are some of the major limitations or errors and the major achievements of this 
law? What needs to be improved or changed? 
6. How is the role of Fiscalía perceived by your agency in this process of Transitional 
Justice? How do you perceive it? 
7. What do you think should be done in justice terms to make perpetrators tell complete 
truths? Given the new peace process with FARC, how should the government assure that 
perpetrators would reveal the truth of their crimes? 
8. In your own experience with victims, what do you consider is their major demand in the 
process of transitional justice? And, has the government responded to those demands? 
9. What does truth, justice, reparation and reconciliation mean to you from your 
professional point of view?  
10. What do you think these notions mean to families? 
 
QUESTIONS TO PROSECUTORS (FISCALIA) OF EXHUMATION ACTIVITIES 
 
1. What has been the plan that you have followed to locate and exhume victims of forced 
disappearance?  
2. Does this plan go according to the National Missing Persons Search Plan promoted by 
Law 589 of 2000? If not, do you have a plan? 
3. Once you receive information from a confession or a legal complaint by the family or 
NGO how do you proceed? 
4. What has changed in the process of searching for the disappeared since 2005 to the 
present? 
5. Is Fiscalía promoting the participation of the families in the process of location and 
identification of their disappeared? 
6. What are those positive aspects that you consider have been achieved in the process of 
searching, locating and identifying the disappeared? 
7. What are the limitations, drawbacks and mistakes that have been made in the process? 
8. How does Fiscalía see the involvement of different NGOs and Victims’ associations in 
this process? 
9. What is your personal involvement in this process? How committed you feel to the task 
of searching for the disappeared? 
10. What does truth, justice, reparation and reconciliation mean to you from your 
professional point of view?  
11. What do you think these notions mean to families? 
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QUESTIONS TO VICTIMS’ ASSOCIATIONS & NGO’s 
 
1. What is the role of your organization? 
2. What do you think about the Law of Justice and Peace? How does this law affect 
positively or negatively the families of the disappeared? 
3. Do you think that forensic intervention as a mechanism of TJ has been effective in the 
location and identification of victims? 
4. Does your opinion (questions 2 & 3) differ from the perception that your organization has 
about the law? 
5. Are confessions given by paramilitaries reflecting a complete truth with respect to the 
numbers of disappeared and their locations? Why? 
6. Does Fiscalía have a plan to search for the disappeared? Do they follow the National 
Missing Persons Search Plan promoted by Law 589 of 2000? 
7. What do you think about the job of Fiscalía in the search and location of victims? What 
are some positive and negative aspects about these tasks? 
8. What are the opinions of victims regarding the time that Fiscalía and the Institute of 
Legal Medicine take for identification tasks? 
9. What do you think are the needs of the families you represent? 
10. What is the relationship like between victims’ associations and Fiscalía? Is there 
collaboration between the two? 
11. How important are exhumations and identifications for the victims you represent? Why? 
12. How many cases are you representing so far and what has been the outcome of those 
cases? 
13. What is your personal involvement in this process? How committed you feel to the task 
of searching for the disappeared? 
14. What does truth, justice, reparation and reconciliation mean to you from your 
professional point of view?  
15. What do you think these notions mean to families? 
 
 
QUESTIONS TO FORENSIC ANTHROPOLOGISTS IN CHARGE OF EXHUMATIONS  
 
1. What is the plan that you follow to conduct an exhumation? 
2. Does this plan go according to the National Missing Persons Search Plan promoted by 
Law 589 of 2000? 
3. Do you follow any protocol when doing an exhumation? If you don’t, how do you 
proceed? 
4. What has changed in the process of searching for the disappeared from 2005 to the 
present? 
5. Is Fiscalía promoting the participation of the families in the process of location and 
identification of their disappeared? 
6. In general, what do you think about the job of Fiscalía in the search and location of 
victims? What are some positive and negative aspects about the job done so far? 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	   	  	  
211 
7. Do you feel that you were unprepared to assume the task of exhumations when you got 
this job? What have been some of the major mistakes that you or your peers have made 
when conducting exhumations? 
8. Do you conduct lab analyses? Do you feel that you were unprepared to assume the task of 
lab analyses when you got this job? What have been some of the major mistakes that you 
or your peers have made conducting lab analyses? 
9. Is forensic casework monitored to minimize errors? 
10. What is your personal involvement in this process? How committed you feel to the task 
of searching for the disappeared? 
11. What is your perception about the work done so far to locate and identify the 
disappeared?  
12. In your experience working with families, what do you think they demand from the 
process of TJ? 
13. Do you participate in “entregas” (meetings to return remains)? Do you like to participate 
in those? If not, why? What aspects from entregas do you highlight? What needs 
improvement? 
14. How could the forensic work by Fiscalía be improved? 
15. What does truth, justice, reparation and reconciliation mean to you from your 
professional point of view?  
16. What do you think these notions mean to families? 
 
 
QUESTIONS TO FORENSIC ANTHROPOLOGISTS, MEDICAL EXAMINERS, 
ODONTOLOGISTS AND GENETICISTS AT INMLCF, FISCALIA AND THE DIJIN 
 
1. What are some of the major difficulties you have encountered in the process of analyzing 
‘justice and peace’ cases? E.g., lack of background information of the cases, lack of good 
fieldwork information, lack of AM data, etc.  
2. Has anything changed in the way cases are approached? Do you still work in 
interdisciplinary teams? 
3. Do you follow Standard Operation Procedures? What protocols do you follow? 
4. What are the factors affecting the possibility of achieving identification? (e.g., the 
different taphonomic processes that affect the preservation of human remains, the large 
number of cases to be analyzed and the few personnel to do this task, the non-application 
of scientific standards in exhumation and/or analysis activities (if that is the case) etc. 
5. Is there a number of cases “to do” per week/ month/ etc? how does this relate to INMLCF 
or Fiscalía perceiving the problem of the disappeared as a mere statistic? 
6. Do you feel that you were unprepared to assume the task of lab analyses when you got 
this job/task? What have been some of the major drawbacks that you have experienced 
when conducting analyses? 
7. Is forensic casework monitored to minimize errors? 
8. Is there any kind of certification promoted by your agency? How do you keep yourself 
updated in scientific methods, etc.? 
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9. What is your perception about the work done so far to locate and identify the 
disappeared? 
10. Have you or your peers received any complaints from families regarding the time that 
your agency takes to identify and return the remains? 
11. Is there fluid inter-institutional communication regarding the way cases are approached 
and analyzed? How’s the use of software shared between the different agencies? 
17. Do you participate in “entregas” (meetings to return remains)? Do you like to participate 
in those? If not, why? What aspects from entregas do you highlight? What needs 
improvement? 
12. In your opinion, what are some positive bearings that you could think of the analysis of 
justice and peace cases? 
13. What does truth, justice, reparation and reconciliation mean to you from your 
professional point of view?  
14. What do you think these notions mean to families? 
15. What are some of the major difficulties you have encountered in the process of 
autopsying ‘justice and peace’ cases? (to medical examiners specifically) 
16. Do you feel that you had the necessary preparation to conduct autopsies on skeletonized 
and decomposed cadavers? If you had not, how have you overcome this situation? (to 
medical examiners specifically). 
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